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Taking off from some the more recent discussions regarding the puzzling character of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, this dissertation aims at four 
main points, mostly negative ones, all closely related when considered from a 
Wittgensteinian angle: an exegetical, a metaphilosophical, a linguistic, and an ethical 
point.  
[1] Serving as a background illuminating the remaining three, the exegetical point 
is concerned with the particular modes of philosophical criticism Wittgenstein’s works 
ask for, favouring the idea that it is impossible to expound them as something finished, 
and so than even the Tractatus shall prove more profitable when taken as a collection of 
remarks, not as a system. [2] Arguably as pivotal, the metaphilosophical point expounds 
a non-metaphysical view of philosophy, aware of its own mutable, given its contiguity 
with all our other activities, and practical character: philosophy, we hold, following 
Wittgenstein, is the art of (dis)solving intellectual puzzles, a contribution to 
understanding, not to knowledge. [3] The linguistic point is somewhat made manifest by 
the former: the ways of doing philosophy here adopted, relying as much on hinting (often 
through the deliberate employment of figurative modes of expression or even nonsense) 
as on argument, end up indirectly drawing attention to the untenability of the idea that 
language might be a somewhat self-sufficient and clearly defined structure, asking for 
definitive explanations of its workings. [4] As for the ethical point, a complaint against 
prevailing contemporary approaches to ethics and aesthetics, and alongside the more or 
less subtle hints already provided by the other three, silence has been the chosen method 
to intimate it.  
Though mostly focused on the Tractatus, the present dissertation, tendentially 
favourable to the spirit of the “New Wittgenstein”, is meant to serve as a kind of window, 
even if a tiny one, to the Philosophical Investigations as well. 
 








Partindo de algumas das mais recentes discussões em torno do carácter enigmático do 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Ludwig Wittgenstein, esta dissertação procura 
desenvolver quatro pontos principais (exegético, metafilosófico, linguístico e ético), 
maioritariamente negativos, e de estreita relação entre si quando considerados de um 
ponto de vista wittgensteiniano.  
[1] Funcionando como uma espécie de pano de fundo elucidativo dos restantes três, 
o ponto exegético visa as formas de crítica filosófica requeridas pela obra de Wittgenstein, 
privilegiando a ideia de que é impossível tratá-la como algo acabado, pelo que até o 
Tractatus se poderá revelar mais proveitoso quando tomado como um conjunto de 
observações, não como um sistema. [2] Não menos central, o ponto metafilosófico 
desenvolve uma visão não metafísica da filosofia, consciente da sua própria natureza 
mutável, dada a sua contiguidade com todas as nossas restantes actividades, e 
essencialmente prática: a filosofia, defendemos, na senda de Wittgenstein, é a arte de 
resolver (ou antes dissolver) enigmas do pensamento, uma contribuição para a 
compreensão, não para o conhecimento. [3] O ponto linguístico é de certa maneira 
tornado manifesto pelo anterior: recorrendo tanto a estratégias sugestivas (entre as quais 
o emprego deliberado de enunciados figurados ou até absurdos) como a argumentos, o 
modo de fazer filosofia aqui adoptado acaba por chamar indirectamente a atenção para a 
insustentabilidade da ideia de que a linguagem se trata de uma estrutura claramente 
definida e em larga medida auto-suficiente, cujo funcionamento seria passível de 
explicações definitivas. [4] Quanto ao ponto ético, uma queixa contra as abordagens à 
ética e à estética de maior prevalência nos nossos dias, e a par das pistas mais ou menos 
subtis já fornecidas pelos outros três pontos, optou-se pelo silêncio como forma de o 
insinuar.  
Embora centrada sobretudo no Tractatus, a presente dissertação, tendencialmente 
favorável ao “Novo Wittgenstein”, procura também funcionar como uma espécie de 
janela, ainda que estreita, para as Investigações Filosóficas. 
 










How well he’s read, to reason against reading! 
 
DUMAINE 
Proceeded well, to stop all good proceeding! 
 
LONGAVILLE 
He weeds the corn, and still lets grow the weeding. 
 
BEROWNE 
The spring is near, when green geese are a-breed-ing. 
 
DUMAINE 
How follows that? 
 
BEROWNE 
Fit in his place and time. 
 
DUMAINE 
In reason nothing. 
 
BEROWNE 
Something, then, in rime. 
 















The Tractatus as it struck me 
 
 
This dissertation owes a lot to the recent exegetical discussions concerning Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In fact, it has in several ways been shaped by them. 
However, and though it still engages with such discussions, its main purpose does not 
stop there. Rather, it is intended to explore a few issues into which these debates – which 
Wittgenstein himself would have regarded as intensely academic ones – have somehow 
managed to enlighten: among others, the nature of language, in particular that of sense 
and nonsense, the nature of ethics, and, perhaps above all, the very nature of philosophy. 
A further issue, about which little or nothing has been said within discussions of the 
Tractatus, has caught my attention along the way and will be crucial here too: the nature 
of the interpretation of a philosophical text. I shall thus aim at four main interdependent 
points: (1) an exegetical, (2) a metaphilosophical, (3) a linguistic, and (4) an ethical point. 
Each will be approached in considerably different ways, and with different degrees of 
explicitness. 
The development of the exegetical point serves, so to speak, as the background 
against which everything else takes place. I begin by rejecting the idea that a correct 
exegesis of a text should coincide on all occasions with its author’s intentions. If the 
intentions are realistic and the author manages to convey them just well enough, then we 
can unproblematically say that they virtually correspond to what the text means. If not, 
however, what the text means may be quite different from what its author had intended. 
So far, most exegetical work done on the Tractatus – in fact, most work done in so-called 
history of philosophy – has been informed by the presupposition I shall be dissenting 
from. Philosophers, Wittgenstein included, have thus often been treated as Humpty 
Dumpty-like characters, not quite as ordinary speakers like everybody else. As I see it, 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, mostly done in what Cora Diamond has called a realistic 
spirit1, a though minded, non-metaphysical (not anti-metaphysical) approach to 
                                                          
1 The notion of being realistic in philosophy, not to be confused with that of realism in its traditional 
philosophical sense, is best clarified if we are to look outside of philosophical jargon, i.e. among our 
everyday discourse: for instance, realism in this ordinary sense is what we have in mind when saying ‘Be 
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philosophical thought, concerned with the character of philosophy itself, calls for modes 
of criticism other than the more standard ones. Considering that the Tractatus still 
displays certain unrealistic features which Wittgenstein would later go on to recognize as 
so and hence discard, reading it in a realistic spirit will often require us to distinguish 
between what it really means from what Wittgenstein had then meant.  
Following – and expanding – a suggestion once made by Ryle, I shall take the book 
as consisting of a series of six main intertwined stories: an ontological, a picturing, a 
propositional, a metalogical, a metaphilosophical, and an ethical story. The first three are 
among what counts as unrealistic and on closer inspection shall be revealed as chimeras. 
As for the remaining ones, their value becomes evident once they are freed from the 
former, i.e. once we cease to look at them through the distorting glasses – an ideal 
language – we thought we had been provided at some point. And when we manage to 
take the glasses off, the initial systematic appearance of the Tractatus vanishes, as we are 
then left with a collection of remarks, nevertheless concerned with the nature of language 
and thought, of logic and philosophy, or of ethics. The first is illuminated through a 
procedure in a way comparable to negative theology: by having wore the glasses and been 
deceived by them for a while, our minds shall be made clearer about a variety of things 
which language is not, notably a self-sufficient and rigorously accountable structure, 
which in their turn may very well end up reminding us of what language might be – as 
competent linguistic users ourselves, it would have been rather odd if we had been at all 
missing something essential about it. As for the remaining, it is above all emphasized that 
they do not consist of any particular bodies of knowledge. Instead, we are reminded that 
logic and ethics penetrate all thought, talk and action, and that philosophy is, as we shall 
describe it, following Wittgenstein, an elucidatory activity.  
The majority of our discussion will focus on showing why the ontological, picturing 
and propositional stories are chimeras and then on exploring the surviving remarks from 
the metaphilosophical story. The metalogical and ethical ones will only be marginally 
alluded to, which is to say that this is far from an exhaustive or even wide-ranging account 
of the Tractatus. Nevertheless, even if the latter were to be considered in detail too, the 
recognition of its non-systematic character entails that, just as is the case of a self-
acknowledged collection “of sketches of landscapes” (Wittgenstein 2009, 3) such as the 
                                                          
realistic’ to someone who e.g. shows enthusiasm for some unreasonable plan or desire, or when referring 
to realistic fiction, i.e. (non-fantastic) fiction where things take place somewhat as they do in real life. See 
Diamond’s “Realism and the Realistic Spirit” (1991). This notion of realism – elementary realism, as we 
may call it – is thus closely connected with that of reasonableness, if not equivalent. 
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Philosophical Investigations, it is ultimately impossible to expound the Tractatus as a 
finished thing. Given the unrealistic features of Wittgenstein’s initial plan, all we can do 
is to abandon it, though at the same time recovering a variety of its sketches, the remarks, 
each valuable on its own, independently of the whole chimerical enterprise they had at 
first been meant to be part of. A further pitfall of the aforementioned exegetical debates 
has hence rested upon the idea of there being such a thing as the correct reading of the 
Tractatus.  
Far from ignoring Wittgenstein’s earlier intentions (as we shall see, considering 
these is nonetheless a key part of the interpretative process, notably for us to understand 
why they cannot quite be matched all the way through), our reading seeks for an 
understanding of the Tractatus which renders it as philosophically viable as possible. For 
that purpose I have drawn from the work of both so-called standard and resolute readers, 
from Anscombe to Diamond, from Ryle to James Conant or Oskari Kuusela, among a 
few others which I believe to bring something valuable to the discussion. 
So, apart from attempting to follow Ryle’s advice of not being too desirous of taking 
sides in philosophy – as he put it, “[t]o be a ‘so-and-so-ist’ is to be philosophically frail” 
(Ryle 2009, 161) – and of not being proud of doing so when that is the case, the approach 
I advocate partly resonates with what Saul Kripke once remarked about his much debated 
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: “the present paper should be thought of as 
expounding neither ‘Wittgenstein’s’ argument nor ‘Kripke’s’: rather Wittgenstein’s 
argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him” (Kripke 1982, 5; my 
emphasis). Kripkensteinian quarrels aside, what I shall here attempt is thus to present the 
Tractatus (or an important part of it) as it struck me, as I have grappled with it and see 
what looked like its main structure dissolve, and as I then tried to get hold of what I 
thought to be left afterwards, i.e. of what seemed to me to be its actual philosophical 
achievements. Above all I have tried to do some justice to the sort of wish expressed by 
Wittgenstein in the Investigations’ preface (as, despite some misunderstandings of 
“Wittgenstein’s argument”, Kripke certainly did) when he wrote: “I should not like my 
writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if possible, to stimulate someone 
to thoughts of his own” (Wittgenstein 2009, 4). And we should also not forget that already 
about the Tractatus Wittgenstein had forewarned that it was not a textbook. 
This brings us to the metaphilosophical point: throughout his entire work, 
Wittgenstein’s purpose in doing philosophy was never that of teaching us things that we 
did not know, but rather to remind us of our harmless ignorance in cases we thought we 
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knew when in fact we did not, or to sharpen our awareness of everything we already 
knew, even if only tacitly. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, philosophy is thus not 
a contribution to our knowledge, but to our understanding: it is meant to bring light to 
where there had been darkness before, to render clear what was previously in a muddle, 
to make explicit what we were just tacitly aware of, not to discover any new empirical 
facts about the world, hence its contrast with the natural sciences. Also, while the latter 
aim at generality, at necessary features of reality not always laying open to view, 
philosophical elucidation will tend to seek for particularities, for subtle comparisons and 
distinctions which, more or less imaginatively, may help drawing attention to the given 
issue. In this sense, philosophy is more akin to e.g. art criticism than to science. It is also 
more akin to, say, music or tennis, or painting or chess (or even logic or mathematics), as 
its success has much more to do with practical proficiency, especially at (dis)solving 
puzzles, than with theoretical accuracy. 
Moreover, it has to be stressed that in Wittgenstein’s case his methods, views, and 
often stylistic options too, are virtually inseparable. To try to paraphrase his writings and 
present them in a systematic way – as so many have done, usually falling short – is already 
to distort them in a way or another. It is thus my conviction that the best way to do justice 
to his philosophy when expounding it is to do it while remaining as faithful as possible to 
his own methods, i.e. instead of compiling a list of topics and arguments and declaring 
‘Wittgenstein said such-and-such’, to let the reader himself engage into the interpretative 
activity, side by side with the one writing. I hence offer no apologies for some of the 
methodological options here followed and which may strike some as loose or obscuring2: 
for sure, there will be argument, but there will often be more hinting than argument and 
many of the issues left partially unexplored. My method can thus be said to be a half-
argumentative one and, as I said, springs from the very nature of the subject at hand. 
Straightforward argument would have perhaps been preferable on other occasions, not 
this one. What is essential, though, and this is another important part of the point, is that 
one pays deliberate attention to his own methods and subjects. By developing the 
exegetical point through both arguments and hints I shall already be very much 
demonstrating the metaphilosophical one, more explicitly formulated later on. 
In its turn, the linguistic point, also negative, which is in fact a more general point 
about human behaviour broadly considered, will be above all hinted at through the very 
nature of the methods employed here, in particular by the oscillations between sense and 
                                                          
2 Nonetheless, and for clarity’s sake, an analytical table of contents has been included at the end. 
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nonsense. It runs somewhat as follows (and this is by far its most explicit formulation to 
be found throughout these pages): if language is to be taken as a clearly defined and self-
sufficient structure, accountable on strictly logical grounds, which all language users 
share, not only utterances which fail to make sense but virtually all figurative modes of 
expression would have to be exempted from it and considered alongside forms of non-
verbal behaviour; however, as we observe what goes on all the time in our daily 
exchanges, it shall be clear that all sorts of figures of speech – and even nonsense – play 
their part in communication, not to mention overtly non-linguistic factors such as tones 
of voice, facial expressions, or bodily reactions, and so that it is impossible to treat 
language separately from all these; hence, as we realize that what we share is rather a 
variety of intertwined activities, habits and institutions, both linguistic and non-linguistic, 
our initial idea of language goes by the board, and with it maybe the temptation to seek 
for anything like definitive explanations of how language works, too. This point’s role 
here is subsidiary to that of the metaphilosophical one, serving as an example of the sort 
of outcomes, quite distinct from those of scientific enquiry, philosophy is supposed to 
achieve when done this way. 
As for the ethical point, and though I could have here included a discussion of the 
ethical story, as well as of its clear-cut restatement on occasion of the “extremely 
‘Tractatussy’” (Anscombe 2011, 177) 1929 Lecture on Ethics, a lecture about the very 
impossibility of there being lectures on ethics – i.e. about absolute value, what is really 
important, the meaning of life, etc. – I have decided, perhaps being even more 
Wittgensteinian than Wittgenstein had been back then, to remain (almost) silent about it 
all the way through. This option alone shall, however, show something about how I regard 
ethics, and in particular about how I regard much of the arguments exchanged between 
contemporary moral philosophers (or philosophers of art). For sure, there is a lot to be 
said about a variety of issues closely related to ethics, namely human life, mind, and 
action, but maybe not so much about ethics. 
A final remark. Though focusing mostly on the Tractatus, this text could in a way 
be seen as consisting of a sort preamble, no matter how incomplete, to the study of the 
Investigations. Diamond or Conant have often been accused of reading too much of later 
Wittgenstein into the Tractatus. I agree that they do so but what has been taken by their 
detractors as an exegetically suspicious move has in fact worked out as a most welcome 
contribution to the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s works: by looking at the Tractatus 
from the point of view of the Investigations, not only have they exposed the impossibility 
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of understanding the former when read in a standard way, but, and perhaps even more 
importantly, have shed new light onto the latter as well. This is to say that if one is to look 
at the Tractatus in the way I suggest he may very well find himself in a better position to 
make sense of the Investigations. He shall, for instance, take Wittgenstein’s 
metaphilosophical remarks seriously and not be too tempted to find there theses as robust 
as e.g. a use theory of meaning, radical conventionalism or a behaviourist view of 
sensation language. He shall also be less tempted to look at its opening, the so-called 
Augustinian picture – a humdrum description of a particular situation of instruction (a 
leitmotiv running throughout the entire text) – as itself representing a certain conception 
of language standing in need of criticism and replacement. But, and though I am largely 
favourable to those writing in the spirit of the “New Wittgenstein”3, neither is this a 
‘therapeutic’ reading, i.e. one denying that Wittgenstein did put forward any theses 
whatsoever, even if only implicitly.  
This, I think, is the key question his readers should be asking today: if neither a 
system builder nor practicing a form of therapy, what is it, then, that Wittgenstein was 
doing or trying to do? And, analogously, this is what philosophers of the present time 
ought to ask themselves: if neither science nor poetry, what is it, then, that we are doing 
or trying to do? I suggest that an answer to the first question may very well help us find 
an answer to the second. Having tried to remain faithful to Wittgenstein’s methods, and 
though having made various suggestions, some stronger than others, I have not managed 
to provide anything that should be taken as a decisive answer. I have, however, pointed 










                                                          
3 See Crary & Read (2000). 
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Wittgenstein’s Tractatus deranged  





§ 1. I shall begin by glancing at a few issues involved in the controversy that has 
dominated Wittgensteinian research for the last couple of decades, now often referred to 
as “the Tractatus Wars” (Lavery & Read 2011, 1), which has its origins in the gradual 
emergence of what we could call unorthodox readings of the Tractatus, i.e. readings 
dissenting from the more usual ways of approaching it. Among its various contours it has 
been especially concerned with how to deal with what seems to be the book’s central 
puzzle: the fact that it at least appears to put forward a series of metaphysical claims4 
while at the same time discarding them as nonsense and declaring (meaningful) 
metaphysics to be an impossible affair. Though differing in various respects between 
them, unorthodox readers have tended to share a general impression that the more 
orthodox ones have so far, in a way or another, failed to take such puzzle seriously 
enough. And it is indeed extraordinary that, despite such apparent inconsistency, some of 
the latter have so quickly taken the Tractatus as a cogent and, though maybe flawed here 
and there, valid philosophical system. 
For a long time, the most widely accepted attempts to ‘solve’ the puzzle have 
somewhat agreed on ascribing to the early Wittgenstein the rather peculiar idea that, 
though all metaphysical discourse – and thus his own in the Tractatus – is nonsense 
(which is itself a metaphysical claim), there are at least two fundamentally distinct kinds 
of metaphysical discourse: (1) the more abundant one throughout the history of 
philosophy, ultimately amounting to, as Hume or the logical empiricists of the Vienna 
Circle would have put it, nothing but sophistry and illusion, and (2) one of a much rarer 
sort, which vainly tries to speak of metaphysical truths that cannot be said but which are 
shown, i.e. displayed inter alia through the forms of what can be said. On this view, the 
statements of the Tractatus are supposed to be of the second kind: they are nonsense 
                                                          
4 By ‘metaphysical claims’ I mean general unempirical claims about the alleged essential nature – or 
structure – of things. 
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because they try to state ineffable truths (about the alleged essence of logic, language, 
thought and reality), including the ones that purport all metaphysical statements to be 
nonsense, and while, of course, failing to do so, still somehow manage to convey them. 
That this account possibly matches the early Wittgenstein’s intentions is far from being 
out of question and there is indeed some persuasive evidence supporting it, though 
perhaps not as conclusive as some might claim. However, if what one is looking for while 
reading the Tractatus is not only a faithful determination of authorial intentions but, and 
above all, philosophical viability, I cannot see how it could be satisfactory.  
It is thus not surprising that the more careful ‘orthodox’ readers, from Elizabeth 
Anscombe to Peter Hacker, have had no problem in recognizing the untenability of such 
position: that the Tractatus as a whole is irreparably defective – “like a clock that did not 
tell the right time” (Anscombe 1971, 78) and could not be fixed – and that Wittgenstein 
himself would later go on to acknowledge so and thus reject many of its central tenets, is 
not a matter of much doubt for them. This is perhaps the point where the approach of 
some of the more unorthodox ones, notably the so-called resolute readers (now numerous 
enough to form a sort of alternative orthodoxy among Wittgensteinian scholars), most 
diverges from that of the former, as they seek to read the Tractatus in a way that tries to 
save it from collapsing into incoherence.  
This resolute approach (a particular stream – or array of streams – among Tractarian 
unorthodoxy, not the only one) should be understood as a reasonably flexible program 
for reading the book, one that should not force us into one particular reading, as two of 
its leading proponents, Cora Diamond and James Conant, have maintained. In fact, they 
suggest that the acceptance of the following assumptions should be sufficient for a reading 
to be labelled ‘resolute’: (1) the self-proclaimed nonsensical sentences of the Tractatus 
do not convey ineffable truths, no matter of what kind, and (2) their nonsensicality is not 
a consequence of a theory of meaning put forward in the book. As we can see, “both of 
these features […] say something about how the book ought not to be read, thereby still 
leaving much underdetermined about how the book ought to be read” (Conant & Diamond 
2004, 43). 
The very notion of a resolute reading of the Tractatus is best explained by 
contrasting it with the seeming irresoluteness of the more standard interpretations. To be 
resolute in this sense is to demand plausibility rather than inconsistency, to avoid 
unreasonable philosophical temptations such as that of attaining an illusory point of view 
external to language (or thought) and the world from which we could somehow grasp an 
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ineffable theory of meaning (the so-called picture theory), anchored on an equally 
ineffable metaphysics, that is nonsensical in its own terms. And at least not to be too 
comfortable in ascribing such irresoluteness to Wittgenstein. It is also a matter of trying 
to take his metaphilosophical remarks (from both his earlier and later writings), such as 
his insistence “that it is only through some confusion one is in about what one is doing 
that one could take oneself to be putting forward philosophical doctrines or theses at all” 
(Diamond 1991, 179; my emphasis), as seriously as possible. 
To sum up, while most standard readings have taken the Tractatus as, despite its 
seemingly paradoxical nature, advancing robust metaphysical doctrines and theses, 
resolute ones find a different purpose in it: to help us out of philosophical puzzlement, 
one of the main aims (if not the main one) of Wittgenstein’s later work, which would thus 
seem to have been more significantly anticipated by the Tractatus than is usually 
supposed. As the former appear to be filled with paradox, the latter would by now seem, 
at least on such general grounds, to present themselves as having a better chance of 
satisfying our requirement for philosophical viability. Let us see what can be made out of 
this initial impression. 
 
§ 2. Before moving forward, I must clarify a guiding principle to my entire approach. 
While it would be sheer carelessness to ignore what Wittgenstein might have intended 
when writing the Tractatus, we should not fail to consider the often overlooked but 
important distinction between authorial intentions and the actual achievements of a 
particular work, notably when the author fails to achieve what he had intended. That is to 
say that it is one thing to intend to put forward e.g. an ineffable theory of meaning as a 
valid philosophical hypothesis and a quite different one to achieve so.  
Even when someone’s intentions are reasonable (or realistic), there can always be 
cases where things do not go according to plan, and, if the intentions go beyond not only 
what is reasonable but what is altogether possible, it could only be due to an illusion that 
one could think they could ever be achieved: e.g. when coming to the table with fourteen 
(not the total fifteen) reds remaining and without having been awarded a free ball, a 
snooker player cannot think of scoring a maximum break in that visit, unless he is 
confused about the number of red balls available. If Wittgenstein was trying to do what 
most standard readers believe he was, it seems implausible to think that he ever 
succeeded, for the fulfilment of such project would seem to depend on what there cannot 
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be: “cosmic exile, to use Quine’s phrase” (Williams 2004, 1), a point of view beyond all 
points of view. 
The interpretative principle I am aiming at hence runs somewhat as follows: if an 
author’s intentions exceed the limits of reasonableness (or possibility), the interpreter 
cannot be forced to match them all the way through (he can, so to speak, go as far as it is 
reasonable – or possible – to go). If, despite its appearance, the aforementioned theory of 
meaning is nonsense, there can be no such thing as understanding it (as if it somehow 
made sense), even if Wittgenstein had once fallen prey to an illusion and believed it to 
be, though ineffable and consisting of nonsensical formulations, true. This is far from 
saying that a work springing from unreasonable intentions cannot still be reasonably 
interpreted. A composer can write e.g. a beautiful three movement piano sonata and add 
that each movement should be played in order to reflect the essence of, say, Heaven, Hell 
and Purgatory, but it is obvious that this does not imply that the sonata cannot still be 
played beautifully by an interpreter who decides to ignore these rather eccentric 
instructions and focus on nothing but the music itself.  
When applied to the case of the Tractatus, this principle has the following 
consequence: it is possible for one to assign a standard reading of the book to the early 
Wittgenstein (thus operating with a variety of empty notions for a while) and nevertheless 
read it resolutely (by ultimately overcoming such notions), i.e. even if many of his 
intentions at the time were highly unrealistic (some even impossible to fulfil), one can 
still approach it in a more or less realistic way and try to extract something of genuine 
philosophical value out of it.  
In addition, it has to be said that, independently of the chosen interpretative 
approach, reading the Tractatus with understanding will always involve, at least for some 
time, going through it as if it was advancing the doctrines and theses that resolute readers 
deny. One can only hope to overcome them and move on to the illuminating insights that 
after all remain if one begins by trying to understand them as doctrines and theses and 
then appreciate why they cannot be so, as well as what is then implied by their collapse. 
This to say that even the sternest of resolute readings (one that leaves almost no space – 
if any – for positive insights) will most probably depend, though only provisionally, on 
standard readings. One of the main strategies employed in the Tractatus according to 
most resolute interpreters consists of inviting the reader to enter a kind of imaginative 
activity involving a provisional and unselfconscious taking of nonsense as sense with the 
intention of eventually helping him recognize that very deception and thus stay away from 
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further philosophical entanglements. If that was what Wittgenstein was looking for from 
the beginning (which is far from clear), it should be considered a failure, as the 
prominence of standard readings attest, but from that it does not follow that it should be 
discarded. Now that, out of their unorthodox reading of the Tractatus, the likes of 
Diamond and Conant have made such strategy intelligible (or, perhaps, have developed 
it altogether), it stands out as an interesting and potentially powerful philosophical tool.  
Hence, the two ‘rival parties’ of “the Tractatus Wars”, each with their own internal 
tensions and disagreements, can in fact be fruitfully brought up together in some respects. 
And I believe that it is precisely where that can happen that some of the most enlightening 
possibilities of Tractarian interpretation, as well as the best chances of moving beyond 
those squabbles, may actually lie. That said, such possibilities are not simply to be found 
within the work of interpreting the book in a conventional scholarly fashion, though that 
is nonetheless a necessary part of the process (as, despite the distinction between 
intentions and achievements sketched above, it is hard to see how we can appreciate the 
latter without at least some grasp of the former, in particular of what exactly went wrong 
there), but rather arise out of it. 
 
§ 3. First presented in 2001, Warren Goldfarb’s “Das Überwinden: Anti-Metaphysical 
Readings of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, a key paper among the rise of resolute readings, 
offers a historical survey of the origins of Tractarian unorthodoxy, tracing it back to “Use 
and Reference of Names”, a 1969 paper of Hidé Ishiguro, followed in the two subsequent 
decades by papers5 of Goldfarb himself, Brian McGuinness, Peter Winch and, finally, 
Cora Diamond’s classic “Throwing Away the Ladder”, published in 1988. The latter 
definitely established the possibility of approaching the book resolutely, advising us to 
take its metaphysical remarks as mere nonsense, “not as nonsense that somehow 
communicates” (Goldfarb 2011, 7). But before Diamond’s contribution the initial focus 
of disagreement, Goldfarb argues, rested upon the Tractatus’ alleged (philosophical) 
realism. 
If Wittgenstein was at all putting forward a metaphysical theory, it has indeed the 
looks of a realist one. “The opening of the Tractatus unabashedly presents (or so it seems) 
a realist metaphysics, and the introduction of language only after facts and objects 
suggests that the ontology is prior. Of course those remarks are nonsense, by lights of the 
                                                          
5 See Goldfarb (2011): footnote 6 – p. 20 
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book, but somehow we can understand what they are getting at” (ibid.), or so we may be 
inclined to think. And, as we seem to be told later on, the very possibility of language, 
i.e. of propositional sense, depends on features of that prior ontology, notably the logical 
behaviour of its constituent objects. That our propositions have sense, that we can 
communicate anything at all, is granted by a sort of mirroring (or picturing, to use the 
Tractarian terminology) relation – the sharing of a common logical structure – between 
language (or thought) and reality.  
We can now see a difficulty arising: if language is a kind of mirror of reality, it thus 
seems to be impossible for it to speak about that mirror, and of the mirrorable reality as 
a whole. In other words, there is no way for a mirror to mirror itself. This sort of tension, 
of paradoxical appearance, has led some readers of the Tractatus to become more and 
more dissatisfied with the standard ways of interpreting it, which usually see Wittgenstein 
as trying to elude the paradox – let us call it, for now, the mirror paradox – by holding, 
still paradoxically, that, though the general features of both the mirror and the mirrored 
are ineffable, they are nevertheless made manifest (or shown) by propositions, the 
mirror’s particular components, each working as a little mirror of states of affairs, and 
these, in their turn, amounting to the whole of the mirrorable reality. 
Ishiguro and McGuinness have helped us to recognize an additional, subtler 
tension: a seemingly strong use of Frege’s context principle6, that “only in the nexus of a 
proposition does a name have meaning” (TLP 3.3), plays a key role in the theory of 
meaning seemingly outlined in the Tractatus, clashing with the previous account of 
language as dependent upon metaphysical features of the world. A noticeable corollary 
of the context principle when taken as robustly is that one cannot look for the object a 
name stands for apart from the particular role played by that name within a particular 
proposition, and from this follows that “there cannot be anything prior to the use of names 
in propositions that fixes the referents of names […], it is the use of propositions 
containing a name that fixes its referent” (Goldfarb 2011, 8). On this view, it thus seems 
that “there can be no pre-propositional “grasp” of objects; […] no operation other than 
grasping or expressing propositions” (ibid.), which in its turn implies that it is rather 
language (or the mind), our conceptual scheme, that determines the ways in which we 
interpret reality, not the other way around.  
                                                          
6 Frege’s second anti-psychologist principle outlined in his introduction of The Foundations of Arithmetic: 




This, however, amounts to nothing but an inversion of priorities within a 
metaphysical framework: the mirroring thesis is left intact (the only difference being the 
source and direction of the lines of projection) and we remain entangled in a paradoxical 
position, craving for an external point of view from which to inspect the essence of 
language and reality and the chimerical mechanism that somehow ties them to each other. 
As Goldfarb writes, “there is no more a perspective from which such a “linguistic” (or 
“linguistic-idealist”) account can be given than there is from which a realist account can 
be given. The external stance is one to which […] we ought not have access at all” 
(Goldfarb 2011, 11). 
Hence, McGuinness and Goldfarb tried to look for alternative ways of reading the 
Tractatus that could by some means avoid such apparent incoherencies, suggesting that 
one of the initial keys for doing so was to explore the possibility of taking its opening as 
playing a role other than that of a realist ontology. Instead, McGuinness argues, 
Wittgenstein might have been presenting “a kind of ontological myth” (apud Goldfarb 
2011, 11), with two interrelated purposes: (1) to draw attention to certain features of 
language, and (2) to help us reject that sort of myths by making us aware of such features. 
Wittgenstein’s method, he writes, “allows itself to use or feign to use a whole metaphysics 
in the task of getting rid of metaphysics” (ibid.). By engaging in such a method of 
deterrence by example, as McGuinness calls it, “when we end up having strictly thought 
through everything […] we see that realism coincides with idealism” (ibid.), and that both 
are nonsense, as they arise out of the same kind of chimerical demands, which is also to 
say that in the end there may not even be any claim of an alleged ontological or conceptual 
priority within the book. Goldfarb, who had similarly intuited a sort of dialectic structure 
in it, complements this line of thought: 
 
[T]he seemingly metaphysical remarks of the Tractatus are doing different 
work from that of suggesting an unsayable metaphysics. We are meant to 
come to see that they are myths. It is not that we are to “discount” the opening 
ontology because it turns out to be unsayable […], but rather we are to think 
through the remarks, to see that what they present is not coherent. (Goldfarb 
2011, 12) 
 
Though the issue surrounding realism was soon to become a matter of secondary 
importance among these debates, a fertile ground for resolute readings to arise from had 
thus been set. But before coming to, among others, Diamond’s subsequent elaboration of 
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these propaedeutic inclinations, I would like to go back even further than Goldfarb does 
in his paper. I would like to draw attention to the fact that unorthodox readings of the 
Tractatus, in particular McGuinness’ proposal about the role of the opening ontology, can 
be traced back at least to a couple of writings of one of Wittgenstein’s most perceptive 
readers and arguably the most unfortunately neglected figure among recent discussions 
concerning his interpretation: Gilbert Ryle. 
 
§ 4. The neglect of Ryle is, it seems to me, connected with an unfortunate tendency: from 
the fact that he did not publish much (explicitly) about Wittgenstein it is mistakenly 
inferred that he is not relevant enough among discussions on the subject, though having 
written a few interesting things that are in one way or another related to it. This is the 
exact same mistake people make when they rule out Wittgenstein as supposedly irrelevant 
in the ‘fields’ of e.g. ethics or aesthetics7 on the rather crude justification that his 
contributions amount to all but a relatively short number of unsystematic remarks 
scattered throughout his writings, which is nonetheless false. 
I will on this occasion consider three texts only, which should be enough to support 
my claim that Ryle’s interpretation of Wittgenstein is a most important one. Two of them 
are introductory accounts of his philosophy, an obituary from Analysis and a review for 
Scientific American, both published in the fifties, which, despite their generic character, 
still raise several points that, if properly expanded (sometimes perhaps even by going 
against some of Ryle’s own readings), can cast light onto both his earlier and later 
writings, as well as on how they relate. The third is a short posthumously published paper 
found among his repository at Linacre College in Oxford, which, though by no means 
conclusive, offers some insightful suggestions already pointing towards the path later 
followed by McGuinness, a fellow Oxonian who had most certainly been aware of its 
content. I shall for now focus on the latter, entitled “Ontological and Logical Talk in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, which begins as follows: 
 
At the opening of the Tractatus Wittgenstein is talking about objects and 
facts. He seems to be giving some sort of information about them, for example 
that an atomic fact is a combination of objects; that it is essential to a thing 
that it can be constituent of an atomic fact; that the object is simple; that 
                                                          
7 As if these were somehow autonomous (or even fields at all) and could be discussed independently of 




objects form the substance of the world, and so on. […] So let us call this 
Wittgenstein’s ‘ontological story’. 
He then moves on (at 2.1) to some considerations about what is involved in 
something being a picture, sketch, or plan of something else, and in particular 
what it is for something to be a true picture of something else. […] let us call 
it the ‘picturing story’. 
At about 3.1 he starts to talk about sentences, statements and words; about 
their senses, often denotations; about propositions, their truth and falsehood, 
and so on. Let us […] call this sketch the ‘propositional story’. (Ryle 1999, 
101) 
 
After this exposition, Ryle asks himself the question of how do these ‘stories’ relate 
to each other and considers three possible options: (1) that the ontological story was either 
a complex premiss (a set of axioms) from which the propositional story would follow as 
a complex conclusion (a set of corollaries); (2) that it was, reversely, a complex truth 
subsequently grounded by the propositional story; or (3) that both the ontological and 
propositional stories amounted to the same story, the latter being a more literal 
restatement of the former, an allegorical version. He opts for the third option. This was 
already an important step away from the idea that, despite its systematic presentation, the 
structure of the Tractatus was an argumentative one and hence that the book was to be 
seen as comprising a sort of system.  
However, Ryle then manifests some hesitation between whether “Wittgenstein was 
at least partially clear” (ibid.) about this or that he “was not completely clear about what 
he was doing and that he half-thought” (ibid.; my emphasis) of each of those three options 
as potentially being the case. This indicates two things: (1) that Ryle thought that 
Wittgenstein might have been somewhat confused while putting the Tractatus together, 
and (2) that Ryle himself was feeling at least slightly confused while reading it. A resolute 
reader would here suggest that this was a case of Ryle experiencing the book’s dialectic 
effect: both author and reader seemed to be after something important but were having a 
hard time making their minds clear about it. I would like to add that, whether Wittgenstein 
was indeed confused (in the case standard readings are closer to his intentions) or self-
consciously crafting it (as resolutists hold), this effect of so stunning the reader, of leading 
him to perplexity and doubt, to fall under a spell that can be as charming as it can be 
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terrifying, all part of the aforementioned imaginative activity, may very well be 
something inherent to the very features of the book. 
A few paragraphs afterwards, now seemingly more clear-headed (and thus seeing 
Wittgenstein as more clear-headed too), Ryle attempts to elaborate his initial intuition 
regarding the nature of the ontological story by appealing to one of the most obvious 
tensions to be found within the Tractatus – a specific occurrence of the mirror paradox. 
From 4.126 to 4.1274, Wittgenstein is concerned with distinguishing formal concept-
words (category words) from proper concept-words (ordinary concepts) by accounting 
for the former’s logical nature. That something falls under a certain formal concept as one 
of its objects, we are told, is one of those allegedly ineffable truths, shown by the object’s 
corresponding symbol, i.e. a name shows that it signifies an object, a numeral that it 
signifies a number, and so on. But statements such as ‘A is an object’ or ‘1 is a number’ 
lack sense on the book’s account of propositions, as they fail to conform to one of its key 
requirements: bipolarity, i.e. being true or false. Unlike a proper concept, a formal 
concept is said to be represented in a conceptual notation by a propositional variable (not 
a function), as its properties are expressed by a distinctive feature common to all symbols 
whose meanings fall under that particular concept (TLP 4.126). Hence, a proposition such 
as e.g. ‘There are 2 objects which…’ is represented as ‘(∃x, y)…’, and whenever “it is 
used in a different way, that is as a proper concept-word, nonsensical pseudo-propositions 
are the result” (TLP 1.1272). “So one cannot say, for example, ‘There are objects’ as one 
might say, ‘There are books’. And it is just as impossible to say, ‘There are 100 objects’ 
[…]. And it is nonsensical to speak of the total number of objects. The same applies to 
the words ‘complex’, ‘fact’, ‘function, ‘number’, etc.” (ibid.). 
In light of this, Ryle concludes that there is no way that Wittgenstein could “have 
thought that the ontological story was a legitimate premiss or a legitimate conclusion in 
an inference to or from the propositional story” (Ryle 1999, 103), as he there employs 
formal concepts – such as ‘facts’, ‘things’, ‘objects’, ‘substance’, ‘properties’, and a few 
others – at will and in the ways that are strictly forbidden by the book’s apparent theory 
of meaning. In fact, not a single one of all its constituent statements, from “The world is 
all that is the case” (TLP 1) up to “The sum-total of reality is the world” (TLP 2.063), 





He must therefore have left it for some other purpose, and I suggest it was at 
least partly for an expository purpose. He was deliberately saying something 
that would not do, as a lead in saying something that would do or nearly do. 
It is worth noticing that we hear progressively less and less of atomic facts, 
simples, complexes, etc., the further we read in the Tractatus. It was, I 
suggest, not his message, nor part of his message, but a sort of prefatory 
parable. (Ryle 1999, 104; my emphasis) 
 
Again, we encounter several tensions in this passage. On the one hand, it is a clear 
sign of resoluteness on Ryle’s part that he is not buying into the idea that the nonsensical 
statements forming the ontological story were somehow attempts to gesture at an 
ineffable metaphysics and that it seems to him unthinkable that Wittgenstein could have 
intended so. Could this “prefatory parable” – a formulation that, alongside that of 
“ontological story”, reminds of McGuinness’ “ontological myth” – thus been there as an 
example of the sort of nonsense that philosophers come up with when running up against 
the bounds of sense by trying to speak metaphysically? Ryle was indeed not far away 
from answering affirmatively. On the other, however, we shall see that his proposed 
‘solution’ ends up being still irresolute, as the best it does is to delay the difficulties he 
had been grappling with.  
It is also noticeable that Ryle was still in a way hesitating between what many 
resolute readers have been fond of calling a substantial conception of nonsense, i.e. that 
there can be nonsense that somehow communicates, though through a supposedly 
logically illegitimate combination of symbols, and an austere one, i.e. that all nonsense 
is just mere nonsense, that it cannot communicate anything at all and that there is no such 
thing as illegitimately combined symbols8. By saying that the ontological story would not 
do but that the propositional one would do or nearly do, he was leaving a back door open 
for the idea that among the various nonsensical sentences of the Tractatus some would 
be, so to speak, less nonsensical than others, i.e. that some would be closer to making 
sense, thus conflicting with an important warning Wittgenstein gives in the book’s 
preface: that what lies beyond the bounds of sense is simply nonsense. 
The whole problem with Ryle’s proposal here amounts to him being under the 
illusion that there was nonetheless a significant logical difference between the 
formulations of the ontological and the propositional stories: he believes, quite rightly, 
                                                          
8 See § 22 for an account of these opposing views of nonsense. 
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that both intimate the same kind of insights (though certainly not ineffable metaphysical 
ones) but at the same time, and in this respect irresolutely, that only the latter at least 
partially succeeds. His remark that Wittgenstein applies less and less formal concepts as 
proper ones the further the Tractatus advances, as if the propositional story was somehow 
less guilty of such abuses than the ontological one, is beside the point. There the exact 
same kind of alleged logical violations occur, despite differences in jargon. Just think of 
e.g. all our previous talk of formal concepts, which follows Wittgenstein’s own words 
very closely, which, though not being about the world as a whole, are still concerned with 
characterizing the features of its mirror, once again falling into the paradox. That is to 
say that, according to the supposed Tractarian theory of meaning, the propositional story 
equally amounts to nothing but a bunch of nonsensical pseudo-propositions. Same for the 
in-between picturing story. All three are logically equivalent for none of them actually 
means anything. However, it is obvious that they would have only been so because of 
violating the theory’s principles if there was such a thing as a Tractarian theory of 
meaning and, of course, if such theory happened to be true. And that the statements 
purporting those principles are themselves statements which violate such principles – the 
so-called rules of logical syntax – should make us distrustful of such possibility, as we 
find ourselves on the verge of double-thinking. 
What is remarkable about this paper is that it presents us one of Wittgenstein’s 
cleverest readers lively engaged in a struggle with the Tractatus: oscillating between 
resoluteness and irresoluteness, often unsure about where to go, and above all showing 
dissatisfaction with some aspects of the standard ways of reading the book and looking 
for possible ways out of the incoherence generally attributed to it, hence giving a try at 
reading the early Wittgenstein with genuine charity. He elsewhere observed that due to 
its considerable technical intricacies the Tractatus is inaccessible to most: “Few people 
can read it without feeling that something important is happening; but few experts, even, 
can say what is happening” (Ryle 2009, 264; my emphases). This is certainly true, 
although it seems to me clear that the reason for it amounts to far more than technical 
matters. It is obvious that someone like Ryle did not lack any command of the required 
technical equipment but still faced, as we have seen, considerable (if not insuperable) 
difficulties. In fact, it might only be due to an illusion that one could think of reading the 




§ 5. Let me now attempt to revise and further explore the possibility of reading the 
Tractatus as a series of various intertwined ‘stories’. Ryle’s identification of an 
ontological, a picturing and a propositional story is spot on. Together, they form what 
appears to be the core structure of the book (its skeleton, so to speak), what gives it its 
systematic looks: the picture theory, which, at least as long as it stands in place, virtually 
pervades all the remaining parts of the Tractatus. As we have said, such theory seems to 
consist of a general account of language and its corresponding ontology. Due to the 
aforementioned essential logical structure we are told both share, they shall be treated as 
a single unit, i.e. though we can recognize three different chapters (Ryle’s three stories) 
those are chapters composing a single, unified story: first, we are told what the world is 
and hence what its constituents (facts) are; second what counts (and what does not) as a 
correct representation (pictures) of the world, i.e. of facts; and third, to a much greater 
length, how the medium of representation (propositions, i.e. language, or thought, which 
on this account amounts to the same) does it (or does not). Logic, which is the focus of a 
fourth story, running throughout all the remaining ones, is said to be what holds 
everything together; let me call this the metalogical story, i.e. on what sort of enquiry 
formal logic is. A fifth, and not less important one, is what I shall call the 
metaphilosophical story, i.e. on what sort of enquiry philosophy is, notably an activity of 
linguistic analysis and clarification. Both are sharply distinguished from scientific 
enquiries. Finally, a sixth story emerges already near the end of the book: the ethical 
story. 
I will here consider the picture theory and the metaphilosophical story above all, 
though sometimes hinting at the other two along the way. Our account of the former, with 
which I shall begin, will be far from exhaustive, but just enough, or so I hope, for us to 
realize what kind of thing we have in our hands. For now, let us provisionally leave aside 
any talk regarding nonsense or logical violations as much as possible, i.e. let us not be 
afraid of double-thinking for a while, even forget that we might be falling into such trap. 
As Anscombe remarks, we shall understand the Tractatus best if we let ourselves 
succumb to its attractiveness, “assume its correctness, and follow up its consequences” 
(Anscombe 1971, 72) as we move on. This is exactly how the process of reading the book 
should be supposed to work, though, of course, there may be significant disagreements 




§ 6. Though a most perplexing and obscure book in many respects, the Tractatus 
possesses a relatively simple structure. It consists of seven main oracular-like statements, 
each of them (except the final one, which stands on its own) expanded by a net of 
commentary, forming a sort of tree structure. Each comment is numbered and the role of 
such numbers, at first potentially confusing, is clarified by Wittgenstein – who had told 
his editor Ludwig von Ficker that these were indispensable, as the book would be “an 
incomprehensible mess” (Kuusela 2015, 229) without them – in a footnote to the opening 
statement: each statement is assigned a decimal number specifying the stress laid on it, 
so that “statements n.1, n.2, n.3, etc. are comments on statement no. n; statements n.m.1, 
n.m.2, etc. are comments on statement no. n.m; and so on.” (Wittgenstein 2001, 5). It does 
not, therefore, follow a linear structure. Take the first statement and its respective net of 
commentary, the book’s shortest one, to give us an example: 
 
1  The world is all that is the case. 
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts. 
1.12 For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is 
not the case. 
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world. 
1.2 The world divides into facts.   
1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the 
same. 
 




1.11 1.12 1.13 1.21 
 
The numbering appears to be indeed vital, for otherwise there would be no way to 
recognize the tree structure, but we should not be too tempted to look further than this. 
One can sometimes find a few intriguing parallels throughout the book – e.g. “What 
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constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way” 
(TLP 2.14) and “What constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements (the words) 
stand in a determinate relation to one another” (TLP 3.14) – but those should be seen as 
rather accidental, not as the product of some form of Kabbalistic-like speculation.  
 
§ 7. Let us look at a statement as puzzling as “The world is the totality of facts, not of 
things” (TLP 1.1). Perhaps it may help to follow Ryle’s (still irresolute) suggestion that 
the propositional story often works as a “philosophically careful reformulation” (Ryle 
1999, 104) of the ontological one.  Key notions employed in the ontological story are 
often left unclear in it but somehow appear to be rendered intelligible by their 
propositional counterparts. If that is the case, 1.1 could hence be understood as playing a 
role parallel to that of a statement such as “Language is the totality of propositions, not 
of words.”, for, according to this account, propositions play a role parallel to that of facts, 
and words (more specifically, names) to that of objects. 
Ray Monk argues that, if taken seriously, the ontological story presents “a 
conception of the world that removes at a single stroke a lot of traditional metaphysics” 
(Monk 2005, 37) and that it could be seen as overcoming the typical ‘realism vs. idealism’ 
quarrel such as that between Russell and Bradley regarding the nature of relations: 
 
Bradley argued that, if relations existed, we would have to think of them as a 
kind of object. But since they are clearly not a kind of object, they do not, 
after all, exist. Russell countered by accepting Bradley’s initial premise (that, 
if relations existed, they would be a kind of object), but drawing the exact 
opposite conclusion. His argument was, since relations do exist, they must, 
indeed, be a kind of object. (Monk 2005, 37-38) 
 
This was, for Wittgenstein, a classic example of the nonsensical chatter 
philosophers so often produce when, by trying to establish general claims about the 
essential nature of things, they illusorily station themselves outside the world as if they 
could look at it “from sideways on” (McDowell 2000, 44) or, to use a suggestive 
metaphor, with a pair of special glasses that would allow them to see beyond what one 
would ordinarily see (microscopes, telescopes and other devices employed in the natural 
sciences being among ordinary means for seeing). By conceiving the world as the totality 
of facts (not of things), he was at first sight ruling out such chatter: if we are to think of 
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facts, which are already articulate units (just like propositions are) as the minimum unit 
of the world capable of being meaningfully stated and thus grasped, all the talk about 
relations is therefore exiled beyond the bounds of sense.  
Glory does not last for long, though: if that was his intention, Wittgenstein had not 
yet avoided arguing against metaphysicians and was hence still doing metaphysics. He 
was, just like Russell and Bradley, making claims about the world as a whole, from that 
illusory external point of view, presenting his own ontology. According to standard 
readers, Wittgenstein would have insisted that he was nevertheless aiming at something 
true but that could only be shown, i.e. that propositions, by standing for facts, somehow 
made manifest that the world was made out of the totality of facts, something that could 
not be said but that we were all already tacitly aware of by being able to talk sense. But 
there is a clear gap here, as it seems impossible for one to tell that such-and-such cannot 
be said but shows itself. Wittgenstein’s saying-showing distinction, which is perplexing 
in several respects, is supposed to concern propositions (i.e. meaningful statements) and 
propositions only. Throughout the Tractatus (with the exception of, perhaps, one 
particular occasion which we shall come into later on) one does not find a single relevant 
sign of Wittgenstein having thought that nonsense could ever show anything, at least in 
this very particular sense of showing. 
In the meantime, it should be clear enough why speaking as if it were possible to 
occupy the external point of view I have been mentioning leads into trouble. I have not, 
however, yet offered any argument supporting the claim that speaking metaphysically 
leads into this illusory point of view from which nonsense arises, though I have been 
talking as if that was the case. And, by considering what has gone so far, one may already 
be distrustful about the possibility of offering such an argument, at least if that is the kind 
of argument many professional philosophers would normally accept as an argument.  
 
§ 8. It is important to note that, though it is, as we have seen, unlikely that the three stories 
composing the picture theory are linked by a genuine argumentative line, the way in 
which they are presented gives us a strong impression that each one contains, so to speak, 
the grounds of the following one, whatever they may be. In the previously discussed 
paper, Ryle writes that before “we can talk about caricatures and maps, we have to be 
able to talk about faces and terrains. So Wittgenstein had to produce some seemingly 
descriptive talk about things and facts before he could say anything about caricatures and 
maps being true or false” (Ryle 1999, 105; my emphasis). This is likely to be the initial 
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impression we get. “We picture facts ourselves” (TLP 2.1) is how the picturing story 
begins. “A picture is a model of reality” (TLP 2.12) and has a “logico-pictorial form in 
common with what it depicts” (TLP 2.2). “A logical picture of facts is a thought” (TLP 
3) and a “thought is a proposition with a sense” (TLP 4), hence a “proposition is a picture 
or reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it” (TLP 4.01). “Propositions 
represent the existence or non-existence of states of affairs” (TLP 4.1) and the “sense of 
a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence and non-
existence of states of affairs” (TLP 4.2). We picture facts, i.e. we think and talk sense. 
Presented with apparent clock-like precision, the whole idea is quite attractive and, at 
least on surface, not too difficult to grasp. 
Let us attempt to elaborate on this a little further. Facts are logically articulate. 
Otherwise, they would not at all be thinkable. “What is thinkable is possible too” (TLP 
3.02), so all we can think of amounts to possible facts. “Thought can never be of anything 
illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically” (TLP 3.03), and there 
cannot possibly be such a thing as illogical thinking: an illogical ‘thought’ is not a thought 
but a pseudo-thought, an illusion of a thought; e.g. an object cannot be other than itself, 
that would be unthinkable. Logic thus delimits the realm of what is possible and, so, of 
what is thinkable. All possible facts have a logical form, which corresponds to the way in 
which its constituting elements are articulated with each other in that possible situation. 
This logical (or logico-pictorial form), which cannot itself be depicted but belongs to what 
is shown – “A picture can depict any reality whose form it has” (TLP 2.171); it “cannot, 
however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it” (TLP 2.172) – is what allows a fact and 
a thought to match: the latter mirrors the former by mirroring its logical form; this is the 
famous isomorphism thesis. Our propositional acts establish the correlation between them 
– “The method of projection is the thinking of the sense of the proposition” (TLP 3.11), 
but the possibility of sense is already granted by this sort of pre-established harmony 
between reality, thought and language. Thought and language are one and the same: a 
proposition expresses a thought by being identical with that thought.  
So, except for tautologies and contradictions – senseless, i.e. non-representative 
propositions which nevertheless play a role in symbolism, and so are not yet nonsense 
(they lie, so to speak, somewhere over the mirror’s frame, not outside of it) – propositions 
themselves are pictures of reality, i.e. they represent possible facts. Their sense is what 
they depict. A proposition says how things are or, in the case of negation, how things are 
not. In addition, it is required to fulfil two further interrelated conditions, namely 
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bipolarity and definiteness of sense: it “must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no. 
In order to do that, it must describe reality completely” (TLP 4.022), i.e. though a 
“proposition may well be an incomplete picture of a certain situation, […] it is always a 
complete picture of something” (TLP 5.156). Anscombe explains this as follows: “a 
proposition may indeed leave a great deal open, but it is clear what it leaves open” 
(Anscombe 1971, 73). I prefer a reverse, though equivalent, formulation: a proposition 
may leave a great deal open, but it is clear what it does not leave open, which corresponds 
precisely to what it depicts. A proposition such as e.g. ‘Porto is north of Lisbon’ does 
leave a great deal open about the geography of Portugal (and everything else) apart from 
that Porto is north of Lisbon and, of course, that Lisbon is south of Porto (it is like a map 
which is wholly blank except for a compass rose and two dots signalling the relative 
positions of each Porto and Lisbon, the remaining blank area being what is left open). A 
definite sense is what allows a proposition to be bipolar: a proposition is true, if what it 
describes obtains, or false, if what it describes does not obtain, end of story. Sure, there 
are cases where it is not easy to tell whether a given proposition is true or false, but if it 
has at all a sense, i.e. if it is at all a proposition, it must be possible to determine its truth 
or falsity, which is a matter of empirical investigation. Otherwise it would be a 
nonsensical pseudo-proposition. And, as all matters of fact are contingent, i.e. they “can 
either be the case or not be the case” (TLP 1.21), a proposition must be bipolar. 
Two other prominent features of the Tractatus are connected with this. One is the 
rejection of modality, springing from the requirement of definiteness of sense, as any 
“sense of ‘may’, ‘can’, ‘possible’, other than that of ‘logically possible’, would be 
unamenable to explanation in terms of the picture theory” (Anscombe 1971, 81), which 
“does not permit any functions of propositions other than truth-functions” (ibid.). The 
other is the rejection of a priori knowledge. “If a thought were correct a priori, it would 
be a thought whose possibility ensured its truth” (TLP 3.04). “A priori knowledge that a 
thought was true would be possible only if its truth were recognizable from the thought 
itself (without anything to compare it with)” (TLP 3.05), but, as we have seen, a thought 
has always to be compared with a fact in order to count as thought: a ‘thought’ true in 
virtue of its own components, independently of any corresponding components of a fact, 
would not be a picture of reality and, so, not a genuine thought. A statement is analytically 
true if and only if it is a tautology. In light of the Tractatus, then, all analytic statements 
are senseless. For instance, all mathematics is analytic, which is to say that there can be 
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no such thing as knowledge of ‘mathematical facts’, only the grasp of transformations of 
symbols into other symbols, an entirely formal affair. 
Consider a sentence which seems to assert a necessary truth: ‘an object cannot 
occupy two different positions in space at the same time’. It is obvious that it does not 
depict any fact, as it purportedly refers to something impossible (physically impossible), 
in this case denying its possibility. That it is a negation is irrelevant here: any genuine 
negation is always a negation of something; ‘p’ and ‘~p’ are the exact same picture of the 
exact same state of affairs, though the former asserts it and the latter denies it. In light of 
the picture theory, that it is impossible for an object to occupy two different positions 
simultaneously is something that is shown by all genuine propositions being pictures of 
possible situations, but, again, cannot be said. “There is only logical necessity” (TLP 
6.37): we can now see that it is the picture theory itself which is forcing us into this sort 
of Humean dogma. 
In addition, we are told that both propositions and facts respectively divide into 
elementary (or atomic) propositions and facts, the basic and irreducible (and mutually 
independent) components of the isomorphic structures of language and reality. “An 
atomic fact is a combination of objects” (TLP 2.01) and an elementary proposition “a 
connexion, a concatenation, of names” (TLP 4.22). We may then be tempted to think that 
decompositional analysis of complex propositions would allow us to ultimately exhibit 
those “undissectable bones” (Ryle 1999, 102), just as when in chemistry one decomposes 
a certain substance, and hence grasp the essence of those structures, finally being in 
command of a method capable of determining exactly, and in all possible situations, what 
it really means to say such-and-such. The whole picture theory seems to be connected 
with this form of logical atomism, as is suggested by one of its main theses: “Propositions 
are truth-functions of elementary propositions” (TLP 5), the latter being “the truth-
arguments of propositions” (TLP 5.01). “This is how things stand” (TLP 4.5), the most 
general propositional form, is thus said to be translatable into the quite peculiar formula 
[?̅?, 𝜉̅, N(𝜉̅)], “the general form of truth-function” (TLP 6)9, and “every proposition is a 
result of successive applications to elementary propositions of the operation N(𝜉̅)” (TLP 
6.001). This has all the looks of an outstanding discovery. 
However, we should pause back and remember that Tractarian objects are not of 
the sort of e.g. trees, books or tables (not even of atoms or grains of dust) – as Ishiguro 
                                                          
9 See “‘The General Form of Proposition’”, chapter 10 of Anscombe’s Introduction (1971), for a detailed 
explanation and discussion of the formula, uniquely used by Wittgenstein. 
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observes, they are “not like things (however simple) in the empirical world that can be 
individuated extensionally” (apud Goldfarb 2011, 8) – and realize that neither their 
corresponding names are of the sort of ordinary ones such as e.g. ‘tree’, ‘book’, or ‘table’. 
An ordinary name “has something about it that implies complexity” (Anscombe 1971, 
36), while Tractarian names are supposed to be absolutely simple ones. Objects too are 
said to be absolutely simple: they cannot be composite, as  “they make up the substance 
of the world” (TLP 2.021). This so-called substance, made out of the totality of simple 
objects, is necessary and immutable, independent of any contingent matters of fact, and 
thus cannot itself be pictured. Instead, that there must be such substance, which is beyond 
cognition, that there must be atomic facts and elementary propositions and that our 
propositions must in principle be analysable all the way up to these – though, “alas, we 
never come across these termini of our analyses” (Ryle 1999, 102) and not a single 
example of an elementary proposition can be offered – is allegedly shown in that language 
is able to depict reality. We are therefore left with supposed truth-functions whose 
arguments’ truth bearers are mysteries, and so could rightfully ask whether we could ever 
come to know that these are genuine truth-functions of anything. To that not a single 
answer is given. All we get is the dogmatic assumption that things must somehow be like 
this, for otherwise the correlation between language and reality would be lost: if the world 
had no substance “we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)” (TLP 
2.0212).  
Despite all its attractiveness, this account is, as we can see, built upon extremely 
shaky foundations. In fact, if that alleged substance (and all that is seemingly implied by 
it) turns out to be a chimera, it may very well be hanging in the air, and its doctrines be 
as fragile as a cluster of soap bubbles. Whether this last impression is correct is something 
that the next steps in reading the book should help to disclose: now that we have tried to 
make some sense of the picture theory, it is time to press it more firmly. 
 
§ 9. One must indeed be struck by how far the given account seems to be from actual 
linguistic practices: by merely considering asserting premises and conclusions, truths and 
falsehoods, it rules out virtually all other recurring uses of language, such as e.g. advices, 
analogies, criticisms, inductions, jokes, metaphors, orders, parodies, promises, questions, 
warnings, and so on. Surely, all these play their part in communication and, though not 
all (if any) work like the kind of picturing that is said to be distinctive of propositions, it 
would look like madness to hold that, unlike these, they were all nonsensical for not being 
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so, as it is clear that we can understand them, i.e. recognize their target by being able to 
follow them, to grasp their intent. But, in light of the Tractatus, or so it appears, any use 
of language that is not a description of any possible reality is destined to be nonsense, the 
main task of the philosopher who adheres to its program being perhaps that of exposing 
linguistic constructions that may look like propositions but turn out to be empty on closer 
inspection.  
While reading the book and trying to get hold of the doctrines seemingly presented 
to us, one is often assaulted by the feeling that there is no way the picture theory can be a 
general account of language, but at best a general account, though eccentric, of a 
particular kind of linguistic usage; in this case of propositional (or, in Austinian jargon, 
constative) usage, which is concerned with describing the world, being it clear that we 
use words intelligibly with many purposes other than that. And yet such expectations, 
born not just out of interpretative charity but of a demand for reasonableness, are soon to 
be frustrated by an emphatic pronouncement such as “The totality of propositions is 
language” (TLP 4.001; my emphasis), which seems to rule out every sort of so-called 
performative utterances from the realm of intelligible discourse. If that is so, it is clear 
that the boat is being pushed way too far. 
Astonishment increases when we are told that “The totality of true propositions is 
the whole of natural science” (TLP 4.11). Anscombe’s comment on this says it all: “I 
really do have the impression, as nowhere else in the book, that his feet have left the 
ground” (Anscombe 2011, 176), i.e. that Wittgenstein was under the illusion of viewing 
the world from out of cosmic exile. Still, this is a thesis whose popularity has kept 
growing ever since: that the empirical sciences are the sole responsible for determining 
the truth or falsehood of any given propositions, which is not different from claiming that 
all truth that there can be amounts to so-called ‘scientific’ truth, whatever that may mean. 
This is a paradoxical position, though. For how can it itself be a truth of the sciences? 
Even if all the remaining truths happened to be scientific truths, which is in any case false 
(though we shall not discuss this here), there would still have to be at least one truth, this 
one, which eludes their scope of investigation, for we would have to stand outside of 
science (and engage in e.g. philosophy of science) in order to draw the limits of its 
applicability. So, it would not at all be a scientific hypothesis but, rather, a metaphysical 
pronouncement, and not even a coherent one, as one cannot accept it as true while 
simultaneously holding that there can only be scientific truths. Again, this is a case of 
double-think, and notice that not a single allusion to alleged violations of logical syntax 
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has been required for us to recognize this and hence that we were dealing with a claim 
that misfires. 
Nevertheless, both these statements ‘about’ the totality of propositions would be 
nonsensical according to the picture theory, which is yet another case of double-think. 
Same for statements denying them: e.g. ‘The totality of true propositions is not the whole 
of natural science’ would be as nonsensical. But, picture theory aside, it sounds like a 
perfectly intelligible one, as long as one does not take it as a description of something. 
We are here depending on a distinction between informative statements, those that would 
count as pictures within the account of the Tractatus, and illuminating statements, which 
would not count as pictures and thus be ruled out as nonsense by it. An informative 
statement conveys a propositional content, an illuminating one an insight. Anscombe 
illustrates this distinction with the following example: a rather trivial statement like 
“‘“Someone” is not the name of someone’ […] is obviously true. But it does not have the 
bipolarity Wittgenstein’s ‘significant propositions’” (Anscombe 1971, 85). “What then 
are we intending to deny? Only a piece of confusion (ibid.), i.e. that ‘someone’, or 
‘somebody’, unlike ‘nobody’, refers to a person in particular. ‘“Someone” is not the name 
of someone’ hence does not seem to interfere within the scope of information, as its 
contradictory, ‘“Someone” is the name of someone’, is not a false informative statement 
but a meaningless one, and yet it seems obvious that it can still be used illuminatingly, as 
the expression of an insight intended to clear up a particular conceptual confusion. 
In this sense, it works much like a pointing gesture: though itself devoid of cognitive 
content (at least if we take cognitive contents as purely propositional, i.e. as contents of 
literal descriptions), it is a sentence which still manages to draw direct attention to a 
muddled formulation and contribute to the recognition of its emptiness. And if it does that 
it cannot really count as nonsensical. Within the framework of the picture theory, 
however, it would be nonetheless seen as a piece of nonsense, one which vainly attempts 
to express something which shows itself in the very applications of the words ‘someone’ 
or ‘somebody’. “This partly accounts for the comical frequency with which, in 
expounding the Tractatus, one is tempted to say things and then say that they cannot be 
said” (Anscombe 1971, 86), Anscombe observes. But, of course, we are here dealing with 
a very particular (and quite restricted) notion of saying. On these grounds, to say 




§ 10. So far, we have been presenting the picture theory as what it is usually thought to 
be: a correspondence theory. Thought and language do overlap but there appears to be a 
gap between these and reality, logical form being what is said to bridge such gap. In any 
case, it looks as if propositions and facts are treated as entities of a different kind and 
playing different roles, the former that of truth bearers, the latter of truth makers, thus 
conforming with the standard form of correspondence theories: for a proposition p to be 
true, there must exist some entity, distinct from p, whose being so entails that p is true. In 
the Tractatus, this entity is precisely a fact. 
However, there is a statement which may raise some grounds for doubt and sound 
puzzling in the context of the picture theory when understood as a correspondence theory: 
“A picture is a fact” (TLP 2.141; my emphasis). What does this suggest? Perhaps that the 
picture theory may after all be an identity theory, that according to it a fact is simply 
identical with a true proposition (or thought). This is actually one of the possible 
directions to which Ryle was heading when sketching the possibility of an identity of 
content between the ontological and propositional stories, the differences between them 
amounting to nothing but matters of presentation. If the world is the totality of facts and 
propositions themselves are said to be facts, then propositions too appear to be part of the 
world and thus there would be no gap to be closed between what is the case and what can 
be said. In addition, that they all share the same essence, i.e. logical form, may be another 
indication that they are all part of the same substance. Perhaps we got a few things wrong 
in our previous account. That is far from clear yet, but some reconsideration of the main 
doctrines is in order. 
Now, it is true that in his later writings Wittgenstein does not cancel the possibility 
of being read as hinting at what could be seen as a kind of identity theory. Though it is 
clear that he would have then repudiated any theoretical formulations such as “there is no 
ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or generally the sort of thing one 
can think, and the sort of thing that can be the case” (McDowell 1996, 27; my emphasis), 
it seems plausible to think that his views were somewhat compatible with this. As John 
McDowell puts it, “to say there is no gap between thought, as such, and the world is just 
to dress up a truism in high-flown language” (ibid.). Whether this is at all a truism would 
be a matter of some discussion, but if what is meant amounts to not more than the 
following attempted paraphrase of §95 of the Investigations, McDowell may very well be 
right: “when we see that such-and-such is the case, we, and our seeing, do not stop 
anywhere short of the fact. What we see is: that such-and-such is the case” (McDowell 
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1996, 29). Unlike the previous formulation, Wittgenstein would have most likely 
approved of this, a reminder of something quite humdrum but which could nevertheless 
help to bring us down to earth and stay away from high-flown metaphysical speculation 
about how the mind (and, therefore, language) and reality relate to each other. To call him 
an identity theorist seems to me excessive, but this is not to say that his remarks on such 
matters cannot stimulate identity theorists such as McDowell, as if allowing them to step 
into the grounds he had cleared and even at times providing the required supplies for them 
to develop what he himself, out of concern for not unwittingly reopening a door through 
which metaphysics could make a comeback, had refused: a theory of some sort. 
So, if we were to explore the possibility of reading the Tractatus as propounding an 
identity theory instead of a correspondence one, we would thence be exploring an 
interesting development in Wittgenstein’s thought: a continuity partially masked by a 
shift in tone and some adjustments amounting to a gradual purge of as much dogmatic 
commitments as possible, notably metaphysical ones. However, it has to be said that even 
if we are more sympathetic towards identity theories and find it potentially plausible to 
look for one in the Tractatus, such move would be more or less irrelevant to what 
concerns the main goal of our quest for philosophical viability in reading the book. If it 
ever attempted to put forward an identity theory instead of a correspondence one, there is 
no way it could have succeeded, for it would have still been a theory dependent on cosmic 
exile, just as the correspondence one we have just sketched. Apart from the advantage of 
dissolving the question of whether it is the ontology or the conceptual scheme that is prior, 
it would still suffer from more or less the same difficulties, such as the requirement for 
an atomistic structure grounded on simples which are beyond cognition, the almost 
comical restrictions on what can be said, the insistence on ineffable truths which are 
shown, the mirror paradox, and so on. That we were at all concerned with what kind of 
theory did the Tractatus develop is a clear indication that, somewhat like Ryle, we were 
still experiencing the book’s dialectic effect: in this case, oscillating between two different 
but equally tempting pictures, one staring at us right in the face, the other whispering from 
a less clear angle. Nevertheless, all this was most probably essential for us to come to 
understand what I shall next attempt to make clearer: that the picture theory is all but an 
illusion of a theory, at least if taken as a general theory of language. 
 
§ 11. It is now time to subject a notion as crucial here as that of ‘fact’ to some further 
inspection. As an ordinary notion it should be more or less clear to all of us: a fact is 
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simply what happens to be the case, i.e. what is true; it as fact that e.g. Wittgenstein was 
born in 1889. All this is humdrum and thus unproblematic. In the Tractatus, however, it 
is a somewhat technical notion: “What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of 
affairs” (TLP 2). At first sight, ‘state of affairs’ (from Pears and McGuiness’ translation) 
may also sound unproblematic, as when used in a sentence like e.g. ‘still life paintings 
depict states of affairs’, but only until we realize that its German counterpart, 
‘Sachverhalt’, is used not as standing for regular states of affairs, depictable by regular 
propositions, but to the aforementioned combinations of simple objects mirrored by 
elementary propositions. The use of ‘atomic facts’ instead in Ogden’s translation makes 
this even clearer. This is to say that throughout the Tractatus, the notion of fact has been 
forced out of its ordinary usage and given a new, metaphysical one. And so we realize 
that what a fact is, too, cannot be said. Same with propositions, and virtually everything 
else that had been seemingly said in the book. 
One who is still under the spell of the picture theory may insist that, though we have 
no idea of what atomic facts and elementary propositions are, they must nevertheless 
exist, for otherwise we could not talk sense at all. Against this, the best one can do is to 
adopt a Socratic position, something Wittgenstein was himself masterful at. In a dialogue 
between, for instance, T (from Tractarian) and S (from Socratic), S would probably begin 
to ask for conceptual clarifications and, as expected, T would fail to provide them: he 
would start perhaps by saying that elementary propositions are concatenations of simple 
names, that simple names are names standing for simple objects, and that simple objects 
form the substance of the world; then pause for a while, retreat slightly and say that the 
substance of the world is what allows us to talk sense, until eventually stopping, perhaps 
remaining silent and motionless, perhaps making inarticulate noises while gesturing at 
the void. S, having waited for this weakness in his fellow speaker to become patent, would 
then deliver a fatal blow by asking: What would it be, then, if the world had no such 
substance? After a more or less prolonged silence, T would hopefully come to feel the 
ground under his feet again and recognize that he had not assigned any meaning to the 
relevant concepts in his sentences. This is when we recognize that there is no way that the 
picture theory can stand. 
Another way to put it is to recall the mirror paradox and press it all the way through 
to its own dissolution. As we saw earlier, virtually every sentence forming the picture 
theory violates the conditions of representation (or rules of logical syntax) which the 
theory itself purportedly puts forward, as they either employ formal concepts as if playing 
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the logical role of proper ones or are used as ascribing internal properties to something 
and so fail to conform with the compulsory bipolarity of propositions, as “a property is 
internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it” (TLP 4.123), which is to 
say that the conditions of representation themselves are nonsense in their own terms. This 
leaves us in the following situation: if the picture theory is true, it follows that it is itself 
nonsense, and, as it is impossible for any bit of language to be both true and nonsensical 
at the same time, it follows that the picture theory cannot be true. If it happened to be 
false, however, it would still have to be possible to conceive it as being true in such-and-
such possible cases, but, as we have seen, it is unthinkable that it could somehow be true; 
that would always lead us into double-think. Hence, it cannot be false either. In other 
words, if it was just false it still had to make sense in some way or another, i.e. some 
meaning had to have been assigned to its key concepts. If it can neither be true nor false, 
whatever the case may be, all we can do is conclude that it is nonsense, a house of cards 
collapsing in front of us. 
This collapse may indeed look like following from a rather odd sort of reductio ad 
absurdum argument, embodied in the very sentences of the book: adopted as hypothesis, 
the picture theory turns out to imply not its own falsehood but its nonsensicality, not due 
to any alleged violations of logical syntax, but as a corollary of the paradox. The idea here 
is that these sentences are paradoxically put together and thus work as their own reductio. 
That would still be a sign of irresoluteness, though. If the sentences are nonsense, there 
is no way for them to be put together in order to work (logically) in any way or another. 
Nothing follows from or contradicts anything. There is no argument, not even a paradox. 
Nothing. It was, however, crucial that, up to a certain point in our process of reading the 
Tractatus, it looked as if there were genuine trains of thought and at least a paradox among 
them. Without such paradoxical appearance our recognition of the nonsensicality of the 
purported theory – or system – would have taken much longer. For some, it may have 
even gone unnoticed. 
The question whether it was Wittgenstein’s intention to construct such a puzzle and 
let us fall into it in order to help us out of further ones or that it was rather his own 
chimerical demands that led him to entanglement, though far from irrelevant, shall not be 
essential to our present concerns. This is a simple enough point, and much less 
controversial than what some may suppose. So far, there have been above all two main 
ways of looking at the motivations behind the picture theory: (1) Wittgenstein constructed 
it as an attempt to draw the bounds of sense and hence clear up philosophy from its 
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characteristic metaphysical nonsense, though at the same time running into paradox and 
so recognizing the impossibility of such project (at least through regular means), but 
nevertheless, out of despair, looking for some special means that would somehow allow 
him to complete it. (2) Wittgenstein deliberately constructed it as what he later called “an 
object of comparison” (PI §131; my emphasis)10, with the intent of letting the reader try 
it out, provisionally succumb to its powers, and eventually recognize the absurd nature of 
his own demands and give up on the sort of philosophical theorizing that leads into these 
bumpy roads; among such demands were metaphysical speculation in general, but more 
specifically the very idea of drawing a sharp line between sense and nonsense by means 
of a theory of meaning. 
Now, my point is this: if (1) is true, then it should be obvious that Wittgenstein 
failed to construct such a theory, for, unless by way of some magic trick one finds the 
special means for rendering nonsense – or anything else – into a vehicle of ineffable 
messages, it collapses into emptiness for the aforementioned reasons. Hence, even if (1) 
happened to be true, and unless we deceive ourselves and mix-up nonsense for sense, 
there is not much more to do apart from treating the picture theory such as in (2), i.e. as a 
particular kind of object of comparison we can explore as a way of experiencing the 
bounds of sense and of sharpening our awareness of the nature of philosophical 
puzzlement, which is something that can be done in many different ways. This is what I 
have been trying to do here and exactly what Wittgenstein himself did in his later work, 
even emphasizing that the Investigations ought to be read directly after and against the 
background of the Tractatus, an object of comparison consisting of both a forerunner of 
some of his later views – ‘view’ here not much in the sense of ‘theory’, ‘position’, or 
‘belief’, as in that of «way of looking […]. An “angle” from which to look thereat» (Read 
& Deans 2011, 151) – and a reminder of the sort of things not to attempt in philosophy. 
To sum up, what should here matter the most is, more than being concerned with whether 
Wittgenstein was being resolute or irresolute when he wrote the Tractatus, to look at it 
resolutely. Or, perhaps better put, reasonably, or realistically. 
                                                          
10 “For we can avoid unfairness and vacuity in our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, an 
object of comparison – as a sort of yardstick; not as a preconception to which reality must correspond. (The 
dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.)” (PI §131). Wittgenstein is here emphasizing 
that the role of an object of comparison is, unlike that of an alleged account of what actually happens, the 
only genuine role one can ascribe to a working-model (the picture theory being an example of one), at best 
a rough approximation, a complement to our understanding. His point is that, as long as we conform with 
this, the construction of working-models can be fruitful; not when we decide to go further and try to force 
them onto reality, though. 
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§ 12. A frequent criticism resolute approaches receive is that they tend to trivialize 
Wittgenstein’s early work. Many find it astonishing that such seemingly hard won 
insights on the nature of logic, language, thought and reality could end up being nothing 
but a matter of illusion. Roger White, for example, writes that “the book, viewed this way, 
would no longer be the major work of philosophy I have always believed it to be, but just 
an eccentric sport” (White 2011, 47). In fact, I find the exact opposite to be true. For this 
sort of criticisms are based on some crucial misunderstandings of what it can be to read 
the Tractatus resolutely. 
It is wrong, for instance, to hold that a resolute reading must deny that the book 
shows us anything, that it conveys any illuminating insights. I do think it shows us a great 
deal. What a resolute reading must deny is that a certain kind of ineffable truths 
(amounting to what the book’s nonsensical sentences, such as those forming the picture 
theory, appear to be saying) are shown or conveyed. But apart from that, much is left in 
the open, including numerous insights (though not doctrines) on all the matters the 
Tractatus is thought to be concerned with. It is also wrong, as we have seen, to think that 
resolute readers can allow themselves to renounce to the task of trying to understand the 
book’s apparent doctrines. This is as much part of any resolute reading as of any other 
kind of reading. To think that one can push a button that makes the system collapse 
instantaneously would be as great an illusion as to think that one shall find the key to 
render the picture theory coherent. And, above all, to believe that a doctrine such as the 
picture theory is, though wrong in several respects, more valuable as a theory than as an 
object of comparison is to be as irresolute, as unreasonable, as it gets. 
Regarding matters of matching Wittgenstein’s intentions, it seems to me that, 
overall, resolute readers have stood well enough in discussions concerning internal 
evidence of the Tractatus text. Despite certain difficulties their readings nevertheless 
encounter, Diamond, Conant, or Goldfarb, among others, have done well at, for instance, 
identifying tensions within the body of the book which support the idea of a dialectic 
structure one is expected to overcome. Its apparent oscillations between, as we have seen, 
realist and idealist metaphysics, correspondence and identity theories, seemingly 
incompatible versions of the context principle and that of compositionality (and thus 
austere and substantial conceptions of nonsense)11, or, especially, the general conflict of 
doing metaphysics while denying it, often give the Tractatus the look of a self-
                                                          
11 The ‘seemingly’ is quite deliberate here. Silver Bronzo (2011), for instance, offers strong support for the 
claim that the Tractatus treats both principles in a way that does not render them mutually exclusive. 
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consciously prepared philosophical salad meant as a devastating killing joke, a kind of 
Trojan Horse in the history of philosophy. That is to say that as long as the discussion 
remains only within the boundaries of the text, it is hard to see how standard readers could 
reach a conclusive refutation of resolute ones. In fact, as the debate goes, the latter may 
even be slightly gaining the upper hand. The case is altogether different, though, in what 
concerns external evidence, i.e. consideration of “what Wittgenstein wrote and said to 
others about his work both before, during and after the composition of the book” (Hacker 
2000, 360), as here standard readers seem to have a clear advantage, often not even having 
to engage in much philosophical argument. 
For instance, resolute readers concerned with faithfulness to Wittgenstein’s 
intentions have a hard time in responding to the fact that, on occasion to his return to 
Cambridge in 1929, he first attempted to modify and repair the picture theory, on the 
pretext that it did not correctly account for the inferential relations between propositions, 
before eventually recognizing its untenability12. Unless he was himself still under the 
illusion of having constructed a theory, it seems almost impossible to make sense of this 
move. The idea of him wanting to fix an illusory theory, thinking that his nonsensical 
formulations were calling for some kind of improvement, is a most odd one. Though 
resoluteness is often to be linked with reasonableness, here I do not quite see how resolute 
readers can avoid being themselves unreasonable, and demand what is unlikely. It shall 
thus not surprise us that little (if any) convincing attempts to meet this challenge have so 
far arisen from the resolute camp. The most one gets usually amounts to barely argued 
suggestions that Wittgenstein was somehow being ‘ironical’ or ‘too harsh on his earlier 
self’. This is not to say that these are absurd suggestions or that the challenge itself cannot 
be met, only that they will remain rather weak and unconvincing without further 
elaboration and that it seems to me doubtful that this could ever be done without one 
having to embrace somewhat unsteady tasks such as trying to guess without much support 
what Wittgenstein may have had in mind on such-and-such occasions. In addition, though 
irony was indeed an important tool among his vast anti-dogmatism apparatus, there is a 
risk with generalizing its ascription as a strategy to get round of certain interpretative 
difficulties, for it could lead to a scenario where it would be virtually impossible to discern 
between ironical and non-ironical remarks. 
I must confess, however, that, though determining intentions may not here be my 
priority, the idea of attributing, as standard readers do, unashamed irresoluteness to the 
                                                          
12 See Hacker (2000): p. 377. 
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early Wittgenstein, of thinking that he once believed the picture theory to be a convincing 
general account of language, leaves me with a certain sense of intellectual discomfort. 
Exactly as opposed to White, I think this would in a way diminish the nevertheless 
undisputed greatness of the Tractatus. And this is in part why I find Oskari Kuusela’s 
proposal of an ‘intermediate’ reading most welcome, one which can at the same time do 
better at accommodating the contextual challenges and at least partially exempt 
Wittgenstein from the full-blooded irresoluteness of standard readings. Anscombe once 
suggested that the picture theory could perhaps be salvaged “if one could dispense with 
‘simples’ and draw the limits of its applicability” (Anscombe 1971, 77) and it is in this 
direction that Kuusela’s reading heads: on his view, simples are not meant to have a 
metaphysical character and the picture theory is not intended as an all-encompassing 
account of language. 
 
§ 13. Kuusela argues that, instead of attempting to gesture at an ineffable theory of 
language full of metaphysical implications by means of nonsense, “Wittgenstein’s goal 
in the Tractatus is to introduce a particular logical notation, a concept-script – or at least 
an outline of (some of the central principles governing) such a notation” (Kuusela 2011, 
134) –, the picture theory being nothing more than this very notation,  a scheme for the 
logical analysis of propositions (constative uses of language), where these are treated as 
pictures of facts and truth-functions of elementary propositions, which is not quite the 
same as claiming that propositions are so. The notation was thus intended above all as a 
tool, a particular angle from which to look at language, not a theory pretending to account 
for it as a whole. As for its criterion of correctness, it was not “a matter of the notation 
corresponding to facts about language and the world” (Kuusela 2011, 136) but rather of 
being logically sound, i.e. of not giving rise to paradoxes and other difficulties, hence 
being capable of dissolving specific logical and philosophical puzzles. And so the 
requirement of simples was only a technical requirement within the notation’s framework, 
a condition for such logical soundness, not a postulation of any ungraspable metaphysical 
entities on which the possibility of sense depended. This allows Kuusela to explain 
Wittgenstein’s attempts to modify the picture ‘theory’ in the early 1930s without having 
to treat it as a theory: having found that, unlike what he had thought before, his notation 
did in fact give rise to certain logical difficulties, he attempted to fix it. 
If that is so, then ‘nonsense’ may very well seem to have a connotation other than 
that of mere gibberish on this view. A nonsensical sentence may simply be a sentence 
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which cannot be treated as a picture and hence cannot have a systematic place within the 
notation; everyday language, which is clearly not logically perfect as the ideal language 
of the notation was intended to be, being full of such sentences. Among these are what I 
have called, following Anscombe, illuminating sentences, non-descriptive expressions of 
insights. Already in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein recognized that the “tacit conventions on 
which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously complicated” 
(TLP 4.002) and it is clear that his notation had not been designed to account for all these 
conventions. He nevertheless sought, following Frege’s first anti-psychologist principle13, 
to distinguish sharply between genuinely descriptive sentences, supposed to be 
manageable on purely logical grounds, the object of analysis of his notation, and those 
which, despite sharing similar grammatical forms, did not actually work as descriptions 
of reality and whose understanding so often depended on psychological implications, as 
is the case with figurative modes of expression. He did not see any problem with these 
non-descriptive sentences per se, only that philosophers (especially metaphysicians) 
tended to misuse them, muddling them for descriptive ones and hence producing illusory 
descriptions of chimerical features of the world. What amounted to gibberish were not all 
illuminating sentences like ‘“Someone” is not the name of someone’, as these can still be 
given an intelligible use, but the pseudo-illuminating or pseudo-descriptive sentences 
arising out of such muddles. Muddles which in their turn consisted of a mistaken 
employment of whole sentences, not of particular words, unlike what the talk of formal 
and proper concepts seemed to imply when taken as theoretical formulations rather than 
as insights into rules governing the notation. This is what he most likely had in mind when 
he wrote: 
 
Most of the statements and questions to be found in philosophical works are 
not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answers to 
questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most 
of the sentences and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to 
understand the logic of our language. (TLP 4.003) 
 
To point out that these sentences are nonsensical is to demonstrate, by means of 
logical analysis in terms of the notation’s standards, that the utterer had failed to assign 
meaning to certain signs in them, not by having put these signs together in a logically 
                                                          
13 “[…] always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective” 
(Frege 1960, xxii). 
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illegitimate way (for Wittgenstein, as for Frege already, there was no such thing as doing 
so), an idea in tension with the Tractarian treatment of the context principle, but by having 
confusedly used these sentences, i.e. as if playing the role of a description when in fact 
nothing at all was being described. This is more likely to be what he meant by 
misunderstanding the logic of language. 
This reading also appears to free the Tractatus from the mirror paradox, as its 
‘nonsensical’ sentences would cease to be seen as attempts to gesture at ineffable features 
of reality, but as insights used in outlining some of the notation’s principles, including 
distinctions of logical category which cannot be described by means of sentences 
translatable into the notation but which are nevertheless “reflected in distinctions between 
the signs for what is in one category and the signs for what is in the other” (Diamond 
1991, 180). Showing thus seemingly loses its esoteric character: it is not concerned with 
ineffable features of reality, but with such distinctions within the notation. Now, if, unlike 
cases when it is used in the strong sense of ‘inexpressible’, ‘ineffable’ is taken in a weaker 
sense, as meaning ‘(literally) indescribable’, it becomes a more or less innocent notion. It 
is impossible to describe e.g. the sound of a clarinet, the smell of baking bread, the taste 
of roasted chicken, or the pain of a toothache (which are all, in this particular respect, on 
a par with the aforementioned logical distinctions), in the sense one describes the visual 
features of e.g. a clarinet, a piece of bread, a chicken, or a person’s teeth. Only the latter 
are, as it were, picturable. But there are, of course, various means to convey all sorts of 
(no)things like the former as effectively as literal descriptions (‘pictures’) convey the 
latter. We use them all the time in everyday discourse and in an intelligible way. They 
should not then even count as ineffable, as the employment of such a word, fully 
psychologically charged with the implications of its stronger sense, could often lead to 
misunderstandings, notably that there was at all something to be described (in the sense 
of ‘pictured’) about sounds, smells, tastes or pains and which somehow eluded us. 
It should be noticed that when talking about descriptions I have here been using, 
just like Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, the notion of picture metaphorically with the intent 
of illuminating what kind of linguistic use a description is. “A proposition is a picture of 
reality” (TLP 4.01), which is of course not a picture of any reality, is precisely a metaphor: 
it is not describing any feature of propositions, neither stating that propositions are 
pictures, but, as metaphors do, leading us to see propositions as pictures in order to throw 
light into how propositions work, i.e. as descriptions of a particular sort. And, unlike 
propositions, metaphors do not, so to speak, carry a content (definite or indefinite) but do 
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their job by letting us see something as another by way of a seemingly false or absurd 
literal statement which prompts a particular insight or set of insights14. They are what we 
could call transitional remarks, i.e. a sort of linguistic ladders, as it were, to borrow a 
metaphor Wittgenstein himself made famous and which we shall further consider in 
detail. Though they cannot fit the Tractatus’ notation, metaphors are, nevertheless, part 
of our ordinary means of communicating and there is nothing odd in relying upon them 
while outlining the notation’s principles. Before Wittgenstein, Frege had gone through a 
virtually identical process, which Diamond explains as follows: 
 
We are left after the transition with a logical notation that in a sense has to 
speak for itself. If we try afterwards to say why it is a good notation, we know 
that we shall find ourselves saying things which may help our listeners, but 
which we ourselves cannot regard as the expression of any true thought, 
speakable or unspeakable. When we say that the notation is a good one, when 
we explain what logical distinctions and similarities it makes perspicuous, we 
are in a sense going backwards, back to the stage at which we had been when 
grasping the point of the transition. (Diamond 1991, 183) 
 
§ 14. Take, for instance, Frege’s attempt to distinguish the notion of concept from that of 
object in their strictly logical senses, i.e. leaving aside any possible psychological 
associations that these words may suggest. With this he was trying to clarify his third 
anti-psychologist principle: “never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and 
object” (Frege 1960, xxii). He starts by reminding that such notions, being logically 
simple, cannot be defined, and hence the best we can do when introducing these logically 
simple notions, he admits, is to “lead the reader or hearer, by means of hints, to understand 
the word as is intended” (Frege 1984, 183), including the use of metaphorical expressions 
such as speaking of concepts as being ‘unsaturated’ and of objects as ‘saturated’. Of 
course, such modes of speech were not meant to fit his notation (the Fregean 
Begriffsschrift), nor could they. He was simply, in his own words, giving propaedeutic 
elucidations in order to make the distinction perspicuous within his notation, relying for 
that on allegedly unprecise ordinary words that, though having “no place in the system of 
a science” (Frege 1984, 300), which requires technical terms with fixed meanings, were 
                                                          




nevertheless necessary as a transitional stage towards the outlining of his notation, just as 
Wittgenstein later did with his own.  
For a thinker as rigorous as Frege all this was above all a matter of necessity, not of 
option, something he thought to be imposed on him by the very (imprecise) nature of 
language: “on thorough investigation it will be found that the obstacle is essential, and 
founded on the nature of our language; that we cannot avoid a certain inappropriateness 
of linguistic expression; and there is nothing for it but to realize this and always take it 
into account” (Frege 1984, 194; my emphasis). His point runs somewhat like this: there 
is no way for us to avoid imprecise formulations from time to time, which is to say that, 
outside the notation, it is not quite possible to keep the distinction between logic and 
psychology in place as sharply as one would have wished, as the construction and 
clarification of the notation itself requires us to make some concessions to the inaccuracy 
of ordinary language; this is tolerable, though, as long as one is aware of what one is 
doing, notably when using such formulations, and willing to make it as clear as possible 
to others. Hence he elsewhere wrote that “a great part of the work of the philosopher 
consists in […] a struggle with language” (Frege 1979, 270).  
The idea of a struggle with language is connected with another aspect of Frege’s 
views: for him, thought and language were not one and the same. Unlike language, 
thought was logically faultless, i.e. we think by the laws of logic, therefore being no such 
thing as illogical thoughts. And so he saw thought, not language, as the true subject of his 
investigations. However, as thoughts are expressed in language (are made perceptible to 
the senses by it, to use a Tractarian formulation), he found himself forced to recognize 
that any philosophical investigation of thought depended necessarily on a philosophical 
investigation of language, thus playing a crucial role in the so-called linguistic turn in 
philosophy. So, for him, linguistic analysis, though indispensable up to a certain point, 
was not an end in itself but only a means to explain thought. Unfortunately, though 
language was generally capable of matching thought, there were cases where it fell short, 
often distorting it or even missing it altogether. In fact, he seemed to believe that there 
were certain thoughts that could not be apprehended through the standard (propositional) 
means of linguistic expression, as was the case with logically simple notions. He had 
indeed developed an extensive account of how a thought expressed by a proposition is 
grasped, but was now left in a rather uncomfortable position. The following passage, still 
regarding the distinction between concept and object, gives us a good indication of this 




I admit that there is a quite peculiar obstacle in the way of an understanding 
with the reader. By kind of a necessity of language, my expressions, taken 
literally, miss my thought; I mention an object, when what I intend is a 
concept. I fully realize that in such cases I was relying upon a reader who 
would be ready to meet me half-way – who does not begrudge a pinch of salt. 
(Frege 1984, 193; my emphasis) 
 
It is clear that, for Frege, anything that could at all be thought was made perspicuous 
by a proper logical notation. Unlike everyday language, the ideal language of the notation 
was supposed to do full justice to thought. Rather, the difficulty had to do with the 
intermediate stage of introducing the notation, the transitional steps to move from a 
logically defective medium such as everyday language to one where all these problems 
had been overcome. It was also clear to him that the hinting strategies he relied upon to 
clarify the notions and distinctions that eluded language did not work as expressions of 
any thoughts. They were just hints. A distinction such as that between concept and object 
could only be grasped, so to speak, in its nakedness, i.e. without linguistic clothing. The 
hints were meant to draw attention to that, though the distinction could not itself be 
properly put into words, it was nevertheless reflected in features of language, features 
which the notation sought to render even clearer. And, of course, one who was already in 
command of the notation could well dispense such hints. 
Now, Wittgenstein, who seemed to be proceeding very similarly, tried to dissolve 
this tension, which he saw as springing from Frege’s general view of logic. Unlike 
Russell, who regarded logic as being concerned with the most general facts in the universe 
(underpinning, so to speak, all empirical facts), Frege understood logic as having a strictly 
normative character and hence being purely formal, one of the most important things 
Wittgenstein owed to him. However, he somehow felt that logical necessity was still in 
need of some ulterior foundation, which led him to postulate a kind of Platonic realm 
where logical laws were to be grounded. Having rejected the idea of logic relating to the 
empirical world, he nevertheless acknowledged a certain notion of logical truth, i.e. that 
logical laws, being necessary, were a sort of eternal, abstract truths. This led him further 
to accept, for instance, that logical connectives were names of functions, and so that in a 
way they were still concepts of a certain kind, or that logical propositions described 
relations between abstract (logical) entities. And so he nevertheless regarded it as being 
a subject of some sort, one that, though abstract, could still somehow be a content of 
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(propositional) thoughts, a step away from his own recognition of logic’s purely formal 
nature. 
But given its purely formal nature, the very idea of thinking about logic is rendered 
vulnerable, if not untenable. For if the rules of logic are the rules of thought, of our 
reasoning apparatus, it seems hard to think of someone thinking (in the sense of 
articulating a propositional content) about the very rules that govern our thought. We can 
of course say that we come into direct acquaintance of such rules by thinking, even give 
hints of them in ordinary speech (which can only succeed because everybody is already 
acquainted with them, even if only tacitly), or clarify them by means of formalizations, 
but to think and talk about them, in the sense one thinks and talks about ordinary matters 
of fact, would seem to require an unconceivable position outside of logic, i.e. outside of 
thought. And so, against Russell and partly against Frege, Wittgenstein sought to make 
clear that “in logic we are not dealing with truths or facts, ineffable or otherwise. […] a 
logical distinction might be said to be genuine insofar as its recognition solves a 
philosophical or logical difficulty or difficulties, but one need not maintain that there are 
therefore some kinds of truths about it, or that we could speak of it as if about a fact or 
truth” (Kuusela 2011, 133). On his view, logic is not a content of our thoughts but their 
very structure, not a matter of thinking that p but of thinking tout court. This is what he 
meant by logic being transcendental (TLP 6.13). Hence, there can be no such thing as 
thinking about logically simple notions (e.g. thinking that a concept is such-and-such), 
and distinctions of logical category such as that between concept and object require 
elucidation simply because they are not a subject of any thought, effable or ineffable. 
Frege had been under an illusion, Wittgenstein assumed, in having the impression that 
there was anything at all behind his elucidatory hints, something that propositions proper 
failed to express. 
Being transcendental, in this sense of purely formal, of not relating to the empirical 
world, logic cannot thus be subject of any doctrine or theory. “The idea of a science of 
logic is, on Wittgenstein’s account, nothing but illusion” (Diamond 1991, 201). By 
outlining his logical notation he was not at all (or so he thought) committed to any theory 
or doctrine about logic, but expressing logical insights which were, as it were, embodied15 
                                                          
15 Kuusela explains this as follows: “What it means for general logic insights, such as the insight that the 
negation sign is not a name and that propositions are (re)presentations of states of affairs, to be embodied 
(to find their expression) in Wittgenstein’s concept-script, is simply that this notation treats certain 
expressions as analyzable in certain (but not other) ways. This is, briefly, a matter of there being certain 
rules of translation that govern the codification of expressions (signs with use) into the concept-script, and 
that not just anything counts as such a translation.” (Kuusela 2011, 137; my emphasis) 
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in the notation itself, not asserted by any theoretical formulations. Such insights were not 
meant to provide any new piece of information about logic (there was no such thing for 
him) but simply to target at and hopefully help to dissolve particular conceptual 
confusions regarding the nature of logic, notably that logical connectives were somehow 
representative. As he put it in a 1929 manuscript, in the notation “an entire way of looking 
at the object is expressed; the angle from which I now regard the thing. The notation is 
the last expression of a philosophical view” (apud Kuusela 2011, 134; my emphases). 
Kuusela adds: 
 
Essentially, what is at stake is the reader’s recognition of the dissolution of 
logical or philosophical problems on the basis of that very same non-
theoretical linguistic [and logical] capacity that allows her to recognize 
something as philosophically or logically problematic (e.g. paradoxical) in 
the first place. In this sense, Wittgenstein only needs to appeal, in introducing 
his concept-script, to what the reader already knows as a language user. This 
non-theoretical comprehension is the justificatory ground of Wittgenstein’s 
notation. (Kuusela 2011, 137) 
 
§ 15. It is now time, however, to distinguish intentions from achievements once again. As 
Kuusela points out, there was nevertheless at least one clear dogmatic commitment in the 
Tractatus: the idea of there being a strictly correct method in philosophy, i.e. the method 
of logical analysis of language in terms of the notation’s own standards, aimed at a 
comprehensive dissolution of logical and philosophical problems. Now, accepting 
Wittgenstein’s notation as one among many other valid tools for philosophical 
clarification would be one thing. To take it as the correct tool, as a canonical notation, 
quite another.  
By the standards of his later works this was a most unwittgensteinian thing to do: 
instead of seeking a genuine Übersicht of things, resulting from an overlapping of 
different angles or points of view (from quite contrasting to subtly diverging ones), to 
privilege, above all others, a single angle or point of view and dogmatically accept it as 
the correct one. Indeed, in the remark quoted above, he speaks of a way of looking, the 
angle, and a philosophical view. This brings out at once a very significant contrast but 
also a quite striking continuity between the Tractatus and a later text like the 
Investigations: on the one hand, and as for the continuity, in neither of them, the notion 
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of view is to be understood as theoretically charged, which is also to say that in neither 
did Wittgenstein intend to construct doctrines or theories (this is a guiding principle in all 
his philosophical work); on the other, and here does the contrast lie, while the 
Investigations, and in a way as a reaction to the mistake(s) of the Tractatus, sought for as 
wide a variety of perspectives as likely, in the Tractatus he limited his enquiry to a single 
one, i.e. “the perforated screen of logic” (Ryle 2009, 275), by means of his canonical 
notation, which turned out to be somewhat “like the shoes of Chinese ladies, which 
deformed their feet and prevented them from walking on them” (Ryle 2009, 264). 
As we have observed, the mere construction of a notation does not per se entail any 
theoretical commitments, and its prime criterion of correction is mostly a matter of logical 
reliability and effectiveness, not of being an accurate model of any features of reality. 
Though it is still a kind of mirror (or screen, to use Ryle’s word), it is a self-acknowledged 
restricted and artificial one, a set of tools. However, this only remains so as long as its 
range of applicability is kept limited up to a certain point, and, clearly, in the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein crosses these limits and by quite a long margin, ending up betraying his own 
intents. So, though a notation’s correctness need not be a matter of it corresponding to 
features of reality, when promoted to a canonical status such as here it follows that it must 
have something in common with its object of analysis in order to fulfil its task. While he 
did not seek to put forward any theory of meaning, just a notation, his abusive use of it as 
the sole and whole correct method of philosophical analysis commits him, though largely 
unwittingly, to such a theory. Kuusela is spot on here. He puts it as follows: 
 
For although one isn’t committed to any doctrines about language by simply 
constructing a notation, to maintain that all logical unclarities can be settled 
through analysis in terms of a particular logical notation is to commit oneself 
to a thesis about language. This is how a thesis about the essence of language 
sneaks into the Tractatus. The back door through which metaphysics enters 
Wittgenstein’s early philosophy is his […] assumption that there should be 
something like the correct method of philosophy, and the dogmatic 
imposition of a particular framework of analysis onto language as the one to 
be adopted. (Kuusela 2011, 140) 
 
And he continues: “to impose a mode of presentation onto the phenomena and 
assume that they all must fit, comes to exactly the same as putting forward a philosophical 
thesis about the necessary characteristics of things” (Kuusela 2011, 141). So, details 
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aside, the most substantial differences between Kuusela’s reading and that of the most 
prominent so-called standard readers are a matter of intentions ascribed to the early 
Wittgenstein. These are important differences. In fact, Kuusela’s contribution to 
Tractarian interpretation, a “dialectical synthesis” (Read & Deans 2011, 149) breaking 
through the “Wars” of the last couple of decades, may so far be arguably the most 
significant one since the definite establishment of the resolute interpretative program with 
The New Wittgenstein’s first appearance in 2000. And given the principle of charity, 
assuming, as Goldfarb, “that we should like to understand the Tractatus in a way that 
renders it as coherent as possible” (Goldfarb 2011, 14), and that Kuusela’s proposal seems 
to have a stronger chance to stand as a faithful one in light of the challenges presented by 
pieces of external evidence, factors about which he is quite thoughtful, I shall for now 
assume that, at least in general outline, he may very well be right16. In what concerns 
determination of authorial intentions, a viable ‘third way’ has been developed out of “the 
Tractatus Wars”, one which deserves to be become as widespread as the other two. 
As of a matter of the book’s actual achievements, though, my main concern here, 
the difference is not great, if any. By unreasonably promoting his notation to a canonical 
status, Wittgenstein ended up converting it into the picture theory along the lines that we 
have sketched above. Unlike what standard readings tell us, this was above all an accident, 
which gives us a much more sane picture of the early Wittgenstein. Intentions aside, 
however, the result is virtually the same. The notation turns into a theory and everything 
collapses just as we have tried to exemplify before considering Kuusela’s reading, though 
a variety of significant non-systematic insights shall nevertheless remain intact after the 
system’s collapse. In addition, this new reading also ends up drawing attention to that one 
does not need to be as patently unrealistic as the Wittgenstein of standard readings of the 
Tractatus in order to fall prey to illusions, to become entangled in paradoxes, and end up 
speaking nothing but nonsense. It shows that one must indeed be extremely careful about 
what one is doing when doing philosophy. Take, for instance, the following image (let 
me call it, somewhat following Ryle’s ‘prefatory parable’, an elucidatory tale): 
 
The young and brilliant Ludwig built a pair of specially designed glasses that 
would help him to see certain things in a more precise way. This was the 
intended plan and at first he knew he was not meant to put them on all the 
                                                          
16 Some further tests still await it, though. It may, for instance, have a hard time dealing with the claim that 
the totality of propositions is language. 
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time. However, the experience of wearing the glasses was striking. His vision 
acquired a crystalline purity, he had the impression that his eyes could 
penetrate everything, right up to the ultimate structure of things. He soon got 
addicted to the glasses and never took them out, now looking at everything 
through them. He kept them even when he went to bed. At night, he dreamed 
of being stationed outside the world, staring at it right in the face, 
contemplating the essence of its structure. Later on, he even forgot that he 
was at all wearing glasses. They had not at all been designed for such 
intensive use, though, neither could have they. His vision started suffering: 
the crystalline purity was still there, but there were now clouded areas too. 
With time, the clouded areas became more and more numerous. He nearly 
went blind. One afternoon, barely being able to see, he climbed to the top of 
a tree, hoping that a higher point of view would somehow help his vision. By 
the time he finished climbing he had gone completely blind. He tried to look 
inside himself, recalling the visions of his dreams. For a moment he thought 
he may have had regained sight. He suddenly slipped, falling right back to the 
ground, the rough ground of his garden. The glasses fell too and got scattered 
into pieces. He bumped his head with some force and for a while still saw all 
the matching little forms he used to see before. When recovered, he took a 
deep breath, stayed silent for a while, in awe of what had happened, and 
eventually made up his mind. Luckily he was not hurt, luckily he had not gone 
blind (nor mad), he had regained the vision he used to have before ever trying 
the glasses. It had all been a monumental illusion. Something was different, 
though. The world was exactly as he had left it, but he still perceived a slight 
change, though he could not quite tell what it was. Then he saw the glasses’ 
wrecks: now he knew! Or, rather, he understood he did not quite knew. He 
picked them up and, instead of throwing them out in the garbage bin, kept 
them in a little box. 
 
My point is as simple as this: even if the first few lines of the story had been 
different, i.e. if Ludwig had designed his glasses with the purpose of wearing them all the 
time and seeing everything through them, all the rest would have remained identical, the 
only difference being that readers would above all see it, on the version here told, as an 
audacious experience gone wrong, on the alternative one as a case of near madness. Either 
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way, though, the moral of the story, including what Ludwig came to understand in the 
end, would remain the same. 
 
§ 16. I can now, at last, turn to Diamond, and in particular to two central features of her 
interpretation of the Tractatus, a standard setter among resolute readings: the alleged 
frame-body distinction within the book’s structure, and the so-called austere conception 
of nonsense. When first introduced among Tractarian discussions, the frame was said to 
consist of its preface and closing remarks (6.54 and 7) and to contain “instructions, as it 
were, for us as readers of it. Read it in light of what it says at the beginning about its aim, 
and what it says at the end about how you are meant to take what it contains” (Diamond 
2000, 151). The so-called body, in its turn, is what is supposed to be simply nonsense, in 
this case deliberately framed nonsense which the reader should be able to recognize as so 
with the help of the frame’s instructions. It has since been a widely adopted notion by 
resolute readers, though not without some controversy: for instance, some still accept its 
initial formulation, others have suggested an expansion meant to include at least some of 
the metaphilosophical remarks to be found among the 4s, which they see as equally 
instructive, and others have not quite bought into it, considering it rather misleading, even 
from a resolute point of view.  
As I shall look into the metaphilosophical story more closely later on, I will for now 
limit my attention to the preface and the closing remarks. I too tend to find the notion of 
a frame misleading, for various reasons, but especially for that passages such as the 
preface and 7 are, as I see them, still among the not so reasonable (if at all intelligible) 
parts of the book, i.e. they are still part of what I think one should overcome. It is thus 
quite deliberately that I have until now avoided mentioning any of these passages, and so 
I think I have already made one of my points clear: one does not at all require a frame, a 
set of instructions of any kind, in order to recognize that the apparent doctrines of the 
Tractatus are illusory ones, i.e. that they collapse into nonsense, and that such recognition, 
after we had tried to make sense of them, can teach us quite a lot. In fact, Diamond herself 
agrees that “in the end nothing important for the resolute reading depends on the frame-
body distinction” (Kuusela 2015, 231; my emphasis). And so my aim in discussing the 
‘frame’ here will not be to discuss it as a frame, as a set of instructions distinct from the 
rest, but to try to look at these particular passages afresh and rethink their roles within the 




§ 17. Let me begin with the preface. I shall do no more than locate its key claims and 
attempt to sketch possible interpretations of them, often more than one: 
(1) “Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already 
had the thoughts that are expressed in it – or at least similar thoughts. – So it is not a 
textbook” (Wittgenstein 2001, 3). About this, Diamond observes that his “intention is not 
that the book should teach us things that we did not know; it does not address itself to our 
ignorance” (Diamond 2000, 149). This should be a rather uncontroversial point: whether 
we opt for a standard or resolute reading, or for an intermediate one such as Kuusela’s, it 
should be clear that in neither case did Wittgenstein intend to present us with any new 
information. His insistence that philosophy is not a science, that it cannot yield doctrines 
or theories, is quite conclusive. There is nonetheless a further distinction to be made: 
when distinguishing philosophy from the empirical sciences, he puts equal emphasis on 
its inherently practical character – it “is not a body of doctrine but an activity” (TLP 
4.112) –, i.e. that philosophy (like logic) is not a matter of knowing that but of knowing 
how, and that the latter is not quite reducible to the former. Ryle, who was well aware of 
it, puts it: though not being concerned with a theoretical body of knowledge, such as in 
the sciences, one can still be “skilful or unskilful, successful or unsuccessful [in 
philosophy]. It is in pursuing the activity itself that we see what we need to see” (Ryle 
2009, 262). Moreover, what is being suggested in this initial comment is that perhaps only 
reasonably advanced ‘players of the game’, i.e. people who had already learned some of 
the activity’s crucial skills and been grappling with the same kind of issues (the nature of 
logic and philosophy, of the bounds of sense, and so on), may have a chance to understand 
what is at stake in the book. He most probably had Frege and Russell in mind, to whom 
he recognized a considerable intellectual debt. And that, despite their extraordinarily 
advanced skills, they both failed to understand the Tractatus’ fundamental aim may have 
very well had to do with their failure to understand that philosophical (and logical) 
investigation could not be a sort of science. 
(2) The reason why the problems of philosophy “are posed is that the logic of our 
language is misunderstood” (ibid.). To misunderstand the logic of language is not, for 
instance, to run over a set of previously fixed rules allegedly governing the uses of words 
in sentences – what has been fondly called logical syntax – but to (a) fail to distinguish 
what is logical from what is psychological, (b) use sentences while failing to assign them 
a meaning, and (c) confusedly mix-up distinct uses of language such as descriptive (or 
constative) and illuminating (or elucidatory) ones. These three features are inseparable 
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from each other: by being under the illusion that the psychological accompaniments 
prompted by certain signs or sentences already count as meanings, independently of their 
logical roles, one often fails to assign meaning, i.e. a logical role, to them and hence speak 
as if saying something when in fact nothing at all is being said. On standard readings, one 
is supposed to disclose this kind of confusions by following the method of logical analysis 
outlined in the Tractatus, on resolute ones all that is required for us to recognize them is 
nothing but our ordinary (though hopefully sharp) linguistic and logical capacities. I have 
tried to exemplify the latter when discussing the picture theory above. 
(3) “The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what 
can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in 
silence” (ibid.). Now, this may well look as if a distinction between two fundamental 
categories of things is being implied: “things speakable about and things not speakable 
about, and the suggestion appears to be that Wittgenstein is going to draw the line between 
them: what words can reach and what they cannot” (Diamond 2000, 149). And, at first, 
one may even believe oneself able to identify such categories: on the speakable side we 
have ordinary matters of fact, the subject of empirical sciences; on the unspeakable we 
have above all formal matters and matters of (absolute) value, the alleged subjects of e.g. 
logic, mathematics, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, or religion. The former are concerned 
with contingent features of reality, the latter with necessary ones. This is to say that 
though scientists may inductively infer necessary laws of nature from the inspection of 
contingent matters of fact and subsequent recognition of certain regular patterns among 
them, they are deprived from stating such laws. 
However, if one follows the Tractatus carefully enough, either resolutely or 
irresolutely, one should notice that this supposed second category of unspeakable things 
is not quite a category, as it does not have things of any sort as its subjects. As Diamond 
puts it, “just as logic is not, for Wittgenstein, a particular subject, with its own body of 
truths, but penetrates all thought, so ethics has no particular subject matter; rather, an 
ethical spirit, an attitude to the world and life, can penetrate any thought or talk” 
(Diamond 2000, 153). Though for quite different reasons, the early Wittgenstein would 
have then agreed with Neurath’s remark that “one should indeed be silent, but not about 
anything” (apud Hacker 2000, 355). He saw the philosophical chatter about logic or ethics 
as empty not because it tried to say something that could not be said, but because there 
was nothing which logic or ethics could be about. Take again, for instance, the case of 
laws of nature: when we say that there are laws of nature we are not trying to say 
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something that cannot be said but that is shown by a set of patterns of observed 
regularities in nature (as if we could infer that, though we cannot see or grab them, they 
would still have to be somewhere), but using a certain mode of expression to refer to those 
patterns; laws of nature “are not descriptions of nature, but forms of description” (Hacker 
2000, 354; my emphasis). Resolute readers have been keen to emphasize this point, but 
even when one is still under the illusion that the picture theory may be intelligible qua 
theory, it should be clear that what is said to be shown is not something. Rather, what is 
shown is what penetrates everything, and so it cannot itself be anything, at least in the 
ordinary sense of ‘to be’ (or ‘to exist’). 
And, now, very much like Frege, I could well feel tempted to complain that 
language forces me to misleadingly employ e.g. ‘what’ in cases when there is nothing 
corresponding to it. In fact, I have been using quite curious expressions all the way 
through the last couple of paragraphs, and it should now be clear that this may be 
inevitable as long as one is willing to draw sharp distinctions between, so to speak, full 
and empty sentences, no matter whether that alleged emptiness springs from these 
sentences trying to gesture at what cannot be said or from there being nothing at all behind 
them apart from confusion, or between genuine and chimerical subjects. This is not to say 
that we do not often come up with meaningless talk and pursue illusory enterprises, but 
rather that this is not something that can be settled in abstract, i.e. by identifying a range 
of hypothetical pseudo-subjects whose sentences per se end up being nonsensical. These 
are matters which are to be decided piecemeal, and that itself should be enough for us to 
see that the kind of enquiry we have in our hands cannot be a scientific one. I will come 
back to this, but for now what I would like to suggest is that the very words that are said 
to sum up the whole sense of the book seem to be highly unreasonable. At best, these 
words should themselves be nothing but elucidatory hints that we could well dispense 
after having understood the book’s point, or at least not to be taken as the expression of 
any truths. If that is so, and I do not quite see how it could be otherwise, the idea of a 
frame becomes problematic. 
(4) “[T]he truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me 
unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe to have found, on all essential points, the 
final solution to the problems” (Wittgenstein 2001, 4). This is indeed, given the rest of 
the preface (and the rest of the book), a most puzzling remark, as the idea that the 
Tractatus communicates true thoughts, i.e. true propositions, does not seem compatible 
with its self-acknowledged practical character and its refusal to convey any kind of factual 
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information. Juliet Floyd, for instance, suggests that, as the rest of the preface, this remark 
is “ironic” (Hacker 2000, 383). This would be an easy way out of trouble. Probably too 
easy. My own proposal to dissolve the puzzle may in fact suffer from similar problems 
but it still seems to me to be a more tenable one: it consists in assuming that the notion of 
thought here employed may not necessarily correspond to the notion of thought which 
the Tractatus seems to account for, i.e. of thought in a strictly logical sense, as amounting 
to nothing else than thinking that p. Being a relatively fluid notion overall, this may not 
be implausible. And so my proposal is to read this remark as no more than an expression 
of the early Wittgenstein’s somewhat unrealistic faith in the method (either an irresolute 
one of logical analysis or a resolute one of deterrence by example) he had just developed, 
i.e. that he was now equipped, as no one had been before, to bring metaphysics to a close, 
which squares fairly well with his later recognition, already by the early 1930s, that in the 
Tractatus he had “still proceeded dogmatically” (apud Kuusela 2011, 140), even if not 
intending to construct doctrines of any sort, and that in philosophy there can be no such 
thing as the correct method, but rather that one should be able “to tailor methods to 
particular problems” (Kuusela 2011, 142). 
(5) “[T]he value of this work consists in that it shows how little is achieved when 
these problems are solved” (ibid.). After such emphatic announcements of definitive 
truths and final solutions the final assessment of the book’s value is a most anti-climactic 
ending to it. This has two main implications: (1) that philosophical (or metaphysical) 
problems and theories were really nothing but houses of cards – after we expose their 
nonsensicality and see them collapse, which requires significant effort, the world is left 
exactly as it had ever been, as all we had been doing was a matter of dissolving illusions; 
and (2) that, more importantly, what most mattered to us human beings, ethics, i.e. the 
ethical spirit, the meaning of life, was left untouched by all this seemingly titanic 
enterprise. We can here notice a further tension in Wittgenstein’s thought, one which, 
despite some back and forths, he never quite settled throughout his life: while firmly 
denying that ethics may be about something and hence rejecting the idea of ethical 
questions or truths, he still held, at least as firmly, that ethics (in a wide sense, comprising 
all absolute value) was the single most important (no)thing to concern us. 
(6) Finally, I have decided to leave the following passage as a conclusion to our 




“[T]he aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather – not to thought, 
but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to 
thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we 
should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). 
It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies 
on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense.” (Wittgenstein 2001, 
3-4) 
 
It is true that, as Diamond suggests, the use of ‘will simply be nonsense’ seems to 
imply, in contrast with the previous remark about one having to seemingly remain silent 
about something, that in light of the Tractatus there are no unspeakable things or truths 
and that all nonsense is just plain nonsense – this would be another sign of the book’s 
internal dialectic. But what is most striking about this passage, however, is its doubly 
paradoxical nature. Wittgenstein begins by self-consciously offering an incoherent 
formulation and appears to correct himself immediately afterwards. For the first few 
seconds, the reader may even have the impression that the proposed reformulation will 
do but should soon realize that the initial difficulty had only been delayed, as the exact 
same incoherence remains in place. Just as he had done regarding the idea of drawing a 
limit to thought, Wittgenstein could well have said “not to language (the expression of 
thoughts): for in order to be able to draw a limit to language we should have to be able to 
find both sides of the limit sayable (i.e. we should have to be able to say what cannot be 
said). And then, of course, there would be no third alternative, one that could make sense, 
no funny dance or whistling. So, this passage is at best a deliberate piece of transitional 
nonsense, which, again, seems to weaken the idea of a frame (unless one is to allow that 
the preface itself contains bits of framed nonsense), at worse evidence of confusion on 
Wittgenstein’s part. But what should really matter is that in either case it pretty much 
sums up the kind of difficulties one is to encounter within the body of the book, as we 
cannot now fail to recognize that the “frustrating conclusion” (Ryle 2009, 262) that to 
“try to tell what makes the difference between significant and nonsensical talk is itself to 
cross the divide between significant and nonsensical talk” (ibid.), one of the most 
important lessons (if not the most important) one is to learn from the Tractatus, was 




§ 18. Before closing the book by repeating that “[w]hereof one cannot speak, thereof one 
must be silent” (TLP 7), Wittgenstein introduces what has arguably been its most often 
quoted and discussed passage throughout “the Tractatus Wars”: 6.54. It has been 
translated in different ways and we should indeed keep an eye on the interpretative 
differences that come out in the different translations. I shall compare at least three. The 
still canonical translation by Pears and McGuinness, for instance, reads as follows: 
 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used 
them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away 
the ladder after he has climbed up it.) 
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. 
(Wittgenstein 2001, 89) 
 
And here is what we find in Ogden’s initial translation: 
 
“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally 
recognizes them as senseless, when has climbed out through them, on them, 
over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed 
up on it.) 
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. 
(Wittgenstein 2016, 108) 
 
In addition, I have decided to include the following one by Anscombe, which, 
though slightly freer, I find to be perhaps the most reliable among the three: 
 
My sentences are illuminating in the following way: one who understands me 
rejects them as nonsensical if, using them as steps, he has climbed out over 
them. He must as it were throw away the ladder after he has climbed it. Then 
he sees the world rightly. (Anscombe 2011, 175) 
 
Apart from Ogden’s misleading use of ‘senseless’, the word corresponding to 
‘sinnlos’, characteristic of tautologies and contradictions, instead of ‘nonsensical’, the 
counterpart of ‘unsinnig’, characteristic of pseudo-propositions, a contrast explicitly 
marked throughout the text, the remaining differences amount to a matter of detail. For 
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instance, White agrees, as I do, with Anscombe’s translation of ‘Sätze’ as ‘sentences’, 
instead of the customary ‘propositions’, remarking that “there is an oddity to my ear in 
describing something which is nonsense as a proposition” (White 2011, 59). In fact, if we 
take ‘proposition’ in its technical sense, i.e. as referring to a compulsorily meaningful 
assertion (either true or false), to talk of a ‘nonsensical proposition’ would itself be a 
contradiction in terms. Wittgenstein makes clear that a nonsensical sentence with the 
grammatical form of a proposition is not a proposition but a pseudo-proposition.  
A further issue is concerned with the translation of ‘erläutern’. The most direct one 
would arguably be ‘elucidate’, i.e. ‘My sentences elucidate in the following way: […]’, 
which is not too different from Ogden’s ‘are elucidatory’. Now, though a notion such as 
‘Erläuterung’, i.e. ‘elucidation’, in the sense of ‘making (something) clear’ or ‘throwing 
light into (something)’ is a commonplace one in the German language, there have been 
suggestions that in Frege or Wittgenstein it plays a somewhat technical role, something 
to which the Pears and McGuinness translation ‘serve as elucidations’ may contribute. 
Conant, for example, in a paper entitled “Elucidation and nonsense in Frege and early 
Wittgenstein” (2000), emphasizes the relation between Frege’s use of elucidations, in the 
sense of the preliminary hints we have mentioned, and Wittgenstein’s, as in a way 
modifying Frege’s and using his own hints as a means to draw attention to the very 
absurdity of the task at hand and so to the limits of thought and philosophy, not to any 
features of a theory or notation. This leads him to the conclusion that the exact same 
notion of elucidation is employed both in 6.54 and when, after having described 
philosophy as an activity, not a body of doctrine, Wittgenstein asserts that a “a 
philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations” (TLP 4.112). Conant is here 
taking ‘elucidations’ in the sense of ‘deliberately employed nonsensical sentences’ which 
might appear to make sense at first look and are meant to lead the reader into the 
aforementioned imaginative activity that may end up freeing him from philosophical 
illusion after he is able to recognize the elucidations’ own nonsensicality. And so he takes 
this sentence, as its adjacent ones, as part of the frame, in a way complementing 6.54 and 
providing further evidence of the idea that the body of the book is essentially composed 
of nonsensical sentences which are to be resolutely thrown away after having served their 
elucidatory purpose. 
I find this assumption problematic and, again, just as I think of the idea of a frame, 
I do not think that the possibility of a resolute reading may in any way depend crucially 
on it. White may very well be right in observing that when “an innocent word like 
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“Erläuterung” suddenly becomes a quasi-technical term” (White 2011, 50) the boat is 
being pushed out just a little too far. Nowhere in the Tractatus a definition of elucidation 
as meaning what Conant takes it to mean is given (and, apart from 6.54, not even 
intimated), though in the end I do certainly agree with him about how the book’s 
nonsensical sentences may elucidate us. And notice that immediately after saying that a 
philosophical work consists of elucidations, Wittgenstein appears to explain this very 
notion of elucidation (as used in 4.112): “Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical 
propositions’, but rather in clarifications of propositions” (TLP 4.112; my emphasis)17. 
Elucidations, then, the main task of a philosophical work, are clarifications of 
propositions, of thoughts, which would otherwise be “cloudy and indistinct” (ibid.). And 
so, in this sense, an elucidation is not itself to be taken as a sentence but as a particular 
exercise of analysis, most probably to be employed with the tools of Wittgenstein’s 
notation. This is to say that, in each of its three occurrences (3.263, 4.112 and 6.54) 
throughout the Tractatus, ‘Erläuterung’ is used with three different meanings (in case we 
take them as meaningful): elucidation in a Fregean or quasi-Fregean sense of 
metaphorical (or even nonsensical) hint – 6.54; elucidation as logical analysis of language 
– 4.112; and elucidation as a proposition which contains a name “and ‘elucidates’ that 
name for a person acquainted with its reference” (Anscombe 1971, 27) – 3.263. And so 
with her ‘illuminating’, a viable translation of this non-technical notion, and quite suited 
to the sense intended in 6.54, Anscombe virtually dissolves the issue. 
How are we, then, supposed to read this passage? Again, it would be mistaken to 
think, as many do, that we need Wittgenstein’s warning in it in order to recognize that we 
had so far been dealing with nonsensical sentences. In fact, when reaching 6.54, anyone 
who had been reading the book with ‘understanding’ (no matter if resolutely or 
irresolutely) should have the following reaction: of course! Rather, what may surprise us 
is his avowal that, though nonsensical, these sentences are illuminating, i.e. that they 
somehow throw light into something, that, if taken rightly, they were helping us along the 
way. The genuine issue concerning Wittgenstein’s acknowledgement of his sentences’ 
nonsensicality is that of understanding the reason why they are nonsense. And, even more 
importantly, there is also the question of understanding what does he mean by these 
nonsensical sentences being illuminating. One thing is for certain: though transitional, the 
                                                          
17 And just before “Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity” (TLP 4.112), it is said that 
“Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts” (ibid.), a further reason for us to think that it 
would be rather odd if the sentence speaking of elucidations were not as tightly linked to its adjacent ones 
as it seems to be. 
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ladder climbing is necessary. They cannot be illuminating for one who does no more than 
throwing them out as nonsense, without first having tried to do considerable work with 
them, i.e. they can only be recognized and thus rejected as nonsensical if one has climbed 
out over them, i.e. if one has tried to understand them. Then, of course, he will recognize 
that there can be no such thing as understanding them, and so it is never too much to 
emphasize that Wittgenstein “chooses his words to draw attention to a contrast between 
understanding a person and understanding what the person says” (Diamond 2001,150), 
hence speaking of ‘one who understands me’ (him, Wittgenstein), not them (his 
nonsensical sentences): we are meant to understand what he was trying to do with those 
sentences, not what they were seemingly saying or trying to say.  
 
§ 19. Four notions present themselves as key for us to understand Wittgenstein, to grasp 
what he had been here willing to show us: (i) nonsense, (ii) nonsense being illuminating 
(or elucidatory), (iii) transition (encompassing the whole idea of climbing a ladder which 
can be dispensed after fulfilling its role), and (iv) seeing the world rightly (what we are 
supposed to achieve by grasping Wittgenstein’s intent). Based on the different ways 
readers of the Tractatus usually look at this passage, I will sketch three different 
interpretations, each giving a different look to each of these four key notions. The first 
will be a standard reading, roughly in Hacker’s lines, the second one inspired by 
Kuusela’s interpretation, and the third a resolute one more or less corresponding to those 
of Diamond or Conant. More than trying to expound their readings, I am here interested 
in assembling three different kinds of reading from which a revealing Übersicht of the 
passage may emerge. This will also help us to recap various things that have been 
discussed so far. Moreover, let us assume for now that when we refer to the Tractatus’ 
nonsensical sentences we are virtually referring to the totality of the book, from 1 right 
up to 6.53, as “6.54 seems to suggest that there was something nonsensical about 
everything that has led up to that point” (White 2011, 48). 
(1) The sentences of the Tractatus, apparently forming a tight system with the 
picture theory at its heart, are nonsense because, by trying to state ineffable features of 
reality, such as its logical form, they run over the rules of logical syntax that this ineffable 
form itself fixes. However, by understanding why these features cannot be said (or even 
thought, as thought and language are one and the same), and why every attempt to put 
them into words generates nonsense, we end up realizing that in fact we did not at all need 
to say or think them, as they can be apprehended by our grasp of the forms of our 
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meaningful expressions about what can be said, i.e. propositions standing for contingent 
matters of fact: it is in this sense that propositions are said to show e.g. the logical form 
of reality. So, the nonsensical sentences of the Tractatus are said to be illuminating for, 
despite failing to say anything, they may nevertheless manage to draw our attention to 
those ineffable features which make themselves manifest (notice that this is the only time 
throughout the book in which the idea of nonsense being capable of gesturing at ineffable 
features may seem to be implied). And they do so because, though they are nonsense, 
what they try to say is indeed quite correct and so they still somehow manage to gesture18 
at what they would say if they had a sense, i.e. if what they were trying to say could be 
said.  
This, of course, is not the strictly correct method of philosophy sketched above: “to 
say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science […] and then, 
whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him 
that he had failed to give meaning to certain signs in his sentences (TLP 6.53). Still, it is 
a necessary transitional method in order to establish the strictly correct one, for we can 
only start employing the latter after the bounds of sense have been recognized. Before we 
can end any metaphysical speculation, we must first be aware of the only correct 
metaphysics, which is itself what governs the sense that we talk, and understand that we 
cannot say anything about it. Hence, to climb up the ladder is to go through this 
transitional method and once its task is complete, i.e. once we have grasped those 
ineffable features of reality, which was only made possible by our previous tacit 
awareness of them (shown by our ability to use language meaningfully), and at the same 
time given up the idea of trying to state them, we may well dispense it and adhere to the 
correct one, which can only work after one has come to see the world rightly, i.e. from 
the correct logical point of view. And it is also from this point of view that we may finally 
come to grasp the essence of ethics and understand why we must remain silent about it. 
(It is not clear, however, what the sentences of these last two paragraphs might mean.) 
(2) If we take the self-acknowledged nonsensical sentences of the Tractatus as 
outlining a notation rather than an ineffable metaphysical system, things seem to change 
considerably. On this account, ‘nonsense’ is not necessarily taken as ‘absurd’ or 
‘meaningless’ but simply as ‘untranslatable’ into a logically perspicuous language. And 
so we can see most of these sentences as being illuminating in the way metaphors and 
                                                          
18 In a sense not to be equated with the Tractarian sense of ‘showing’, though it is not clear what this other 
sense might be. 
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other figurative modes of expressions are. In this, as we have seen, there is a definite 
parallel with Frege’s preliminary hints meant to introduce some key terms of his notation 
that eluded definition. We climb the ladder by grasping what these metaphors and similar 
devices are drawing attention to – e.g. that propositions work somewhat like pictures, and 
so on – and in the end we should be in command of the notation, not needing to rely upon 
these supplementary aids anymore. 
To say that one who is in command of the notation comes to see the world rightly 
should make us suspicious about Wittgenstein’s intents, though, as it appears that he may 
very well be overestimating its powers. We could still give him the benefit of the doubt 
and accept that as the role of propositions is that of describing the world, the notation 
would be supposed to allow us to sharpen our view of the world through a clarification 
of our linguistic descriptions of it. But as we know the rest of the story, it might have been 
already a sign of the aforementioned dogmatic commitment which would lead his project 
to collapse into something analogous to (1), i.e. paradox and absurdity, and, eventually, 
nothingness. 
(3) From a resolute point of view, to throw the ladder away is to throw all the 
nonsense, mere nonsense, away, including the very idea “that there is something or other 
in reality that we gesture at, however badly, when we speak of the ‘logical form of reality’, 
so that it, what we were gesturing at, is there but cannot be expressed in words” (Diamond 
1991, 181)19. To pretend to throw away the ladder while preserving the saying-showing 
distinction as is presented in the Tractatus – what appears to allow ineffability 
interpretations a chance, despite, again, no explicit allusions to nonsensical sentences 
‘showing’ something other than their own nonsensicality being found throughout the 
book – is to pretend to throw it away “while standing firmly, or as firmly as one can, on 
it” (Diamond 1991, 194), which can only correspond to an illusion. The nonsensical 
sentences of the Tractatus do indeed play a transitional role, while in the case of standard 
readings what we have is no more than an illusory transition, as only in dreams could one 
be sent by the Tractatus into cosmic exile). Their content is only apparent, but they are 
nonetheless useful, or even necessary, in fulfilling Wittgenstein’s alleged aim. They are 
used as a means to stimulate the reader’s imagination, and it is in this sense that we can 
                                                          
19 The very notion of a resolute reading is thus connected with the act of throwing away the ladder with 
determination, without “chickening out” (Diamond 1991, 181), i.e. without fearing to let something go that, 
despite not being at all clear to us, still gives us the impression of being important. 
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say that they are illuminating, through a process we could more or less summarize as 
follows:  
(i) Taken at first by certain philosophical anxieties, such as those related to the 
limits of thought and language and to how they relate to logic and the world, the reader 
begins by believing that the Tractatus might provide him answers to at least some of the 
questions that intrigue him. He is thus convinced that what he has in front of him makes 
sense and so, despite severe difficulties, tries as hard as possible to understand it. (ii) At 
a certain stage, which may vary depending on the reader’s own dispositions, he comes to 
see what he is in fact facing – a set of seemingly paradoxical metaphysical doctrines and 
theses that collapse into absurdity and are so revealed as not being doctrines and theses 
at all – and therefore becomes self-conscious of the illusion that he had fallen into. (iii) 
And with this, he should at last go on to understand that the very problems and questions 
that had once tormented him had equally been the product of an illusion, as every attempt 
to answer them results in nonsensical formulations, which, in their turn, exhibit the 
nonsensicality of the original questions (e.g. Q: ‘What is the meaning of a word?’; A: 
‘The meaning of a word is an essence shared between a word and the object it refers to’). 
He would then be able to see the world rightly, i.e. the world seen without the aid of some 
special pair of metaphysician’s glasses that would misleadingly suggest that one could 
somehow search, either by digging under trees or rocks or looking at the starry sky, for a 
logical structure that determined how language should be used, without misidentifying 
the former as a kind of more or less accurate mirror or filter of reality, and without the 
illusory trust in the idea that certain ladders would possibly lead to a privileged external 
point of view from where the nature of all such cryptic matters could be apprehended. 
The aim of the book would have thus consisted of dissuading the reader from doing 
philosophy in certain ways (or at least making him aware of what was being done), which 
could be compared to the attempt of solving impossible puzzles, of answering impossible 
questions. In fact, the method of the Tractatus as understood by Diamond or Conant is in 
many ways analogous to the following: if one is convinced that some impossible puzzles 
can be solved (which means, of course, that he has not yet recognized their impossibility), 
give him one of these (one where some of the pieces do not fit and so cannot by any 
means be completed) and let him try as many times as he is willing to until he realizes 
that there is no conceivable way to do it; and at the moment he decides to give up, it 
should be clear in his mind that unsolvable puzzles are indeed not genuine puzzles at all. 
It would be like provisionally putting someone in the place of a Tantalus or a Sisyphus 
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until he convinces himself that, no matter how hard he tried, he would end up in the same 
frustrating positions over and over again. In their view of the Tractatus, one sees 
Wittgenstein deliberately putting himself in such positions and thus showing the 
consequences that usually (if not always) follow from them. 
 
§ 20. Now, from comparing these three accounts, and considering what had been said 
before about (1) the intelligibility of the picture theory qua theory or the very idea of 
whistling the ineffable by way of nonsense, to use Ramsey’s famous expression20, or (2) 
the consequences of taking the notation dogmatically, it should be clear that, though it 
may not be the most faithful to Wittgenstein’s earlier intentions, (3) is by far the most (if 
not the only) philosophically viable one. And so, for our present purpose, it is the one we 
shall embrace, as it has already been argued. To read the Tractatus resolutely, or 
realistically, is surely the best thing we can do if we are to understand its actual 
achievements, and if we are to extract something illuminating out of it. I have already 
suggested that, in fact, by prompting us to read the Investigations against the background 
of the Tractatus, and having acknowledged the latter’s achievements (including what it 
had failed to achieve), Wittgenstein was in a sense already giving us permission to do just 
that. Back in 1930, shortly after his return to Cambridge, he wrote: 
 
I might say: if the place I want to get to could only be reached by way of a 
ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place I really have to get 
to is a place I must already be at now. 
Anything that I might reach by climbing a ladder does not interest me. 
(Wittgenstein 1984, 7) 
 
This is a crucial remark for our account of the Tractatus. On what exegetical 
quarrels are concerned, given its ambiguity, it may seem to serve standard and resolute 
readers equally well. On the one hand, Hacker, for instance, takes it as evidence of 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of the ladder metaphor and so of his rejection of the method of 
the Tractatus, despite wishing to preserve and often reinterpret some of the book’s key 
insights. This would seem to contradict the resolute suggestion of a significant 
methodological continuity in all Wittgenstein’s work. On the other, however, it could also 
                                                          




be seen as supportive of the resolute agenda instead by providing a supplementary 
clarification of the ladder’s role: on a resolute reading, one does not end, of course, on 
top of the ladder or in some higher place reached by way of it, but exactly where one had 
left off, the place we must all (not just Wittgenstein) already be at now, i.e. our humble 
place on Earth. In fact, there is no real ladder climbing in the Tractatus but at best an 
illusion of ladder climbing. Just as, for example, an Escher print presents us with a spatial 
(or visual) illusion, the Tractatus presents us with an illusion of sense, and so its ladder, 
if it exists at all, is just like an Escherian ladder or staircase, for, as Rupert Read and Rob 
Deans observe: 
 
[I]t probably never ends—and if ascending it could ever be said to get its 
climbers anywhere it would only be to return them to where they had “begun”, 
and for them then in a certain sense to know the place (the only place that 
could really have interested them anyway) for the first time. . . . However, if 
it has done its elucidatory work it “returns” them/one there with the 
realization that one is prone to confusion and needs to continually subject 
one’s thoughts and words to scrutiny. (Read & Deans 2011, 155) 
 
In the end, this is what should really matter, as even if the early Wittgenstein could 
have once thought that it was something else, this is what the ladder amounts to, what it 
has always been. If someone intends e.g. to offer us a glass of Scotch whisky but, out of 
ignorance or mere distraction, brings one of Irish instead, we cannot hold, unless we are 
equally mistaken, that what we are drinking is Scotch. Now, that the Tractarian ladder 
does not transport us to cosmic exile but leaves us exactly where we have always been 
should be as obvious as this. And, of course, sober standard readers do not think that the 
Tractatus does transport us to cosmic exile, but simply that the early Wittgenstein may 
have confusedly thought so. I thus find it astonishing to come across so many attempts to 
allegedly debunk resolute readings, which, though maybe wrong about what Wittgenstein 
may have thought back then, are certainly closer, at least in the case of the more insightful 
ones, to make genuine sense of the book and bring out what it can teach us, being it clear 
that it does not teach us that out there lies the ineffable logical form of reality. Just think 
of someone acknowledging “Of course, I know that this is Irish” but then angrily 
screaming “But he genuinely thought that it was Scotch!”. 
Except perhaps for the use of ‘deliberately’ in the last sentence of our sketch of the 
resolute position (3), the rest is quite correct. And, above all, unlike (1) and (2), seemingly 
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reasonable. Moreover, one can find further evidence for claiming that later Wittgenstein 
would have not himself entirely disapproved of this way of looking at the Tractatus, if 
not embraced it altogether, as is the case of this passage of the Investigations, a perfect 
match to the aphorism quoted above (and to a resolute view of 6.54 as well): 
 
The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic 
was, of course, not something I had discovered: it was a requirement.) The 
conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming 
vacuous. – We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, 
in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we 
are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough 
ground! (PI §107) 
 
Ryle’s no less appropriate image of the shoes of Chinese ladies comes to mind. The 
rough ground is, of course, the place we must all already be at. The seemingly ideal 
conditions were those of the notation (perhaps of the picture theory). And the more one 
examines actual language the more one gets to understand that the notation may indeed 
be of little help: for we either try to force everything into it, and so end up with nothing 
but an artificial construction that tells us little about how things really work, or limit our 
enquiry to a very specific kind of language use and hence lose touch with the actual 
complexity and richness out there. As for simples, the general propositional form, etc. 
they were all but vacuous requirements of such illusory crystalline purity. “It’s all more 
complicated than that” (Anscombe 2011, 179), Wittgenstein later came to realize. But 
from it being more complicated does not follow that we need more complicated theories. 
 
§ 21. In a paraphrase of the Tractatus’ final remark, Anscombe helps to bring out its 
implications more clearly: “What there cannot be significant propositions about we 
should not discourse about” (Anscombe 2011, 177). Now, some resolute readers have 
tended to sympathize with it, arguing that after one throws away the ladder and is freed 
from the illusion into which he had fallen, one realizes that we should keep silent about a 
number of chimerical matters that may have attracted us before and led us into nonsense. 
We realize e.g. that there cannot be significant propositions of ethics and so we simply 
stop talking as if it was possible to talk about ethics. I find this unfair. In fact, I do not 
think 7, at least when taken literally, can be altogether separated from the Tractatus’ 
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irresolute conception of the significant proposition (as we have emphasized, even if its 
initial aim was no more than the outline of a notation, it ended up, by a perhaps unwitting 
and certainly unreasonable expansion of its scope, to fall back into such a conception) 
and so it is itself something which is to be overcome, to be thrown away with the rest of 
the ladder. If, for instance, we follow the tree presentation of the book, not the linear one 
which the usual printed editions force us into, we should be less tempted to see it as any 
sort of final corollary. It’s transitional role was that of making us feel the aforementioned 
conflict as deeply as possible, up to a point when, after so much nonsensical chatter, we 
felt that in the end we were altogether deprived from talking about anything whatsoever, 
the climax of the book’s dialectic. And at this point the conflict was arguably as 
intolerable as it had ever been.  
Instead of forcing us to remain silent apart from ordinary or scientific matters of 
fact, what a genuinely realistic reading should do is to increase our awareness that we 
may very well be inevitably prone to confusion and so that, as Read and Deans put it, we 
ought to subject our thoughts and words to scrutiny. We ought to be aware when we are 
describing something and when we are not, when we are speaking literally or figuratively, 
also, and very importantly, when we are not quite sure about what we are doing, and so 
on, and for all that our regular capacities will do. In fact, in case we suspect that we are 
going to come out with nonsense, it may at times be better to just spit it out and then 
subject it to inspection, though, of course, silence may be preferable in other 
circumstances. Again, this has to be decided case by case, and any general decree, 
whether for or against silence, should be avoided.  
Anyhow, somewhat like Stanley Cavell21 would have had it, to demand that we only 
speak about what is absolutely true or false, that about that which we cannot speak with 
certainty, we must be silent, is in fact to demand that we do not speak at all. And yet it is 
essential that one tries to avoid being careless with one’s words, to be aware of possible 
entanglements. As Diamond suggests, if we come to understand ourselves, the utterers of 
nonsense, we shall not come out with nonsensical sentences under the illusion that they 
make sense but, as it will be almost inevitable in some cases to utter them anyway, we 
may explicitly frame our sentences such as when saying e.g. ‘I am inclined to say (or 
think) that such-and-such’ – ‘I am inclined to say’ being the framing technique with which 
we show ourselves to be self-conscious about our own nonsense, while at the same time 
still uttering it (maybe half-thinking that it may express the sense we somehow want it to 
                                                          
21 See “Must we mean what we say?” (2015). 
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make). In a 1947 remark, Wittgenstein summed up the entire issue, and in the most 
reasonable of ways: “Don’t for heaven’s sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you 
must pay attention to your nonsense” (Wittgenstein 1984, 56). 
 
§ 22. Nonsense has indeed been a key term in our discussion, and by now some may feel 
inclined to ask for a further clarification of it. In the terms here put, the claim that e.g. the 
picture theory is nonsense, plain nonsense, may resonate uncomfortably. It should be 
noticed that I have been using ‘nonsense’ in a most commonplace way. There is little, if 
anything, technical about it. And that is what may leave a feeling of incompleteness, of 
lack of rigor in the air. I shall argue, however, that this would still be a sign of 
irresoluteness, an inconsistent demand, for the only rigorous way to deal with nonsense 
is simply to make clear that it is nonsense, not to muddle it with sense. I can offer no 
better definition than Peter Sullivan’s: “Taken straight, as it were, nonsense is simply, 
and open-endedly, a failure to make sense” (Sullivan 2004, 34). This is so nearly circular 
that it cannot be wrong. And, indeed, if we are to make such a notion at all clear to us, 
there is no other way to go other than taking it straight. “The idea that a [technical] 
definition of nonsense can be given […] is again another manifestation of a philosophical 
impulse that needs to be overcome, as it implies that there are hidden necessities and 
possibilities that determine the limits of application of signs” (Read & Deans 2011, 158), 
Read and Deans observe. To fail to make sense is simply that, i.e. fail to make sense; there 
are no rules (no transgression of any supposed rules) that engender such a failure. In fact, 
the very idea of a theoretical account of nonsense is itself contradictory: for if nonsense 
is what shows on its symbol’s face, i.e. nonsense, there can be no such thing as accounting 
for it in any possible way, unless, of course, one forgets to separate logic from 
psychology. Let me attempt to qualify these claims. 
If we are to hold the distinction between logic and psychology in place, it follows 
that “the primary vehicle of meaning is not the term but the statement” (Diamond 1991, 
108). This is illustrated by Frege’s first two principles. As Diamond puts it, “if we disobey 
the second principle and ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, we shall almost 
certainly look for an answer in the realm of the psychological – we shall explain what it 
is for a term to have a meaning in terms of the mental images or mental acts, and that will 
be a violation of the first principle” (Diamond 1991, 97). Wittgenstein thus recalls that 
“[e]very proposition must already have a sense” (TLP 4.064), and so that every 
proposition is well-formed. If a sentence is nonsense that can only be because it lacks a 
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sense, not because it somehow happens to have a sense which is ill-formed, whatever ‘ill-
formed sense’ may mean. It is therefore impossible for a sentence to be nonsense by 
means of a violation of some rules allegedly governing sense formation. Again, there can 
only be, on non-psychological grounds, one reason for a sentence to be nonsensical: its 
utterer failed to make sense, to mean anything with it.  
Take, for instance, a key sentence from the Tractatus which we have considered 
above, say, “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions” (TLP 5). Just 
as Frege stressed that one should not look for the meaning of a word in isolation but only 
the context of a sentence, we could well extend the principle and advise one not to look 
for the meaning of a sentence in isolation but within a larger context of discourse22. We 
cannot quite know what a sentence such as the one quoted above means when taken in 
isolation, or even whether it means anything at all or not, for, even if we are familiar with 
this kind of jargon, we need further clues in order to know what is the reference of its key 
terms. They could all mean different things in different contexts. Same for e.g. “A 
proposition is a picture of reality”, which may arouse all sorts of mental images in us. 
And when considered in its particular context of use, we have come to realize that a 
sentence such as that of 5 is meaningless. As we saw when inspecting it, one of its key 
terms, ‘elementary propositions’ is inscrutable. It may at first seem like we can figure out 
the idea, but then we realize that not a single example of one can be given, and so that 
there is no way to tell what an elementary proposition might be. Though looking like a 
meaningful term, it is in fact logically indistinguishable from a blank space or an arbitrary 
scribble.  
According to the Tractatus, ‘elementary proposition’ = ‘concatenation of simple 
names’, ‘simple name’ = ‘name standing for a simple object’, ‘simple object’ = ‘primary 
component of the substance of the world’, ‘substance of the world’ = ‘all that, within the 
world, is necessary and immutable’. But then if we are to ask about what is it that is 
necessary and immutable, no answer other than the circular ‘Well, the substance of the 
world’ shall be provided. We thus realize that ‘substance of the world’ =  and that this 
whole sequence of identities was an illusion, not because the introduction of a single 
meaningless term such as ‘substance of the world’ sends it automatically tumbling down, 
but as a result of none of these expressions having been assigned any meaning. We have 
here exploited a hole in ‘substance of the world’ but all the others would have served this 
                                                          
22 Which is not to claim that sentences only have meaning within a larger context of discourse. The claim 
– a descriptive, non-theoretical one – is, rather, that attention to a larger context is often essential for one to 
be sure about what a given sentence means. 
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purpose equally well. Hence, “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary 
propositions” = “A proposition is a truth-function of ”, which is to say that, from a 
logical point of view, and in the context of the Tractatus, the whole sentence is itself no 
different from simply  or, say, “abracadabra”, though, of course, it could mean 
something somewhere else. 
Now, we might be tempted to think that we can identify a specific process, 
consisting of certain mistakes – violations of certain rules – which entails this. Let us 
assume, given that we are considering this sentence within a wider context, that no doubts 
remain about what ‘proposition’ and ‘truth-function’ mean, i.e. ‘assertion’ or ‘statement’ 
and ‘a function that accepts truth values as input and produces a truth value as output’, 
respectively. We then realize that, unlike the former two, the third term, ‘elementary 
propositions’, is meaningless, and so that the sentence is cut short, that it is as if we had 
no more than the grammarless “A proposition is a truth-function of”, seemingly of the 
same of kind of, say, “Peter is a son of”. Our initial conclusion may then be: the sentence 
“A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions” is nonsense because one 
of its key terms, ‘elementary propositions’ is meaningless, the predicate is thus bruised 
and the sentence ends up falling short of meaning anything. Let us call this violation P: a 
sentence s is nonsense given that one of its predicate’s key terms is not symbolizing. And 
so the rest of the sentence – though its remaining terms seem to be symbolizing (or at 
least would have been symbolizing had the former been too) – is left, so to speak, hanging 
in the air. As a whole, it is not symbolizing or is at least doing so incoherently. 
The problem with this view is that it is being assumed that one can somehow 
reconstruct something out of a string of words which he himself recognizes as 
nonsensical. For if a string of words is nonsense, in the way we have defined ‘nonsense’, 
nothing at all can be said to be symbolizing in it, no matter how incoherently. If we are 
to hold that “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions” is really 
nonsense, i.e. that it is equivalent to  or “abracadabra”, then there can be no way to tell 
what kind of mistake was made by its utterer apart from the obvious one of failing to 
make sense. Surely, no one would ever dream of being able to reconstruct the logical or 
grammatical steps leading to such failure out of an arbitrary scribble. 
We now seemingly face two options: (1) to assume, as we have been doing right 
from the start, that all nonsense is logically equivalent, which is to say that, contrary to 
what its appearance would have suggested, “A proposition is a truth-function of” is no 
more similar to “Peter is a son of” than it is to “abracadabra” or any other piece of 
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nonsense; or (2) to concede that, rather, it is possible to reconstruct the aforementioned 
steps and thus identify the violation that engendered a given piece of nonsense, which is 
also to say that not all nonsense is logically equivalent: there is, on the one hand, cases of 
nonsense in which a flawed syntax in discernible and, on the other, ones in which no 
syntax whatsoever, no matter how flawed, can be discerned. We shall see that option (2) 
is untenable and so that, though perhaps counterintuitively, we can do no other than to 
keep sticking to (1). In fact, it is not even necessary to argue against the idea of there 
being different kinds of logical mistakes such as, among others, violation P. All we need 
to do is show that it is incoherent to hold that a given sentence can be nonsense while still 
working as a symbol, even if a defective one. 
Conant, for instance, distinguishes the so-called substantial conception of nonsense 
from the austere view we have been here embracing as follows: the substantial conception 
“holds that there are two logically distinct kinds of nonsense: substantial nonsense and 
mere nonsense” (Conant 2000, 191), a case of substantial nonsense being that of “a 
proposition composed of signs which symbolize, but which has a logically flawed syntax 
due to a clash in the logical category of its symbols” (ibid.); on the contrary, the austere 
view sees all nonsense as mere nonsense – “a string of signs in which no symbol can be 
perceived” (ibid.) – and so as logically equivalent, i.e. simply null. No further distinction 
is made between different kinds of substantial nonsense, i.e. kinds of nonsense allegedly 
arising out of different kinds of violations, category mistakes or others. Given this broad 
definition, many philosophers and linguists, from Carnap23 to Michael Dummett24, can 
thus be said to have embraced a substantial conception of nonsense. The belief that 
nonsense is a matter of a sentence failing to conform with some fixed rules governing 
categories of expression, i.e. a matter of the sentences’ words having certain meanings 
that cannot coherently fit together according to such rules, is a quite commonplace one. 
But, again, there seems to be something odd in the very idea of a sentence being 
meaningless while its constituting words are not so. 
One of the reasons why attention to a larger context of discourse is often crucial for 
one to know what a particular sentence means is that any possible combination of 
linguistic units can, at least in principle, make sense or fail to do so. There can be no such 
thing, for instance, as a prior list of meaningful and nonsensical sentences, or even of 
kinds of meaningful and nonsensical sentences. Language is governed by a variety of 
                                                          
23 See “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language” (1959). 
24 See Frege: Philosophy of Language (1973): p. 62; also p. 32. 
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rules that ensure levels of regularity (and, therefore, of predictability) that make our job 
as linguistic users much simpler, but none of these rules alone, however, can be necessary 
nor sufficient for successful communication. A good example for attesting this point is 
that of apparently bizarre or ill-formed expressions that, even sometimes against the odds, 
are nevertheless understood just as they were intended, which shall already suggest that 
many other factors apart from the utterances’ meanings are relevant to communication, if 
not inherently part of it. It is always possible to imagine a certain context where a given 
expression, no matter how peculiar, can be used in an intelligible way, and it is equally 
possible to imagine a context where the most common expression among ordinary 
discourse is nonsense, which is to say that it is also possible for a whole text to be 
composed of sentences seemingly well-formed on all conceivable standards of correctness 
and still be plain nonsense if it happens that one has failed to assign meaning to them. 
For instance, ‘Peter is a son of a truth-function’ could be used intelligibly within 
e.g. the context of a group of friends who are used to talk in certain curious ways and 
sometimes call themselves sons of truth-functions: ‘You, son of a truth-function!”, which, 
though eccentric, is certainly not as impolite. No category mistake can be said to occur 
here. But, of course, either ‘truth-function’ is not being used here with its first meaning25, 
or, in case it is, what we have is a metaphor, drawing attention to that a given person 
called Peter is particularly fond of logic. Just think of a scenario in which this group of 
friends goes for a night out on a Friday and, still relatively early, Peter announces: ‘I have 
to go home, for I have to get up at 7:00 to read some Frege in the morning’. ‘I told you, 
this guy is such a son of a truth-function…’, one of his friends may comment, in this case 
looking to stress more than just Peter’s fondness for logic. 
This example alone does not yet rule out the substantial conception. Their 
proponents are not as naïve as I was apparently taking them to be: what they claim is that 
it is nonsense to say ‘Peter is a son of a truth-function’ in case ‘truth-function’ is taken to 
mean, as usual, ‘a function that accepts truth values as input and produces a truth value 
as output’ or equivalent, and, above all, in case the sentence is intended as a proposition. 
In other words, the sentence collapses into nonsense when someone attempts to use it 
literally, as its constituent terms’ first meanings cannot, according to an alleged set of 
                                                          
25 Introduced by Donald Davidson, the notion of first meaning is analogous to what is sometimes called 
literal meaning but more straightforward: it “applies to words and sentences uttered by a particular speaker 
on a particular occasion. But if the occasion, the speaker, and the audience are ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ […], 
then the first meaning of an utterance will be what should be found by consulting a dictionary based on 




rules fixed prior to the sentence’s construction, fit coherently together in order to 
engender a genuine proposition. There are several difficulties with this view, though. 
Now, it is true that ‘Peter is a son of a truth-function’ cannot be a proposition when 
its terms are used with their first meaning (though it can be, as we have seen, a metaphor), 
but the case is that it is only possible to (apparently) recognize this when considering 
them already as a part of a given string of words. For, when taken independently of any 
situation in which linguistic acts are performed, ‘Peter’, ‘son’ or ‘truth-function’ alone 
have yet to have been put to use in language and so, though we may guess what they are 
most likely to mean when employed in standard situations (or even imagine what they 
could mean in less standard ones), its meanings have yet to have been specified. In fact, 
at the very moment we recognize a given sign as a symbol, even if mistakenly, we are 
already considering it within an at least hypothetical context of a larger string of symbols, 
in which logical relations are perceivable, not simply on its own. As soon as I take ‘Peter’ 
as more than a mere mark or noise, I am already imagining situations, quite possibly in 
which someone called Peter figures, which can be described by propositions. Even the 
image of Peter surrounded by a blank area is still one of such situations, and even if I 
simply describe it by no more than ‘Peter’ what we have is an abbreviated proposition, 
just as e.g. ‘Fire!’, which is not just a performative utterance but an abbreviation of, say, 
‘There is fire in the kitchen!’. And notice that what we are imagining when taking ‘Peter’ 
in isolation is not yet what ‘Peter’ means. In order to know what it means we need 
something articulate, such as a proposition.  
The point I tried to make is this: even when taking a word in isolation and hence 
looking for its meaning in the psychological realm, there can be no such thing as a grasp 
of anything that may have at least a physiognomy of meaning within the individual word 
when considered on its own. In other words, nothing less than an illusory proposition can 
serve as an illusion of meaning. And then, of course, nothing less than a proposition – or, 
rather, “a complete linguistic act” (Bronzo 2011, 102), as Silver Bronzo puts it, “in order 
to do justice to, among other things, non-constative uses of language”, unlike the picture 
theory – can be recognized as meaningful. All we can do is thus conclude that the context 
principle is true, and that we did not require any particular theory of meaning in order to 
recognize this. And if the context principle is true – and if we commit ourselves to a 
sufficiently strong version of it – then all we can say about a sentence which is recognized 
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as nonsensical is that it is an illusory symbol26. No matter what its word’s first meanings 
may be, the case is simply that its utterer failed to put them to work in that sentence. Its 
physiognomy may indeed give us the idea of certain rules somehow being violated, but 
that is no more than a further illusion springing from our acquaintance with the first 
meaning of the words, being it clear that even the first meaning can only be grasped within 
a complete linguistic act. As for the question whether this sentence which we fail to make 
sense of had been intended as a proposition (or anything else) or not, it is a merely 
psychological matter, and so virtually irrelevant for an intersubjective phenomena such 
as that of meaning. 
Proponents of substantial nonsense are hence incurring into double-think, for if 
‘Peter is a son of a truth-function’ is meaningless, no part of it can be said to mean 
anything either. It is incoherent to hold that the sentence is itself meaningless while in it 
‘Peter’ is being used as if referring to a person (though an unknown one) who is said to 
be a son of someone and ‘truth-function’ as if having its standard meaning from classical 
logic, as if only in the context of a complete linguistic act – such as a proposition – does 
a word have meaning, it cannot have meaning in the context of, say, a pseudo-proposition. 
The most that can be conceded is that the sentence’s physiognomy reminds us of the terms 
‘Peter’ or ‘truth-function’ as when used in sentences such as e.g. ‘Peter is a son of Mary 
and Charles’ or ‘a logical connective is a truth-function’, respectively, and that it is 
obvious that these cannot fit together coherently in a sentence of that form. What cannot 
be conceded, though, is that, in a regular context, ‘Peter is a son of a truth-function’ says 
something, something which is taken as illogical. 
As for Wittgenstein himself, who has often been mistakenly taken as either a radical 
contextualist or as allowing room for substantial nonsense27, he seems to have consistently 
                                                          
26 In order to hold this, we need not even go as far as contextualists do and hold that the meaning and 
understanding of a sentence are conceptually prior to that of the meaning and understanding of its 
constituent words, i.e. that the context principle is prior to that of compositionality. This is a robust 
philosophical assumption, and a questionable one, as is, for instance, its exact opposite, i.e. the view that 
the meaning and understanding of a sentence’s individual words precede those of the whole sentence. One 
can hold that neither the meaning of the whole sentence nor that of its constituent words has conceptual 
priority over the other and still retain an austere view of nonsense: though there can only be meaning where 
there is articulation, a genuine articulation can only be an articulation of meanings, and so the relation 
between a sentence and its parts is one of interdependence, like that of two balanced forces, which still 
entails the austere view. To ask, for instance, which comes first in the order of interpretation would once 
again constitute a step back towards psychologism. As for a nonsensical string of signs, what we have is no 
more than an illusion of articulation, not a somehow flawed articulation. See Bronzo’s “Context, 
Compositionality, and Nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus” (2011) for a comprehensive account of these 
matters. 
27 Again, see Bronzo (2011), who criticizes both these views. 
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held a view of nonsense which can be labelled as austere, another thing which he greatly 
inherited from Frege, as attested by, among several others, the following remarks pointed 
out by Diamond, from three distinct occasions and with a considerable temporal gap 
between them, which somewhat sum up our position: 
 
When a sentence is called senseless [or nonsensical] it is not as it were its 
sense that is senseless. But a combination of words is being excluded from 
the language, withdrawn from circulation. […] they are excluded from our 
language like some arbitrary noise, and the reason for their explicit exclusion 
can only be that we are tempted to confuse them with a sentence of our 
language. […] “I feel his pain” […] “abracadabra”… […] there is in fact no 
difference between these two cases of nonsense, though there is a 
psychological distinction in that we are inclined to say the one and be puzzled 
by it and not the other. We constantly hover between regarding it as sense and 
nonsense, and hence the trouble arises. (apud Diamond 1991, 106-107)28 
 
§ 23. Apart from being intended to throw some extra light into what nonsense might be, 
this discussion had an additional (though connected) purpose: to further expound the 
transitional imaginative activity of taking nonsense as sense on which the understanding 
of the Tractatus depends. For proponents of a substantial conception of nonsense are 
under an illusion analogous to it: by claiming that nonsense is generated by an illegitimate 
combination of words, they are falling prey to the illusion that a nonsensical sentence still 
has a kind of sense, though a flawed one, as a result of the mental associations that this 
sentence’s meaningless words arise in them. In a way, just as resolute readers depend of 
going through a transitional stage of reading the book irresolutely, any recognition of a 
string of words as nonsensical depends on one provisionally going through such an 
illusion, for otherwise we would not even be talking of nonsense, but of arbitrary marks 
or noises. Of course, from a logical point of view, nonsense is no different from these (the 
difference is only a physiognomic one; one of external features, as Diamond would say), 
but if this happened to be immediately perceivable in all situations, there would be no 
confusions of the sort we have been here considering; confusions which above all result 
from our virtually irredeemable, almost instinctive, tendency to muddle logical and 
                                                          
28 These are, respectively, from the Investigations (§500), Philosophical Grammar (p. 130), and a 1935 
lecture. One also finds supportive evidence of this view in the Tractatus, such as the suggestion that there 
can be no such thing as an ill-formed proposition. 
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psychological matters while using language (hence the need, alluded to by Wittgenstein, 
to explicitly identify nonsensical formulations). And so, again, as in the case of paying 
attention to our nonsense, we should not hopelessly try to prevent ourselves from making 
such confusions (it would be an illusion to think we could definitely manage to do so), 
but to be aware of the distinction between logic and psychology and hence be capable of 
escaping them when needed. 
This is how we recognize a sentence as nonsense: even if this takes place in a matter 
of seconds, as it does in the more obvious cases (certainly not in the case of the Tractatus), 
we begin by trying to understand it, and so we imaginatively engage with the mental 
images aroused by it until we realize, first, that these images are incoherent, and, at last, 
that it was all but an illusion and the sentence was no different from an arbitrary string of 
marks or noises. And so, just as resolute readers of the Tractatus depend transitionally on 
standard readings (to put it as abridgedly as possible, we begin by trying to understand 
the picture theory qua theory, we then see it as paradoxical, and finally that it was nothing 
but a house of cards, and so not even a paradoxical theory implying its own falsehood), 
an austere view of nonsense depends transitionally on a substantial one, the major 
difference among them being that while those who accept the former come to recognize 
the illusion and move one, proponents of the latter remain unwittingly under it, hence 
their tendency to double-think, to make inconsistent claims such as when denying that a 
piece of nonsense means anything while still holding that it is so because of the meanings 
its words do have.  
By extending, as it were, this transitional stage in the process of recognition of 
nonsense considerably beyond what we would expect, the experience of reading the 
Tractatus is thus found to be greatly illuminating as for what concerns our understanding 
of the very nature of nonsense, which may very well be as inherent to us as language 
itself. 
 
§ 24. Though denying the possibility of there being such a thing as substantial, or 
‘positive’, nonsense, we have not denied “that it is possible to communicate philosophical 
insights by the use of sentences that are nonsense” (White 2011, 37). Let me explain this. 
It should, first of all, be made clear that ‘to communicate’ is not by any means to be here 
taken to mean that a propositional (or cognitive) content, and certainly not a special kind 
of content such as an ineffable one, is conveyed. I hope to have already said enough in 
order to reject both of these. My suggestion, rather, is that one can deliberately employ 
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nonsense with a purpose which is to an extent akin to that of expressions of insights such 
as ‘“Someone” is not the name of someone’ or certain metaphors, i.e. that of drawing 
attention to something. In the particular case of nonsense, usually to draw attention to 
particular pieces of confusion whose disclosure may lead to their dissolution.  
And so the nonsense of the Tractatus can work not only as a way of drawing 
attention to the very character of nonsense itself, but to numerous other philosophical 
issues as well. If taken seriously, as I think it ought to be taken, it should make us at least 
suspicious of the possibility (or plausibility) of e.g. (1) traditional metaphysical 
speculation in general, notably ontology and its typical realism vs. anti-realism debates 
(2) purportedly all-encompassing theories of language, or (3) a genuine translatability of 
all our linguistic behaviour into allegedly flawless formalized languages, and more. This 
is far from saying that we ought not to do (or try to do) these things, but at least that we 
should pay scrupulous attention to what we are doing while doing them, and not to be 
overconfident about their supposed results. For instance, that nonsense is both 
unaccountable and prone to be put to use in communication is at odds with the possibility 
of one developing a general theory of language. Unless, of course, one decides to rule out 
nonsense from language, which would be compatible with what we have so far said about 
it. But then, if one rules out nonsense from language while at the same time 
acknowledging that it can nevertheless play a part in communication, the very idea of 
language, or at least a certain idea of language, common among countless philosophers 
and linguists, is in jeopardy. And that may very well be the point. 
In the meantime, consideration of a somewhat close case such as that of metaphor 
might be of help here. Metaphor shares a crucial feature with nonsense; as Donald 
Davidson put it in his essay “What Metaphors Mean”: “Joke or dream or metaphor can, 
like a picture or a bump on the head, make us appreciate some fact – but not by standing 
for, or expressing that fact” (Davidson 1984, 262). Reading the Tractatus could then be 
compared with a massive bump, one such as Ludwig’s when falling from the tree in our 
tale, which may lead us to appreciate a variety of things, not to mention what its 
meaningful sentences (there are quite a few, as we shall see, if looked at from the right 
angle) teach us. Now, as White observes, Davidson’s remark about bumps disconcerted 
many of his readers, as it “seemed to minimize the difference between metaphor as a use 
of language and non-verbal communication” (White 2011, 39). In fact, I think that that is 
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perhaps the main lesson to be taken from Davidson’s essay29, which is also one of the key 
lessons of the Tractatus and of Wittgenstein’s entire philosophy, and that the perplexity 
of its readers had above all to do with their assumption of some unbridgeable gap between 
language and human action in general. And while a case such as that of metaphor would 
be enough to show that it is an illusory gap, that of nonsense does it perhaps even more 
forcefully. But let us first have a quick look at Davidson.  
It should first of all be noticed that he is careful in keeping the distinction between 
logical and psychological matters in place. His notion of meaning is thus one which is 
accountable on strictly logical grounds: “a form of cognitive content, which is in turn 
analyzed in terms of conditions for truth or satisfaction” (Camp 2013, 372). And so on 
his account there is no place for any notion of meaning other than propositional meaning. 
Moreover, he recognizes that unless we are familiar with the first meaning of the words 
which occur in the metaphor when taken literally, there is no way to grasp the utterer’s 
intent, i.e. the first meaning (or literal meaning, as he still named it back then) of the 
words is essential for the metaphor to do its work, and that a key part of this work has to 
do with the effect of leading one to see something as another (e.g. ‘the lake is a sapphire’ 
in a way leads us to see the lake as a sapphire). However, he also recognizes that there 
are no clear rules governing this process whatsoever and that what a metaphor leads us 
to see is irreducible to a propositional content or a set of propositional contents. Hence 
his own metaphor: “Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and, like all dreamwork, its 
interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the originator. […] understanding 
a metaphor is as much a creative endeavour as making a metaphor, and as little guided by 
rules.” (Davidson 1984, 246; my emphasis). 
It is thus not difficult to understand what forces Davidson into his central thesis that 
“metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing 
more” (ibid.), a metaphor “says only what shows on its face – usually a patent falsehood 
or an absurd truth” (Davidson 1984, 259)30, with which he abolishes the usual distinction 
between literal and figurative, or metaphorical, meaning31: if meaning is taken as strictly 
                                                          
29 In a way already foreseeing the conclusion of his later “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”: “we have 
erased the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally” 
(Davidson 2005, 107). 
30 By a bizarre notion such as that of ‘absurd truth’ Davidson is most certainly, and unproblematically, 
referring to metaphorical expressions of the kind of e.g. ‘No man is an island’. 
31 For Davidson the only plausible distinction to be drawn here is a pragmatic one, i.e. between literal and 
metaphorical use. And so he also discards notions such as those of metaphorical truth or falsity: rather, a 
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propositional (and so if only literal meaning can effectively count as meaning), i.e. if a 
meaningful declarative sentence must have a determinate content and be either true or 
false, then most metaphors are quite simply false declarative sentences, as what is usually 
taken (wrongly, Davidson argues) as their content is in most cases indeterminate and 
cannot quite be pinned down in terms of truth and falsity. What makes them an interesting 
case is the seemingly peculiar role that they nevertheless play in communication. 
But, as Cavell remarks, metaphors cannot simply be false. Rather, they are “wildly 
false” (Cavell 2015, 74; my emphasis) and that is why they play such role (why they 
produce the effects they do), thus differing from standard false statements. Cavell, who, 
unlike Davidson, does not mind referring to metaphorical meanings and contents, even 
goes on by saying that this “is part of the fact that if we are to suggest that what the 
metaphor says is true, we shall have to say it is wildly true – mythically or magically or 
primitively true” (ibid.). It seems to me that despite the fundamental differences in terms 
of expression and emphasis, Cavell and Davidson do not diverge that fundamentally: by 
using terms such as ‘wild’, ‘mythical’ or ‘magical’, Cavell is basically agreeing with 
Davidson in that what a metaphor calls our attention to is frequently, unlike other 
perlocutionary effects, not propositional in character nor clearly calculable. 
We could even reconcile, for instance, most of William Empson’s ingenious 
interpretations of metaphors with Davidson’s view by doing no more than inverting the 
Empsonian idea that metaphors are, so to speak, pregnant, i.e. by admitting that it is rather 
our imagination which is pregnant, especially when a well-crafted metaphor stimulates it. 
The aforementioned metaphor which opens Davidson’s essay does indeed hint in that 
direction: most accounts of metaphor are much like Freudian interpretations of dreams, 
i.e. they fall prey to the illusion of taking free psychological associations as contents of 
the metaphors themselves and often even attempt to draw theories from there. Such 
associations can be of great interest and use, and the main point of metaphors is precisely 
to provoke them. They are, however, often too diverse, variable and indeterminate to fit 
into a proper systematic theory of meaning: “there is no limit to what a metaphor calls to 
our attention […]. When we try to say what a metaphor ‘means’, we soon realize there is 
no end to what we want to mention” (Davidson 1984, 263). 
This explains our earlier (and only marginal) treatment of metaphor as an 
illuminating (or elucidatory) use of language, not a constative one, whose first meaning 
                                                          
metaphor can be said to be useful or useless, effective or ineffective, appropriate or inappropriate, well or 
poorly constructed, and so on. 
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(its only meaning, according to Davidson) plays the role of a transitional way of talking: 
it is essential to lead the metaphor interpreter to more or less where the originator 
intended, but once he gets there he should not muddle what he is now seeing with the 
wildly false statement that allowed him to make the transition. Of course, most of the time 
one is able to say something (often many things) about what the metaphor led him to see, 
just as one can say many things about a dream. The issue does not lie here but in that 
usually there are no clear limits to what one can say and certainly no clear rules to 
determine exactly what to say. Just think of someone pointing to a starry sky with a finger, 
trying to show a particular star or constellation: one can get it immediately, especially if 
the area to where the finger points is not too crowded with other stars or constellations, 
but there are also occasions when, unless some further information is given (or more 
gestures are made), it is almost impossible to tell exactly what the other intends to show 
us. And in either case no one would ever think of the sky, star or constellation as a part 
of the finger that led him to see it, not even metaphorically. 
So, in light of this Davidsonian account, metaphors, though clearly a commonplace 
use of language, running “on the same familiar linguistic tracks that the plainest sentences 
do” (Davidson 1984, 259), are indeed somewhat on a par with forms of non-verbal 
communication (like gestures such as our pointing finger, all sorts of nudges, or, of 
course, bumps on the head), not so much with propositions, though their appearance – 
words grouped together often in the form of a declarative sentence – would probably 
suggest the opposite. In a certain sense, understanding a metaphor is more like 
understanding a facial expression than understanding a proposition. As one does not infer 
that a person is sad by looking at her sad face but recognizes it spontaneously, one does 
not infer a second (metaphorical) meaning from the first (literal) meaning but grasps a 
certain insight or set of insights through a process which, despite being dependent on the 
transitional role played by the literal meaning, goes beyond what we recognize as 
linguistic rules, though not beyond common patterns of human behaviour in general. 
By considering a device (or set of devices) we all take for granted but which is not 
that radically distinct from nonsense, this detour may have helped us to sharpen our 
understanding of the latter, in particular of how it can be deliberately employed as a 
legitimate means of drawing attention to something. For instance, both metaphors and 
nonsense, being void of content, of what some have been fond of calling a ‘message’, do 
their job through their external features, and so the understanding of both is an essentially 
psychological affair. What distinguishes them is that while the metaphor maker achieves 
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his aim by means of the familiar meanings his words have when used in standard 
propositions, the purpose of the self-conscious utterer of nonsense is achieved as his 
words are recognized as meaningless.  
If, for instance, we make transitional use of Tractarian jargon again, and recover 
the notion of language as a kind of picturing, we could say, metaphorically, that while 
propositions are realistic descriptions, metaphors are somewhat surrealistic pictures 
(pictures of dreamwork, as it were), and pieces of nonsense at best pictures of Escherian-
like geometrically impossible objects or situations in space. Unlike the latter, surrealistic 
pictures, though blatantly unrealistic, do not necessarily run over the laws of geometry 
and so are not excluded from all possible worlds. This is all transitional talk, though, out 
of sheer psychological associations. When back to logical grounds all we have is, in the 
case of nonsense, a void, and usually an almost laughable falsehood in the case of 
metaphor. Take the following table as a summary: 
 
 METAPHOR NONSENSE 
Physiognomy (or external 
features) 
The lake is a sapphire. The world is the totality of 
facts, not of things. 
Meaning (or sense) The lake is a sapphire. None. 





Seeing (or rather, 
imagining) the lake as a 
sapphire. 
The mental acts and 
images provoked by words 
such as ‘world’, ‘facts’ or 
‘things’ keep us guessing 
about what the sentence 
might mean for a while. 
Effect 
(intentional, though not 
rigorously calculable) 
Attention brought to 
matters of colour, light 
reflection, etc., i.e. that the 
lake is sapphire blue, that 
it is shining like a 
sapphire, and so on. 
Recognition of the 
sentence’s 
meaninglessness. 
Attention brought to the 
limits of metaphysics, i.e. 
that it depends on an 
illusory external 
standpoint, and so on. 
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This is also to say that the possibilities of metaphor are considerably greater and 
more varied: while metaphor can serve to stimulate all kinds of insights, including 
‘positive’ ones, nonsense can do little (if anything) more than play a ‘negative’ role, a 
device to detect and dissolve confusions. However, given the massive variety of 
confusions out there, it should be clear that its employment as such could indeed play a 
quite substantial factor. And, of course, “no detailed general account of what happens 
when we use nonsense to communicate is possible” (White 2011, 39; my emphasis). But, 
as we saw, neither a general account of what happens when we use metaphors seems to 
be, and, as for these, few would wish to dispute their effectiveness, i.e. that, when properly 
used, they do make us appreciate certain facts, though not by standing for them in any 
direct or indirect way. 
What is here at stake is a reorientation of the role and importance of our key 
questions concerning the interpretation of both metaphor and nonsense. First, we have the 
question we all ask when facing any kind of relatively tricky utterance: What does this 
mean? The point is that, in cases such as that of metaphor and nonsense, though this is a 
necessary question within the process of interpreting what we are facing (it is, so to speak, 
what activates interpretation, its indispensable point of departure), its role is a transitional 
one and hence that if we treat it as the definitive question we are to answer, i.e. if we 
remain attached to it without moving forward to the next interpretative stage, we shall go 
nowhere. Rather, after having gone through the initial transitional stage, the key question 
that arises is: What does this show?, i.e. what does this draw attention to? This, for 
instance, is the key question one is to ask when faced with a work such as the Tractatus, 
after having first asked what it meant and realized that, exceptions aside, it did not mean 
anything. 
 
§ 25. One thing I have tried to make clear from the beginning is that there can be several 
different kinds of resolute readings of the Tractatus, as long as they stick to the two sine 
qua non conditions emphasized by Diamond and Conant, i.e. that the book does not 
convey ineffable truths and neither puts forward a theory of meaning. Now, though the 
consequences of these conditions are massive, there is an awful lot about it which is 
nonetheless left open to further inquiry. So far, my task has been that of establishing these 
two conditions on firm grounds, i.e. I have above all tried to show that the Tractatus does 
not contain a theory of meaning, even in case Wittgenstein had tried to construct one, and 
that no ineffable truths are communicated by it. We have resolutely thrown away the 
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ladder and recognized both of these ideas as nonsense, mere nonsense. Furthermore, I 
have tried to stress that, despite there being no logical distinctions among types of 
nonsense, there are still all imaginable psychological distinctions among nonsensical 
sentences, thus producing all sorts of different illusions of sense, and so that nonsense 
itself can be used in an insightful way, though with a largely ‘negative’ purpose, through 
exploration of these different illusions. I could then make mine the following words from 
Alice Crary’s introduction to The New Wittgenstein, which pretty much sum up what I 
have been here trying to exemplify: 
 
[The] sentences [of the Tractatus] serve as a sort of metaphysical lure – first 
encouraging the reader to envision herself occupying an external standpoint 
and then, by inviting her fully to articulate the things she imagines she can 
say once she has occupied it, placing her in a position in which she can 
recognize that she is putting inconsistent pressures on her words and that no 
rendering of them will satisfy her. Thus the Tractatus delivers us from the 
illusion that we can do philosophy in a traditional vein through its 
presentation of nonsensical sentences which, to the extent that they seduce us, 
equip us to lead ourselves out of our state of illusion. (Crary & Read 2000, 
13) 
 
Now, many resolute readers would agree that this is the moral of the Tractatus, that 
its achievements amount to nothing more than this deliverance from philosophical 
illusion. I shall dissent from this latest assumption, as though I agree that that is indeed 
the key feature of the book, there is quite a lot more to it. And so my next step will be to 
show that nonsense is far from being all that one finds within the Tractatus, which is to 
say that one might be resolute about it and still preserve some of its insights. I do agree 
with Hacker that there is much that it has taught us (apart from what is arguably its main 
lesson, which Hacker himself fails to recognize) and I do not mind to be accused of 
irresoluteness in this respect. This, however, is something which can only be recognized 
after the ladder has been resolutely thrown away, i.e. after we have discarded that 
something like the picture theory was at all standing there. In addition, I shall argue that, 
ironically, someone who holds that all sentences of the Tractatus are nonsense will be in 
a way, even if unwittingly, making a step back towards a certain kind of substantial 
conception of nonsense.  
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My main point runs as follows: after throwing away the ladder, i.e. after recognizing 
the collapse of the picture theory, which was seemingly holding everything together while 
we were still under the illusion that, though most probably wrong in several respects, it 
made sense, there is no possible way of looking at the book as consisting of a sort of 
system anymore. Rather, what will remain after we recognize such collapse is, as in so 
many other of Wittgenstein’s writings, an immensely rich and stimulating collection on 
unsystematic philosophical remarks, each valuable on its own. This will also, for instance, 
exempt resolute readers such as Diamond or Conant from double-think accusations for 
using passages of the body of the book as support of some of their contentions. But is this 
then to say that the ladder is all but the picture theory, i.e. that only a part of the Tractatus 
is to be thrown away? Not quite. As paradoxical as it may sound at first, one can (in fact, 
one ought to do so) throw every single bit of the book away as part of the ladder and then 
recover a variety of its fragments afterwards. And so it could be said that a comprehensive 
reading of the Tractatus should essentially consist of three main stages: (1) Imaginatively 
reading it as a system (the picture theory being the core of the system), (2) throwing away 
the ladder, i.e. seeing the picture theory collapse into nothingness and so seeing the whole 
system tumbling down, (3) going through the system’s wrecks, after the picture theory 
has vanished, looking for what may nevertheless remain. 
After our attempts to account for how one may go through stages (1) and (2), it is 
now time to focus on stage (3), notably to contend that without it the process of reading 
the Tractatus shall most probably remain incomplete. This, however, is not to suggest 
that there can be such a thing as a complete, i.e. definitive reading of the book, as if 
discussions of it could ever be put to rest for once and for all, but simply a way of 
emphasizing the significance of this so often overlooked stage. And so I shall not in any 
way attempt to determine exactly what remains after the ladder is thrown away, but only 
provide a few examples to give us an idea of the kind of thing one is supposed to do at 
this stage. There will, of course, be disagreements among readers about what remains and 
what one is supposed to do with it: some will contend that nothing remains, others may, 
for instance, want to preserve logical insights or a certain conception of philosophy, 
others, even, the saying-showing distinction, others all this and more, and so on. 
Nonetheless, that one engages into this sort of discussion is an indication that, even if 
unaware of it, he is already at stage (3), though the process of going through these three 
stages may not necessarily be a linear one: given the nature the book, it is quite 
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conceivable that one may keep on moving back and forth. I am thus largely in accord with 
Read and Deans when they write that reading the Tractatus should not: 
 
[…] put any limit on the liberating potential of the dialectical process that the 
reader begins when engaging with the text. It does not limit the philosophical 
problems that it treats, as if it were possible to have an overview of the text 
that is divorced from one’s own involvement with it. […] The overcoming 
goes on and on; there’s nowhere stable to stand and utter theses, no words 
that settle things. […] it is not possible to know when the dialectic at work in 
the Tractatus is finally exhausted […] it is not possible for readers to know 
or even rationally believe that they have been completely cured (for all time) 
from the confusions that philosophical problems generate. (Read and Deans 
2011, 164) 
 
The very idea that there could be such a thing as a linear progress of dissolving 
philosophical illusions such as that one could eventually reach a state of complete clarity, 
a view sometimes wrongly attributed to Wittgenstein, and for a time often labelled 
‘therapeutic positivism’, is itself a major illusion in need of overcoming. And so I must 
admit that while I am here writing these lines I am still very much involved in such 
dialectical process. It would thus be an illusion, too, to think that one could somehow 
finish the book and then recite what it contains, as is often done with major works of 
philosophy. What I am here trying to do is above all to invite the reader himself to engage 
in the process as I keep meandering through. This is in fact a method Wittgenstein 
practiced as well as anyone: when reading a text such as the Investigations one must be 
struck by his quasi-Socratic demeanour, never that of a master who solemnly addresses 
his disciples but of someone who walks the same paths as those he tries to lead out of 
conceptual entanglement, often allowing them to proceed on their own, every now and 
then suggesting some relevant clues, and on a few occasions interceding more 
vehemently; all this, of course, depending on the particular circumstances of the 
investigation at hand. And so what I am here trying to do is above all to point out possible 
ways, to draw attention to certain angles from which we might look profitably at things. 
But despite the aforementioned indeterminacy, the impossibility of definitely settling 
matters, one should not be taken by the exact opposite illusion to that of those who crave 
for theories and systems: from theories and systems being frail, perhaps even impossible, 
and quite possibly ill-advised (unless when treated as objects of comparison), it does not 
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by any means follow that all enquiry is aimless, that it is nothing but “a wild goose chase” 
(White 2011, 46).  
 
§ 26. Coming back to our preambular account of what I have called stage (3), we will 
finally say some more about the Tractatus’ metaphilosophical story, which in my view 
contains, as do the metalogical and ethical ones, a lot of valuable insights I am willing to 
preserve. But before let me explain how do we reach a stage where the book is recognized 
as a collection of remarks, not necessarily entrenched with each other. Someone like 
White, for instance, who argues for the possibility of keeping the Tractatus intact as a 
coherent system, observes, and I think correctly, that if one is to erect a line between 
frame and body, sense and nonsense, within the book, as most resolute readers have 
somehow tried, one ends up with “sentences whose status is utterly different jumbled 
randomly together: significant claims being apparently commented on by nonsense 
sentences and vice versa. The book is now radically disorganized, with the crucial 
methodological remarks appearing scattered without rhyme and reason” (White 2011, 48-
49). He then quotes what is arguably the most significant extract of the metaphilosophical 
story, which he takes to be intended as a continuous train of thought and so as evidence 
that “there are complex relations of dependence between propositions of the Tractatus 
that explain their position within the structure” (White 2011, 49): 
 
4.1 A proposition represents the existence or non-existence of states of affairs. 
4.11 The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or, the 
totality of the natural sciences). 
4.111 Philosophy is not a natural science. 
(The word “philosophy” must mean something, which stands above or 
below, but not alongside the natural sciences.) 
4.112 The aim of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. 
  Philosophy is not a [body of] doctrine, but an activity. 
  A work of philosophy consists essentially in elucidations. 
The result of philosophy is not “philosophical propositions”, but the 
clarification of propositions. 
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Philosophy is to make clear and sharply to delimit propositions which 
otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred.32 
 
This is how White paraphrases it: 
 
[E]very significant proposition is concerned with contingent matters of fact – 
which states of affairs exist and which do not – something that is the business 
of the natural sciences to find out. Hence if we are not to confuse the task of 
philosophy with something that is properly speaking the business of the 
natural sciences, we see that philosophy cannot be seen as having a domain 
of propositions that belong especially to it – since all propositions are the 
business of the natural scientist. Hence we have to see the philosophical task 
differently – as not establishing propositions at all, but as clarifying what is 
going on when people put forward propositions. (White 2011, 49) 
 
Now, if we are at all to follow White’s account of this particular passage, which I 
think is faithful enough in reproducing what Wittgenstein may have thought at the time 
(it is, for instance, compatible with a reading such as Kuusela’s), then all this has to be 
taken within an even larger train of thought (or at least what looks like one), which is that 
of the picture theory (or picture notation). Hence, if we imagine that the picture theory 
makes sense, even if false, 4.1, from which the remaining remarks seemingly follow, in 
its turn condenses a whole lot of premises about picturing the world, the logical form of 
reality, and so on. And so, if (and only if) the picture theory happened to make sense 
(which is not the case), this would have ran somewhat as follows: 
 
4.1 [According to the Tractarian account of the significant proposition, which 
amounts to the same as the outline of its canonical notation] A proposition 
represents the existence or non-existence of states of affairs. 
4.11 The totality of true propositions [according to that very account, i.e. 
propositions which are translatable into the notation] is the whole of 
natural science [which deals with the totality of facts]… 
4.111 Philosophy is not a natural science [as it is not concerned with discovering 
new information concerning matters of fact]… 
                                                          
32 This is White’s own translation of the passage. 
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4.112 The aim of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts [through 
logical analysis of propositions in terms of the notation]. 
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine [as, unlike the sciences, it does not 
have its own subject matter], but an activity [of logical analysis of 
language by means of a canonical notation]… 
The result of philosophy is not “philosophical propositions” [as, again, 
philosophy is not a sort of science], but the clarification of propositions [or 
elucidations, i.e. logical analyses which render propositions 
perspicuous]… 
Philosophy is to make clear and sharply to delimit propositions which 
otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred [and so determine what it 
really means to say such-and-such, drawing the limit between sense and 
nonsense, which corresponds to the limits of language – or thought]. 
 
But as we saw before this is all nonsense, nothing but an illusory train of thought, 
as the Tractarian account of the significant proposition, with the very aim of drawing the 
limit to thought (or the expression of thoughts, whatever), of determining what it really 
means to say such-and-such, is all but plain nonsense. With this in mind, some resolute 
readers will argue that, as the picture theory (or the outline of the picture notation, which 
in the end does not make any difference) virtually pervades the totality of the Tractatus, 
then the totality of the Tractatus is nonsense, that there is not a single ‘positive’ insight 
in it. All we have on this view is a ‘therapeutic’, to use their own word, employment of 
nonsense that frees us from illusion. This, however, is itself an illusion, for the resolute 
reader who holds that not a single bit of the ladder can be preserved is forced to hold that, 
even if some passages of the Tractatus appear to make sense (such as e.g. ‘Philosophy is 
not a body of doctrine, but an activity’) on their own, the fact that they are intertwined 
with nonsensical sentences implies that they are nonsense too, as there is no way to 
articulate them coherently with it. But this is mistaken, as it incurs in a confusion parallel 
to that of proponents of combinatorial (and so, substantial) nonsense: even if 
inadvertently, they are relying on the absurd idea that the whole text is nonsense because 
some of its sentences are. 
As we saw earlier, “although we can put together words so that they make no sense, 
there is no such thing as putting together words with a certain logical role in language, or 
with certain logical powers, so that on the account of these roles or these powers, the 
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whole is nonsense” (Diamond 1991, 91), and the exact same holds for sentences. To claim 
that an entire text is nonsense because some of its key sentences are so, and that somehow 
by a kind of magic touch these end up pervading everything else around, as a highly 
infectious virus, is yet another case of double-think. If we assume that these sentences are 
plain nonsense, all we can then say is that it is as if nothing at all was there, which means 
that the remaining sentences are, so to speak, to be found against a blank background, 
which therefore does not logically interfere with them. For these sentences there is simply 
no whole to fit there. They alone have their own micro-context, some larger than others, 
just like individual aphorisms, ready to be picked up and used in all sorts of related 
contexts alongside other meaningful expressions.  
And so, perhaps we could even say that there is a certain sense in which, against his 
own initial intentions, Wittgenstein did not exactly write the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, though that certainly appears to have been the case, but a considerably 
different book33, The Tractatus’ Wrecks, as we may call it. Or, better, Logico-
Philosophical Remarks. And in this ‘new’ book we find indeed very different remarks 
jumbled more or less randomly together, though there are nonetheless significant 
connections between them: for instance, none is meant to tell us something which we did 
not already know in a way or another; they serve at best as reminders of things we had 
somehow forgotten about. 
 
§ 27. The 4.1-4.112 sequence would now look different. 4.1 and 4.11 would have 
probably vanished, unless one is able to turn them around up to the point of not relying 
on absurd dogmas such as that of the picture theory or similar ones anymore: perhaps 4.1 
could be salvaged if taken as meaning simply ‘propositions describe the world, truly or 
falsely’ in its most ordinary sense; as for 4.11 it is at very best false, and so we have 
nothing to do with it – well, unless one is to take ‘natural science’ as nothing but ‘human 
experience’, in the broadest possible sense of ‘experience’, but then it would cease to 
make any sense to refer to it as natural science. As for the rest, what remains is a quite 
viable metaphilosophical view, which is compatible with that of Wittgenstein’s later 
writings. Let me try to paraphrase it. 
                                                          
33 On the other hand, it could be said that Wittgenstein did write the Tractatus but that what we have in our 




Philosophy is not a natural science (4.111) as it cannot yield doctrines or theories. 
There is a sense in which it may be misleading to say that it cannot be placed alongside 
the sciences, as this may suggest a view of philosophy as some kind of a privileged 
activity, a sort of examiner of every essential foundation or legislator of all kinds of 
discourse, capable, as it were, of rising above our everyday practices, but I do not think 
this is how we should take this remark. Rather, what it suggests is that it is a mistake to 
think of philosophy as a kind of pre-science or governess science; philosophy has no more 
connection with the sciences than it has with any other human activity, philosophy itself, 
being, of course, one of such activities. And also that philosophy does not really have its 
own subject matter, apart from, perhaps, that of its own methods, but virtually pervades 
every possible subject matter. For instance, one does not go about the philosophy of action 
in abstract, but through all sorts of examples of real or fictional people doing or trying to 
do certain things in such-and-such situations. Philosophy has, so to speak, to be filled with 
something in order to do anything at all, it cannot simply stand on its own wandering over 
chimeras, either waiting for science to attest or debunk such speculations or, on the 
contrary, claiming to be inspecting an independent realm of abstract essences. It is, of 
course, contiguous with science, as it is with anything else, say e.g. law, cookery, horse 
riding, architecture, gambling, and so on. 
In addition, gone the canonical notation or the commitment to a single method, the 
notion of logical clarification of thoughts becomes a harmless one: it is not anymore to 
be strictly taken as logical analysis of language (though logical analysis can still be one 
among various tools we might use), but as clarification broadly conceived, a matter of 
paying genuine attention to what we say and think, something for which sharp reasoning 
(or logical) capacities are most welcome. And so by paying such attention we hopefully 
make our minds clearer about a variety of things, i.e. we elucidate our thoughts. By 
thinking through all sorts of subjects, philosophy throws light into them along the way. 
Not being a body of doctrine, with its very own theses and truths, it can nevertheless 
contribute, above all by means of careful conceptual clarification (which can be done in 
numerous ways), to disclose truths, as well as falsities and confusions, virtually 
everywhere. This shall be made clearer through some sort of example. 
Let us think, for instance, of a notion such as that of meaning, and in particular of 
a question which has often been asked throughout the history of philosophy such as ‘What 
is the meaning of a word?’. Many have indeed thought that this is a question of paramount 
importance, for it has to be answered somehow if we are to understand the workings of 
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our language. Moreover, it has often been supposed that not only we need an answer to 
it, but that this answer has to come under the form of a theory, i.e. a theory of meaning. 
Countless theories have thus been developed, from representationalist to pragmatic ones, 
and so various answers have been provided. For instance, the meaning of a word is the 
object it stands for, some have said. Others, seemingly with more finesse, have observed 
that as many words do not stand for anything, such as connectives, or at least do not stand 
for anything in particular, such as certain wide ranging concepts, the meaning of a word 
is rather its use in language, which, among several others, can be that of standing for some 
object, as is the case with ordinary names. Many of these theories are extraordinarily 
sophisticated and would deserve to be discussed in detail, but I must leave this for another 
occasion. What I can do for now, though, is to point out that there seems to be something 
problematic about the very question lying behind such theories. 
J. L. Austin once remarked that, at least in the hands of certain philosophers, “the 
phrase ‘the meaning of a word’ is, in general, if not always, a dangerous nonsense-phrase” 
(Austin 1979, 56). Just as the use of ‘in general, if not always’ and ‘dangerous’ indicates, 
he takes it to be, as the earlier Ryle would have put it, a systematically misleading 
expression. Wittgenstein would have not disagreed. But, surely, few today would be 
misled by its grammatical form into thinking that ‘meaning’ consists of a name standing 
for something (some bizarre entity or class of entities) which in its turn would constitute 
a property of ‘a word’, i.e. that each word possesses a property entitled ‘meaning’. Rather, 
its misleadingness lies in its utmost generality, up to the point of abstractness. 
Confusion hence arises when philosophers decide to go beyond legitimate questions 
such as ‘What is the meaning of x?’, to which unproblematic answers can be given, and 
ask the aforementioned general question, which is equivalent of asking ‘What is the 
meaning of a word in general?’ or ‘What is the meaning of any word?’. Now, as a question 
of the ‘What is the meaning of x?’ form is answerable if and only if ‘x’ happens to be a 
particular word one is asking about, we have, as Austin calls it, a case of “the fallacy of 
asking about Nothing-in-particular, which is a practice deprived by the plain man, but by 
the philosopher called ‘generalizing’ and regarded with some complacency” (Austin 
1979, 58). Asking ‘What is the meaning of a word?’ is the same as asking ‘What is 
meaning?’, from the same species of nonsense questions such as ‘What is truth?’ (at least 
in any sense other than a theological one) or ‘What is being?’, and so on. Quite different 
would be to ask instead ‘What does the word ‘meaning’ [or ‘truth’, ‘being’, etc.] mean 
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[in such-and-such contexts]’, which are all legitimate questions as long as one does not 
crave for definitions of these terms. 
Having jettisoned our quest for definitions, which would have allowed abstract 
questions to return, we have to expect a different kind of answer to these questions, an 
answer that may not even count as an answer in the usual sense (Q: ‘What is X?’; A: ‘X 
is such-and-such’). Austin would say that we can either elucidate the meaning of e.g. 
‘meaning’ or ‘truth’ by giving examples of sentences where such terms could or could 
not occur or, analogously, by “getting the questioner to imagine, or even actually to 
experience situations” (Austin 1979, 57) which could be adequately described by means 
of sentences containing ‘x’ or akin words and also “other situations where we should not 
use these words” (ibid.). The later Wittgenstein would have answered in similar lines: 
look at how these words are being used, as well as to what is going on around them, and, 
if they are at all being used meaningfully, you will grasp what they mean. 
From this kind of observation, many have inferred that Wittgenstein was outlining 
some pragmatic theory of meaning, summarized by the following adagio: ‘meaning is 
use’. This is odd, given that Wittgenstein himself often reiterates that he is not putting 
forward any theory whatsoever, and that it could only be through some confusion about 
what one was doing that one could think of putting forward a philosophical theory, 
notably a theory of meaning. As I see it, the mistake here springs from the following 
philosophical prejudice: Wittgenstein is dealing with the question ‘What is the meaning 
of a word?’, a typical philosophical question; philosophers provide philosophical answers 
to these questions and so Wittgenstein, being a philosopher, is doing precisely that, in this 
case holding that the meaning of a word is its use in language. Sure, he is dealing with 
the question, i.e. doing something about it. He is not, however, doing what philosophers 
are supposed to do about such questions. 
“What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” 
(PI §116). Again, this may be seen as a rejection of a metaphysically charged theory of 
meaning such as the picture theory for the sake of a pragmatic one, a though-minded 
theory concerned with the ordinary use of words. The claim is more radical than that, 
though. For a pragmatic theory is still a philosophical theory, ‘meaning is use’ is still a 
statement of utmost generality, asserting an alleged necessary characteristic of language, 
and in it ‘meaning’ and ‘use’ are still being used metaphysically. It is not a truism such 
as, for instance, ‘language is an inherently intersubjective phenomena’, but a far from 
straightforward thesis. (“If someone were to advance theses in philosophy, it would never 
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be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree with them” (PI §128).) By 
bringing ‘What is the meaning of a word?’ back to its everyday use, what Wittgenstein 
was doing was to dissolve it as a philosophical question, i.e. a question standing in need 
for general and necessary explanations. 
When advising us to look for the uses of words instead of some odd property called 
‘meaning’, he was not putting forward any theoretical formulation implying an identity 
between use and meaning, but reminding us of a truism that certain speculative theories 
of language have tended to obscure: that if we are to understand what a word (or string of 
words) means (and taking ‘meaning’ in a most ordinary sense) we should better pay 
attention to how it is being used in the given situation. He was above all exposing a 
particular misorientation in perspective and providing the right clues about where (and, 
with some further elaboration, how) to look if we are to understand that such-and-such 
means thus-and-so, i.e. at language at work in our everyday lives, not at some lifeless, as 
it were, and hence distorting allegedly all-encompassing theory. And with this, he was 
hopefully achieving some clarification of our thought and talk about meaning, which 
might have otherwise been muddled by our deceptive fascination with working-models, 
or by our temptation to consider words such as ‘meaning’ or ‘truth’ apart from examples 
of, say, meaningful expressions or true or false sentences, as if we needed a glimpse from 
outside of them in order to check whether we were legitimately employing such terms or 
not.  
Of course, the whole issue cannot be put as abruptly as I have along these lines. 
Still, my purpose here was nothing more than that of providing some kind of illustration, 
complementing the previous sketch, of the sort of outcome, the sort of clarification, one 
is supposed to achieve when doing philosophy in the way implied by the description 
‘philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but an activity’ when salvaged from the 
requirements of an ideal language. 
 
§ 28. Back in the aforementioned obituary, Ryle, who had been well aware of how central 
the metaphilosophical story was to the Tractatus, emphasizes that, though having 
concluded that “we cannot talk sense about the sense that we talk” (Ryle 2009, 273) and 
that it is thus impossible to construct a theory establishing the conditions of senseful talk, 
Wittgenstein still seemed to hold that philosophy could somehow open our eyes to the 
principles which govern sense but cannot be intelligibly stated, and so that “like learning 
music or tennis, learning philosophy does not result in our being able to tell what we have 
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learned; though, as in music and tennis, we can show what we have learned” (Ryle 2009, 
262; my emphases). Despite seemingly following a standard reading in this ascription of 
a belief in ineffable principles, Ryle also manifests some signs or resoluteness in rejecting 
that the Tractatus may be seen as putting forward any doctrines or theses, effable or 
ineffable, as these ought to be meaningfully stated in order to count as such. The case is 
made even more interesting when comparing this view of the Tractatus with what he then 
writes about the Investigations. 
About the later works, he observes that, though Wittgenstein now explored “all the 
things that all of us say” (Ryle 2009, 264), not only what seemed to fit the narrow rubrics 
of his notation, and was no longer convinced that philosophers were condemned to trying 
to say the unsayable, he avoided to do what most philosophers did, i.e. to propound 
general claims about the world, language, logic, and so on, as he now saw them as, 
typically, if not always, resulting in unclarifications, and that despite such changes his 
chief problem was still “that of the nature, tasks and methods of the philosophical 
activity” (ibid.). I quote a couple of subsequent passages, both summarizing some of these 
methods:  
 
Wittgenstein would rove, apparently aimlessly because without any statement 
of aim, from one concrete puzzle to its brothers, its cousins, its parents and 
its associates, demonstrating both what makes them puzzling and how to 
resolve them – demonstrating but not telling; going through the moves; but 
not compiling a manual of them; teaching a skill, not dictating a doctrine. 
(ibid.; my emphases) 
 
He then compares one of such strategies to tea tasting (and he could have equally 
used the example of wine tasting, chocolate tasting, art criticism, and many other 
activities that require fine distinctions). Similarly to tea tasters, who do not place their 
samples under a couple of general categories but rather “savour each sample and try to 
place it next door to its closest neighbours […] along the lengths of various lines of 
qualities” (Ryle 2009, 265): 
 
Wittgenstein would exhibit the characteristic manner of working of a 
particular expression progressively diverging from it in various respects and 
directions. He would show how striking similarities may go with important 
but ordinarily unremarked differences, and how we are tempted to lean too 
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heavily on their similarities and hence to be tripped up by their latent 
differences. (ibid.) 
 
An enormous amount of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is condensed in this text of 
Ryle. And perhaps the most striking thing about it is that, despite the contrast drawn 
between the Tractatus and the later writings, it also suggests often neglected continuities. 
First, both are said not to consist of philosophical doctrines: for the early Wittgenstein, 
because such doctrines were nonsensical, as their formulations could not fit his notation; 
for the later, because they were usually obscuring, to say the least (their ruthless craving 
for generality leads them away from countless relevant particularities, like the ones that 
the aforementioned subtle distinctions seek to bring into focus). Second, with the tennis 
and music practice analogy, he is alluding to the saying-showing distinction, but most of 
what he says about it seems to hold equally for the Investigations, as the remark 
‘demonstrating but not telling’ indicates: there, we see Wittgenstein himself often in the 
position of the music teacher or the tennis coach, teaching certain skills through various 
procedures, including, of course, demonstrations of how to do such-and-such, and the 
claim that it is while doing philosophy that we see what we need to see seems now, with 
the reference to his wanderings in search of elucidation, made even clearer. 
If Ryle is right, then, the two contrasted scenarios, both with metaphilosophical 
concerns at their heart, have more in common than is generally supposed. The tea tasting 
method can work the other way around as well: exposing that some striking differences 
may go with important but ordinarily unremarked similarities, and that by leaning too 
heavily on the differences we often forget about the similarities and are thus deceived 
about the whole. It seems to me that this sort of mistake has been frequent among 
Wittgenstein’s readers in what concerns how the Tractatus relates to the later writings. 
The absence of theoretical commitments already played a crucial role in the former, while 
there seems to be a sense in which the saying-showing distinction, though certainly not 
the one seemingly implied by a formulation as rigid as “What can be shown, cannot be 
said” (TLP 4.1212), survives in the latter as a key expression of Wittgenstein’s 
metaphilosophical views. Though he insists in the Investigations that it is an illusion to 
think that there is something out there that cannot be said (resolute readers would hold 
the same about the Tractatus), or at least that there is nothing to be said about what may 
strike us as unsayable, as is the case with e.g. sense data (I cannot describe what I 
experience when I see yellow, but it should be clear that that is only so because there is 
nothing to be described there), his whole approach unmistakably suggests that in 
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philosophy, just as in music or tennis, some things are made clearer when shown, when 
attention is drawn to them in certain ways. 
Some readers, notably those used to little more than regular exposition and 
argument, are puzzled by this, if not suspicious of it, regarding it as an obstacle to the 
clarity and rigour one would desire when doing philosophy. We may, for instance, 
consider a straightforward distinction such as that between a statement or a question and 
what is shown by this statement or question: e.g. to utter with a certain tone of voice ‘I 
need some water to drink’ shows that the speaker is thirsty, or to ask ‘Where is the dining 
room?’ shows that he is not yet familiar with that place. But because one could have 
equally said ‘I am thirsty’ or ‘I do not know this place very well’ without any difficulty, 
Wittgenstein’s methodological options, often inseparable from matters of composition, 
may at first seem puzzling. The following question hence arises: if complete clarity is 
what we are looking for, wouldn’t it be more effective to go straight to the point and say 
it without hesitation?  
However, if we think of activities where certain abilities (or techniques) are taught, 
we soon realize how crucial a role demonstration (in the sense of ‘showing how’) plays 
within them. This is not to say that it is impossible to offer comprehensive verbal 
descriptions of e.g. how to play a scale on a piano or of how to serve in tennis, but consider 
how unpractical, if not altogether unmanageable, it would be to follow a teaching method 
solely based on descriptions. If Wittgenstein’s continuous insistence that philosophy is a 
practice, an activity contiguous with so many others, that it is by doing it that we come to 
understand what matters to it, and that it is an illusion to think otherwise, is taken seriously 
enough we should soon find out how to deal with the previous question. Just think of what 
it is for a piano teacher or a tennis coach to convey his instructions in a clear way and in 
what we mean by ‘going straight to the point’ in the context of tennis or piano lessons. In 
most cases, the clearest possible way would consist of showing (which, of course, may 
also involve saying certain things along the way) how to do it and let the apprentice try 
each step out, often here and there providing further instructions, until he is able to do it 
by himself. 
Indeed, if philosophy is seen as consisting not of a body of theoretical knowledge 
but of an activity meant to deal with certain kinds of perplexity in virtually every area of 
knowledge, it should thus not surprise us that to learn to do philosophy should above all 
consist in learning a variety of techniques, not a particular set of information: to deal with 
philosophical perplexity in any given subject presupposes knowledge of that subject but 
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that itself is not yet part of philosophy; rather, philosophy consists of knowing how to 
deal with such perplexity. Of course, there can be philosophy textbooks, just as there are 
music or tennis textbooks: sets of instructions on how to deal with certain philosophical 
problems. But (1) just as in music or tennis, or, say, sculpture or chess (and, of course, 
logic or mathematics too), knowledge of the information contained in a textbook is on its 
own worthless without intensive practice, at least if what we look for is to reach a certain 
standard of proficiency at doing such things; (2) the variety of things that we end up doing 
in practice is such, especially at higher levels, that it would be virtually impossible to 
make it all fit into a textbook (not impossible in principle, but a rather herculean and not 
necessarily useful task); and (3) as, unlike the aforementioned activities, philosophy does 
not have fixed subjects, one will usually have to develop new methods or at least 
variations of pre-conceived ones given the particular subjects (where, usually out of some 
conceptual confusion, Wittgenstein would say, a certain problem arises) one encounters 
along the way. 
This is what I meant earlier when saying that in philosophy, at least when 
considered from a Wittgensteinian point of view, knowing how is ultimately irreducible 
to knowing that, in the sense of not being wholly translatable into a theoretical body of 
knowledge, which is also to say that there is in fact a sense in which showing is not quite 
reducible to saying34 either, though certainly not implying the existence of something 
ineffable. And, in the end, saying and showing should not really be considered as the 
opposed units of any dichotomy but as complementary instead, as clearly comes out when 
we pay attention to what goes on in our everyday activities. Just think, again, of music or 
tennis lessons, or of our uses of nonsense or metaphor, somewhere in between our 
assertions and gestures. This should all be humdrum, a mere description of what goes on 
all the time. 
We have reached an important point: Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy, to which the 
saying-showing distinction – or, rather, the saying-showing symbiosis – is key, is itself 
elucidatory of his later views on the very nature of language and action, at which he 
constantly hints but never quite explicitly formulates, i.e. that language and action are not 
only interdependent but ultimately indissociable (that, at least, there is no sharp boundary 
between them). Now, this sounds like a philosophical thesis. Maybe it is one. But let me 
put it in another way, perhaps clearer: speaking is one of the many things that we do. 
                                                          
34 That is what Wittgenstein had in mind with the following remark from MS 169: “The experience is this 
passage played like this (that is, as I am demonstrating, for instance; a description could only hint at it). 
(Wittgenstein 2009, 192). 
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Usually we speak in order to communicate and, when we communicate, speaking is not 
the only thing that we do (there is also the tone of voice, facial expressions, bodily 
movements, gestures, and so on, which are all contiguous to talk and play their part in 
communication). Surely, this is, again, a humdrum description. It does, nevertheless, 
paraphrase the preceding claim and make its truth manifest, a claim which goes against 
numerous contemporary theories in which language is treated as a somewhat self-
sufficient structure (and so linguistics or the philosophy of language are treated as 
autonomous fields). And it seems to me, for instance, compatible with one of the 
Investigations’ most controversial metaphilosophical remarks: “Philosophy just puts 
everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – Since everything lies 
open to view, there is nothing to explain. For whatever may be hidden is of no interest to 
us” (PI §126). It is indeed something which lies open to view, and that perhaps may have 
gone unnoticed to the eyes of some because they went chasing for some purportedly 
hidden necessities of language, something that could somehow justify it theoretically, as 
if it stood in need of any justification whatsoever.  
 
§ 29. Consideration of Ryle’s own metaphilosophical views, well aware of and to a large 
extent sympathetic towards Wittgenstein’s, may contribute to complement the present 
sketch: 
 
Philosophers do not make known matters of fact which were unknown before. 
The sense in which they throw light is that they make clear what was unclear 
before, or make obvious things which were previously in a muddle. […] 
Something that was obscure becomes obvious to me in the act of seeing the 
force of a particular philosophical argument. Nor can I make a short cut to 
that clarification by perusing the conclusions but skipping the reasoning of 
the argument. (Ryle 2009, 174) 
 
Nothing here collides with Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy (in fact, it almost 
paraphrases the 4.111-4.112 sequence), except perhaps the stress laid on the notion of 
argument. Now, it does not seem to be the case that Wittgenstein had anything against 
philosophical argument per se. Despite its considerable idiosyncrasies, some of his 
strategies can indeed be taken as arguments in the traditional sense and it should not be 
overlooked how rigorous a thinker he was. But he seemed to think standard arguments 
like those exchanged by most mainstream analytic philosophers were at best insufficient 
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(they could complement other techniques but were probably not enough on their own), 
and misleading at worse. What was then their disadvantage in some cases when compared 
with demonstrations, purposeful wanderings, fine comparisons and distinctions, or 
elucidatory tales? I can think of two, which, again, are intimately connected with his view 
of philosophy as an activity. 
(1) A more straightforward one has to do with the fact that most genuine arguments, 
independently of their form and variety of steps, have an explicitly formulated conclusion. 
As Ryle stresses, such conclusion can only be grasped by following the full course of 
reasoning that led to it (or at least alternative but equally sound ones). However, when a 
conclusion is made explicit one can always make short cuts and thus be under an illusion 
of understanding; just think of how often people dogmatically replicate conclusions or 
maybe a couple of the argument’s steps without the slightest awareness of the whole 
argument itself. As Ryle observes, many “histories of philosophy are worthless just 
because they think that, for example, Hume’s philosophy can be presented […] by 
cataloguing his conclusions” (Ryle 2009, 172). Wittgenstein did not want to make any 
concessions towards that: one who follows his lines of thought might be given all the 
relevant clues but still has to figure out the conclusions by himself. He leads us through 
his often unusual steps until what matters is in front of us but does not tell us directly 
what it is, though providing us the instructions for understanding it.  
We can here find another parallel with activities such as music or tennis, i.e. for one 
to be able to have his own thoughts in philosophy is not far away from being able to play 
piano pieces sensitively or competing in tennis: the teacher’s role was important, at times 
even essential, but it cannot work without a minimum of ability and willingness on the 
apprentice’s side; there will always be occasions when the latter, while relying on 
everything he has learned from the former, will have to keep going on his own, and the 
more he progresses the more likely it will be for these occasions to recur. Again, just as 
it does not by any means follow that a person can play tennis by knowing all the passages 
of a tennis textbook by heart, neither does it follow from someone being able to memorize 
and replicate every single sentence of an intricate philosophical system that that person is 
at all a capable thinker. 
(2) It happens that many philosophical arguments, even seemingly logically sound 
ones, are abstract, i.e. the reference of some of its key notions is unclear (if not 
inscrutable), as is the case in metaphysics. And as we saw when trying to argue against 
Russell’s realism or Bradley’s idealism, one can easily end up falling into the same kind 
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of empty (though often very interesting) chatter. Still under the illusion that these 
arguments make sense, one can have the impression of detecting formal flaws within them 
and of arguing for their incoherence, but even then there is no way to tell how close they 
are from being right or wrong apart from purely formal matters. And when we realize that 
their utterers have failed to ascribe meaning to those mysterious terms that kept us 
guessing (and gassing), a further difficulty arises: it may then appear that we would have 
to outline a limit of significant talk and that such task would require us to step outside of 
that limit, a paradoxical situation analogous to that of the Tractatus. And that is once 
again to say that if we try to fight nonsense directly we will most probably end up 
producing more nonsense. But, as we have seen, there are cases where, given our ordinary 
understanding capacities, we can legitimately recognize that a certain sentence, argument 
or text fails to make sense. Not without seeing why that is the case, though, which often 
requires us to look at them from an angle different from that of standard argument, either 
by getting our feet out of our metaphysician boots or by putting them on with an 
alternative purpose. I have been trying to illustrate this throughout our entire discussion. 
For instance, there is a sense in which it can be said that, though not by means of 
any theoretical foundation, the Tractatus succeeds in setting the bounds of sense, or at 
least in making us aware of them. ‘Setting’ may be a misleading word, as what is here at 
stake is not the establishment of such bounds: the Tractatus does not draw them, not even 
gestures at them; these, again, would have been illusions, as there is no such thing to be 
drawn or gestured at. Rather, what it does is, by way of letting us engage imaginatively 
with nonsense until we come to recognize it as so, to let us feel them, as it were, to lead 
us into direct acquaintance with this dark area of language (metaphors being the grey 
one), that though having the physiognomy of language may not quite consist of language 
anymore, at least if we are to keep away from any murky psychological grounds. The 
‘bounds of sense’ are not something, i.e. they are nothing but a particular way of talking, 
and a transitional one, the same going for all those expressions found throughout the book 
such as ‘limits of language’, ‘limits of thought’, ‘limits of logic’, ‘limits of the world’, 
and so on. These are nevertheless expressive of our virtually irredeemable temptation to 
utter nonsense, notably when we become self-aware of that temptation and try to report 
it. We try to gesture at it, though in vain, as there is nothing to be gestured at, no imaginary 
line floating somewhere that we often, most of the time unwittingly, end up crossing. But 
when meeting others that have already felt the same, we may end up feeling validated: 
‘Yes, I see what you mean by that!’ 
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And what is it then, that which you mean? Nothing but the particular feeling, or 
experience, like that of a dream, of having been under an illusion, of having felt our feet 
somehow rising above the rough ground where we all stand, including the very illusion 
of having, with it, crossed a boundary of some kind. There is no way to tell where the 
grey area ends and the dark one begins (still talking transitionally), but what we can be 
sure is to have felt as if we had in some way reached it, even that we had been talking 
from there (the dark area and the external standpoint, both illusory, are one and the same). 
But then we come to see that though the noises we had been making sounded (or looked) 
like words, we had not said anything. And that is what I mean by feeling the bounds of 
sense – or of logic, of the world, and so on, as, though differing in physiognomy, these 
all amount to the same, i.e. they all aim, through the arousal of different psychological 
associations, at this same feeling springing from the recognition of an illusion. Again, to 
request silence would be misleading, as it may seem to imply that the point consists in 
there being prescribed limits to what can be said. There are no such limits. Rather, what 
we came to see is that when presumably occupying the external standpoint we had not 
been doing anything that counts as saying something – well, at least if we equate ‘saying’ 
with ‘sense’, and take ‘sense’ in a strictly logical sense. 
 
§ 30. To round off our discussion let us consider three statements from among the 
Tractatus’ wrecks which I definitely believe to be of value: (1) Logical connectives are 
not representative (the self-proclaimed fundamental metalogical idea of the Tractatus, the 
key for understanding logic’s purely formal nature); (2) Scepticism is not irrefutable, but 
obviously nonsensical (a defining position of Wittgenstein’s entire philosophy35); (3) 
Ethics is transcendental (the ethical story’s key point). They all seem to me to be true. 
And, surely, they are philosophical positions. So, though not necessarily theoretically 
grounded, Wittgenstein did put forward some theses here and there. But notice that they 
are all negative theses – even (3), though its formulation may at first deceive us – and not 
negative theses of the kind of e.g. ‘The Sun does not go round the Earth’, which negates 
a piece of information. They are true in the same way ‘“Someone” is not the name of 
                                                          
35 “Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions 
can be asked” (TLP 6.51).The struggle against scepticism was indeed constant throughout Wittgenstein’s 
work, running from the Tractatus to his very final writings published under the title On Certainty, whose 
second fragment reads as follows: “From its seeming to me – or to everyone – to be so, it doesn’t follow 
that it is so. What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it” (OC §2). We have thus moved from 
a bold pronouncement such as that of the Tractatus to a much subtler suggestion (which itself says a lot 
about the gradual shift in Wittgenstein’s tone), but the point underlying both of them is exactly the same. 
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someone’ is, and hence compatible with the insistence that there can be no such thing as 
philosophical truths, i.e. ‘truths’ amounting to philosophical information. Nothing but 
confusions are being tackled, in this case that logic or ethics are fields of knowledge, or 
that scepticism makes sense. We need to trust Wittgenstein more than we do: there is, if 
we read him carefully enough, no real clash between his metaphilosophical views and 
how he goes about philosophical problems. 
Nevertheless, even if all one does amounts to clearing up confusions and negating 
falsities, there will always be some additional light thrown as a consequence of it. That is 
to say that even if Wittgenstein refuses to explicitly put forward any sort of positive thesis, 
he ends up doing so through what is often implicitly implied by his negative moves. But, 
again, this does not necessarily clash with his metaphilosophical views, as the only thing 
he denies is to advance them – if what he does leads us to see something more is quite 
another matter, one which he leaves open. For instance, I cannot usually know what my 
mother is going to cook for dinner based on a list of things she did not buy, but if I know 
the kinds of things she usually buys this list serves me as a relevant clue. Moreover, if the 
list is exhaustive enough and I also know the kinds of things one is to find at the market 
where she goes, I may get very close of knowing what she is going to cook. With a little 
bit of luck (or, perhaps, patience) I may even get it altogether right.  
Negative theology is somewhat akin to this and Wittgenstein’s philosophy often 
works like it too. The further his ground cleaning advances, the more light is thrown over 
it and eventually, out of a potential Übersicht resulting from his assemblages of 
reminders, we may end up seeing it – or at least some of its parts – as we had never quite 
seen it before36. When confronted with this, he would probably maintain that what was 
being illuminated amounted to nothing but truisms. And perhaps he is right, but then we 
become in danger of taking everything he leads us to see as a truism and so everything he 
contradicts or dissolves as either patently false or nonsensical (and so taking him to be 
right all the time – in fact, not only right, but obviously right), which would be as wicked 
a case of dogmatism as one could fall into, a most unreasonable (and unwittgensteinian) 
thing to do. He would have himself been horrified at the idea of an order of dogmatic 
followers. The very idea of there being followers of his ideas is problematic. According 
to Anscombe there could not even be such a thing:  
 
                                                          
36 Still, this is not to say that, at least for Wittgenstein, philosophy can discover something which is new, 
even if indirectly, in the sense science does: rather, it can uncover what we ourselves had somehow covered. 
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I once heard someone ask Wittgenstein what it all came to, what was, so to 
speak, the upshot of the philosophy he was teaching in the 1940s. He did not 
answer. I am disposed to think that there wasn’t a single answer that he could 
give. That, namely, he did not think out a total position as in writing his first 
book; that, rather, he was constantly enquiring; some things he was pretty sure 
of, but much was in a state of enquiry. I therefore deprecate attempts to 
expound Wittgenstein’s thoughts as a finished thing. He himself in his classes 
sometimes said he was as it were giving examples of ‘five-finger exercises’ 
in thinking. These were certainly not limited in number like the set a piano 
teacher might employ, and were not like automatic formulae of investigation. 
Predictions of ‘what Wittgenstein would say’ about some question one 
thought of were never correct. (Anscombe 2011, 169) 
 
I make most of her words my own. Except that I am inclined to say almost the same 
about the Tractatus. He may have then thought out of a total position, so confident had 
he been about the powers of his notation. But, as we have seen, that turned out to be an 
illusion. So I myself deprecate attempts to expound the Tractatus as a finished thing. It 
stands there inviting us to enter the kind of process I have been here going through. In 
fact, the very idea of looking at things out of a total position, from which the temptation 
of treating them as something definitive arises, is arguably the queen of all illusions. And 
that it is such an illusion is arguably one of the greatest lessons Wittgenstein has taught 
us.  
We have, however, and quite evidently in front of us, his metaphilosophical legacy: 
though it is often hard to tell exactly where he was going (and, as Anscombe suggests, 
sometimes he himself was not sure), it is more or less clear how he was going about. He 
often held that philosophical questions had to be dissolved, not answered. I shall not 
discuss this here, but what I can say for now is that there must have been at least one that 
could somehow be answered: How to do philosophy? In fact, to that he could more or 
less answer if pressed, though often with analogies or metaphors such as that of the five-
finger exercises. And above all he showed us, throughout the whole of his writings, a very 
viable answer indeed. Predictions of ‘what Wittgenstein would do’ about some question 
one thought of may not be as aimless. 
As for the three abovementioned statements, on which he barely changed his views 
throughout his work, they count among the things he was pretty sure of. It is true that, on 
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his later days, he may have found them slightly too emphatically stated and suggestive of 
an air of doctrinarism, common among philosophers, which he found unacceptable. And, 
indeed, if one is being as honest and as less dogmatic as possible, it is most probably not 
enough to claim, without further ado, that e.g. logic is purely formal and so gives us no 
information about the world whatsoever, that most varieties of epistemic or normative 
scepticism are absurd, or that ethics is not to be derived from rationality and so its 
foundations cannot be the subject of inquiry or argument.  
As Wittgenstein rightly saw, it is often the case that the best way to explain such 
things is, rather than trying to give a systematic and critical account of what logic, 
scepticism or ethics may be, to let one engage in the activity, to guide him through a series 
of situations and practices that should eventually increase his self-awareness about them. 
For instance, that we think through logic and so that we cannot quite grab it, just as we 
do not grab numbers but calculate by them. Or to let him experience sceptical positions, 
help him see that they lead to nowhere, as scepticism is still a case of one envisaging 
himself as occupying a sideways-on perspective, and teach him how to stay away from 
these aimless roads. And in the case of ethics, to let him face certain unsolvable moral 
dilemmas, to engage in vacuous metaethical discussions, and so on, once again as a way 
of coming into touch with the bounds of sense and hence realizing, among other things, 
that rational argument for or against e.g. our most fundamental principles of moral 
decency is impossible, as these stand beyond  (our)  decision or justification. This is far 
from saying that they are not firmly founded, though, quite the contrary – in fact, like e.g. 
the rules of inference, they may very well be too firmly founded for such discussions to 
take place37. Some may be inclined to ask: but where does their foundation lie, then? But, 
as Diamond recalls, this is not the kind of question we shall ever see Wittgenstein ask, let 
alone answer38. 
But after that, if one has understood what he wished to show about logic, scepticism, 
or ethics, there are no real problems with the original statements, though before they were 
no more than hints prompting us to follow some demonstration he was willing to 
undertake. That their points are made clearer by one having to go through the practice – 
not by presenting them in a theory – does not necessarily imply that they cannot be 
intelligibly conveyed and that by trying to do that one shall come out with nonsense all 
the time. (This is also to say that by now the Tractarian temptation to treat any non-
                                                          
37 Notice that ‘too firmly founded’ is itself a piece of nonsense framed by ‘they may very well be’. 
38 See “Realism and the Realistic Spirit” (1991). 
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constative use of language as nonsense should have well and truly vanished. Moreover, 
though we cannot give descriptions of logic, we can certainly give descriptions of the sort 
of things we do with logic, which is what we do all the time, even when we think we may 
be describing ‘it’.)What is important is to be well aware of what is being said – and done 
– and that itself might require a certain acquaintance with the activity we call philosophy. 
As a conclusion to his obituary Ryle remarked that Wittgenstein “made our 
generation of philosophers self-conscious of philosophy itself” (Ryle 2009, 266):  
 
“[His] demolition of the idea that philosophy is a sort of science has at least 
made us vigilant about our tools. We no longer try to use for our problems the 
methods of arguing which are the right ones for demonstrating theorems or 
establishing hypotheses. In particular we have learned to pay deliberate 
attention to what can and cannot be said” (ibid.).  
 
Ryle’s generation was indeed a golden one. However, if we look at what people are 
doing in most philosophy departments today, we shall see that, apart from some notable 
exceptions (living authors I have engaged with here being among such exceptions), 
Richard Rorty’s prediction has been largely fulfilled: “If “philosophy” comes to be 
viewed as continuous with science (as Quine wishes it to be) on the one hand and as 
continuous with poetry (as Heidegger and Derrida often suggest it is) on the other, then 
our descendants will be less concerned with questions about “the method of philosophy” 
or about “the nature of philosophical problems”” (Rorty 1992, 374). But, though Rorty 
was hoping that this would happen as a result of philosophers coming to understand that 
“neither “philosophy” nor “language” names anything unified” (ibid.) or that philosophy 
is no “special field of inquiry distinguished by a special method” (ibid.), the case is rather 
that metaphilosophical questions are less heard nowadays while the metaphilosophical 
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